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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE PRESIDING

ECHOSTAR SATELLITE CORP., et ) al., $\square$ ) )
Plaintiffs, )
vs. ) No. SACV 03-950 DOC
) Day 15, Volume IV
NDS GROUP PLC, et al., )
Defendants. )
$\qquad$ )

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Jury Trial<br>Santa Ana, California<br>Friday, May 2, 2008

Debbie Gale, CSR 9472, RPR
Federal Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
411 West 4th Street, Room 1-053
Santa Ana, California 92701
(714) 558-8141

EchoStar 2008-05-02 D15V4

APPEARANCES:

FOR PLAINTIFF ECHOSTAR SATELLITE CORPORATION, ET AL.:
T. WADE WELCH \& ASSOCIATES

BY: CHAD M. HAGAN
CHRISTINE D. WILLETTS
WADE WELCH
DAVID NOLL
Attorneys at Law
2401 Fountainview
Suite 700
Houston, Texas 77057
(713) 952-4334

FOR DEFENDANT NDS GROUP PLC, ET AL.:

O'MELVENY \& MYERS
BY: DARIN W. SNYDER
DAVID R. EBERHART
Attorneys at Law
275 Embarcadero Center West
Suite 2600
San Francisco, California 94111
(415) 984-8700
-and-
HOGAN \& HARTSON
BY: RICHARD L. STONE
KENNETH D. KLEIN
Attorneys at Law
1999 Avenue of the Stars
Suite 1400
Los Angeles, California 90067
(310) 785-4600

## ALSO PRESENT:

David Moskowitz
Dov Rubin

I N D E X

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SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA, FRIDAY, MAY 2, 2008 Day 15, Volume IV
(3:26 p.m.)
(Live reporter switch.)
(Previous proceedings reported by Jane Rule in Volume III.)

THE COURT: All right.

We're still on the record. All counsel are present.

And, Counsel, your Rule 50 motion, please.

MR. SNYDER: Thank you, Your Honor.
Three motions, and I'll present two of them and Mr. Stone will present the third.

First, defendants move for directed verdict on the you issue of disgorgement.

The written record indicates that there never was any contract between DirecTV and any of the plaintiffs -- in either of the plaintiffs in this case, EchoStar or NagraStar. Indeed, the only written agreement was between DirecTV and Kudelski SA, which is not a party to this case.

Further, the testimony of Mr. Kahn, who is the only person from DirecTV to have testified and was indeed the corporate designee of DirecTV on these issues, is that DirecTV did not have an agreement and would not have had an agreement with EchoStar or NagraStar. And he articulated
sound business reasons for that.

He would never have had any such agreement with EchoStar because it was a direct competitor and was not a conditional access provider. And he would not have had such an agreement with NagraStar because it was half owned by their primary competitor and thus would have required a disclosure and approval of a company controlled by a competitor for them to move forward technologically.

Mr. Kahn also articulated additional reasons internally within DirecTV indicating that they would not -they were not going to at that time replace their conditional access system.

Finally, Mr. Kahn testified in testimony that is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Dov Rubin that NDS was never informed of the competitors with whom DirecTV was communicating.

Thus, while I think the first two arguments are absolutely dispositive, even if the Court were to find that there was some possibility of an agreement between DirecTV and one of the plaintiffs, the evidence fails to indicate any connection or any possibility of a connection between NDS having a motive for interfering with EchoStar's conditional access system because they were not aware that DirecTV was even talking to the supplier of that conditional access system, Kudelski.

It is also Mr. Kahn's testimony that the status of that system, although a consideration, was not a primary consideration and, in fact, would not have changed their mind about with whom they would make their ultimate supplier contract.

THE COURT: And I thought I had expressed the opinion last evening that $I$ wanted to listen to Mr. Kudelski, since now he was apparently going to testify, to find out if there, in fact, was not such an awareness.

But let me turn to -- on the issue of disgorgement, then, to Mr. Hagan.

MR. HAGAN: Certainly, Your Honor.
First, I believe that a ruling on this is premature at this point, as the Court has already pointed out.

Second, even assuming that Mr. Kudelski was not to come testify, there is still sufficient evidence in the record to support our claim for disgorgement going to the jury. That claim comes under the California Penal Code.

And I would like to make a couple of points.
First, the separateness of entities is not a
relevant factor. The fact that DirecTV was in negotiations with NagraVision or Kudelski, which is a 50 percent owner of Plaintiff NagraStar, is not a relevant inquiry. The relevant inquiry is whether or not but for the defendants'
misconduct, which would be the acts underlying our California Penal Code claim, DirecTV would not have stayed with NDS as their encryption provider and would have switched to some other company, regardless of which company that would be.

The premise of disgorgement is punitive in nature, and in this particular instance, it's disgorgement of revenues, not profits. So the message to be sent by that portion of the statute is to punish the defendants for unlawful or improper conduct.

Second, Mr. Kahn's testimony is certainly not dispositive of the issue. As Mr. Snyder conceded, Mr. Kahn admitted during his cross-examination that the piracy of EchoStar's conditional access platform in the United States in 1998 and 1999 was a factor that was considered by DirecTV when they decided not to switch to NagraVision's conditional access technology.

Finally, Mr. Kahn's testimony certainly is not dispositive on the issue of whether or not NDS had knowledge of DirecTV's request to other CA providers.

Mr. Mordinson and Mr. Hasak and others have testified that NDS was fully aware of DirecTV's discontent in the 1997-1998 time frame and that they were considering looking at other vendors or other options to replace their CA technology.

One of those other viable options would necessarily be Nagra, which is the only other major competitor in the industry.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SNYDER: Could I respond to the first two of those points, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Let's make sure Mr. Hagan's done.
MR. SNYDER: Of course.

MR. HAGAN: So without waiving those arguments, Your Honor, I still believe that the Court should hear the testimony of Mr. Kudelski on Tuesday of next week before considering the ruling on this particular motion.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Snyder.
MR. SNYDER: Thank you, Your Honor.

The conversations that the Court has had with counsel on this issue recently -- and the Court has been very gracious with its time in thinking through these
issues -- have been in the context of the application of the
Last Overt Act Doctrine and whether the Court should allow
the plaintiffs to reach back beyond the statute of limitations.

Our motion for directed verdict is not focused on that issue. It is, instead, focused on the conditional assumption that if the Court were to allow the plaintiffs to reach back, they still would not be able to have the remedy
of disgorgement based on the DirecTV contract because of a failure of causation.

If DirecTV would have made the same decision
regardless of the allegation -- the alleged conduct charged by plaintiffs, then there is no disgorgement. This must be a "but for" causation. And that is why the first two points that Mr. Hagan raises, I think, are unfounded.

First, I think it would be -- I think it is almost nonsensical to suggest that the separateness of the entities is irrelevant. If that were accepted, the Court could be in the very peculiar situation -- or a series of courts could be in a peculiar situation of charging disgorgement to a variety of different plaintiffs, all based on the same conduct. Each plaintiff could come in and say but for some conduct, the contract would not have gone to the defendant; therefore, the defendant must disgorge their revenues to me, if there's always a question of what is the correct plaintiff. And in this circumstance there is no evidence of any communications, any contracts and certainly no "but for" contracts between DirecTV and the plaintiffs.

The second argument that Mr. Hagan makes is that Mr. Kahn's testimony allows them to proceed because he acknowledges that the state of piracy on EchoStar's system was a factor.

But I believe that Mr. Kahn's testimony was
equivocal -- unequivocal when he said that although it was a factor, it did not affect the decision. They would not have made the decision otherwise.

And so they can consider any variety of things. But unless the alleged conduct creates "but for" causation, the plaintiffs cannot get an award. And Mr. Kahn's testimony is going to be the only competent testimony on that subject because he is the only one from the contracting party who is uniquely in the position to decide where the contract is going to be awarded.

THE COURT: His name doesn't appear on any of the documents.

MR. SNYDER: Whether or not Dr. Kahn was a signatory to the letter or to the request for information, it is clear that it never proceeded to the request for proposal stage. There never was a contract. And he, as the person in charge of technical evaluation at DirecTV, would be in the position to say that from an engineering perspective, that option was not acceptable.

And I believe that was his testimony. And I believe he also testified to his position in the engineering organization at DirecTV.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Hagan.

MR. HAGAN: Yes, your Honor.

August 3rd of 1998, DirecTV sent out their request for information. That is Exhibit 1565. That is consistent with the testimony of a number of witnesses in both sides' presentations of their cases, that DirecTV was dissatisfied in the '98 time frame and they were shopping around. Exhibit 1565 is a request for information from DirecTV to Nagra.

Exhibit 1566, which was admitted through the testimony of Mr. Kahn -- Dr. Kahn, I apologize -- was dated March 31st of 1999. That is a signed study contract between Nagra and DirecTV.

Exhibit 1035, which was admitted into evidence through Dr. Kahn, is the proposal provided by Nagra to Kudelski, the Project Phoenix, or white paper.

And Exhibit 530 is an October 6, 1999 letter from DirecTV to Alan Guggenheim advising Nagra that DirecTV was not prepared to move forward with a swap of their conditional access technology.

Those documents, plus the testimony of a number of witnesses establishing the relevant timeline and the mental state of DirecTV and NDS and Nagra in the '98 and '99 time frame, is more than sufficient for this jury to conclude that but for the hack of Nagra's technology, DirecTV would have swapped to their system.

We're also going to hear from Andre Kudelski, who
was a principal participant in the negotiations between Nagra and DirecTV on the specific issue of whether or not they would swap to Nagra's CA technology.

Mr. Kudelski -- we also anticipate that Mr. Kudelski will testify about attending meetings with representatives from DirecTV. And that once he was advised from representatives of DirecTV that there was information published on the Internet demonstrating that the Nagra conditional access technology was compromised, including compromised DISH Network system in the United States, that was a controlling factor in DirecTV's decision not to switch to Nagra's technology.

THE COURT: And what's the reason that a lawsuit didn't occur in that period of time?

MR. HAGAN: At that time, Your Honor, we were not aware who was responsible for the hack of EchoStar's system or the publication of information related to EchoStar's system.

THE COURT: And Nipper, the 1998 posting of Nipper is simply a partial post. In other words, if it caused concern, it wasn't a complete breach of your security system.

MR. HAGAN: It was just enough --

THE COURT: It had some nuisance value, it had some problem, but it didn't cause eventual harm.

MR. HAGAN: That's correct. It was just enough for DirecTV to know that our system had been compromised. THE COURT: All right. The second issue for the Court after disgorgement.

MR. SNYDER: Can I make two more points on disgorgement, Your Honor? I will try very hard not to repeat myself.

First, although plaintiffs' counsel frequently invokes the word "Nagra," in this context that term has to be clarified. All these communications between DirecTV and Nagra are with NagraCard or NagraVision, a subsidiary of Kudelski. None of them, not one is with NagraStar, a party to this case.

Second, Your Honor, it is not consistent with the record to say that because of the piracy, DirecTV decided not to make a card swap. The process, according to the only evidence in the record, is that it ended much earlier than that.

Exhibit 530, which is in evidence, says that DirecTV is not even going to proceed to the request for proposal stage. They started with a request for information. The next step in the process, according to Dr. Kahn, would be a request for proposal which, if accepted, could potentially lead to a contract. Exhibit 530 makes clear they are not even going to that next
stage of a request for proposal.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hagan.
MR. HAGAN: Your Honor, subject to the testimony
that we anticipate receiving from Mr. Kudelski -- which
again $I$ reiterate $I$ do not think is necessary for us to
create a fact issue to go to the jury on disgorgement under
the California Penal Code -- I think that we have adequately
stated our position.
THE COURT: Okay. The second issue for purposes
of Rule 50.

MR. SNYDER: The second issue on which we move for directed verdict, Your Honor, is the statute of limitations. Early in this case the plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed as time-barred. Plaintiffs resurrected their case in part by alleging that their system was ultimately destroyed by postings in December 2000 on dr7 and PiratesDen.

During the course of this case, in testimony by Christophe Nicolas on behalf of Nagra, and David Kummer, who was in charge of the antipiracy for EchoStar, there was testimony about a post by someone named Nipper, using the alias Nipper, in November of 1990- -- I'm sorry, December of 1998. And that is in Exhibit 2008. Both of them testified that because that post used the code phrase starting with the word "Nipper," that they were aware at that time that
their code had been dumped, that it was in the hands of pirates, and that the changeover in their system was therefore inevitable.

And that is found in both the testimony of Mr. Nicolas and in the testimony of Mr. Kummer.

If that is true and their testimony is that they were aware of that post at the time, they were aware that in the hands of the pirates was the code which could only be obtained by extracting the EEPROM, then they knew at that time all of the damages that they now claim flowed from that information being in the hands of the pirates.

The only defense we have heard is that the plaintiffs were unaware of the identity of the poster at that time, which this Court has previously and correctly recognized is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.

THE COURT: But the response to that that I am anticipating and what's been argued to the Court historically is that a partial compromise of the system isn't the same as the eventual Nipper posting in December of 2000 which, in Tarnovsky's own words, created a hole that couldn't be closed.

MR. SNYDER: I believe, Your Honor, that the hole -- the testimony's been consistent from all of the technical experts, the hole is in the card. And so it's
whether or not pirates have access to that hole to create pirate devices.

And I believe it is true of Mr. Nicolas' testimony and Mr. Kummer's testimony that they knew that pirates were aware of how to get into the card once the secret phrase appeared on the Internet. Because the only way to get to that phrase was to have access to the EEPROM. Whether it was exploiting the buffer overflow vulnerability or by some other method, they knew at that time, it was their testimony, that the pirates had access to it, which meant that the code had been exposed and piracy could proceed.

THE COURT: Counsel on behalf of EchoStar.

MR. HAGAN: Certainly, Your Honor.

Two points. First, we have adequately briefed tolling under two theories, the Last Overt Act Doctrine which the Court is still determining what that applies to. I believe it's just going to be the California Penal Code claims. And also under RICO.

Under each one of those tolling theories, we are allowed --

THE COURT: Just a moment. I already handed down my ruling concerning the federal claims last evening.

MR. HAGAN: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HAGAN: The jury's allowed to consider
evidence of acts that occurred outside of the statute of limitations for purposes of RICO, predicate acts, as well as to determine whether or not it's more likely than not acts occurring within the statute of limitations can be attributed to the defendants.

In this particular case, one example of those acts would be the December 2000 postings on Mr. Menard's website and the PirateDen website under Nipper aliases.

Now, second, there is sufficient evidence to establish that those postings were made by Chris Tarnovsky. I don't think that is one of the issues being urged by the defendants' motion.

But the issue of whether or not the 1998 posting by Nipper, which is Exhibit 2008 -- the date of that is November 12, 1998 -- was the driving force behind the card swap.

Now, the defendants have raised the affirmative defense of mitigation: Failure to mitigate damages. They simply cannot have it both ways. They cannot argue on one hand that the plaintiffs failed to mitigate their damages by not doing ECM's or countermeasures or taking other appropriate action to diminish their damages as much as possible under the circumstances, and then on the second hand argue that that 1998 post was the driving force behind the swap.

The evidence that we've heard from Christopher Tarnovsky, including Exhibit No. 41 and Chris Dalla and Leo Dumov, was that the December 2000 Nipper posting was the significant event in EchoStar piracy that created a situation which could not be resolved without doing a global card swap.

There is sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that, as well as to conclude that the 1998 conduct and postings by Nipper, as well as the activities of Mr. Mordinson and Mr. Shkedy, are related to the December 2000 postings such that the Last Overt Act Doctrine would apply, as well as RICO predicate acts, which plaintiffs have alleged in their complaint.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Snyder.

MR. SNYDER: Thank you, Your Honor.

Regarding the first point, Mr. Hagan's argument applies only to those claims for which the Court has ruled it may reach -- they may reach back beyond the traditional statute of limitations.

That argument for tolling would not apply to the DMCA claims or the Communications Act claims for which they must have actionable conduct after the middle of 2000 -- and it varies slightly, depending on which of those claims you're referring to.

If the Court rules that the Last Overt Act

Doctrine applies to the Penal Code claims and that there is sufficient evidence for plaintiffs to go forward on a conspiracy theory with an overt act, a last overt act within the statute of limitations, I would agree that this evidence of their knowledge in November of 1998 would not completely bar the claim.

Similarly for RICO, if the Court found sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to go forward and a predicate act of either criminal copyright infringement or a violation of 1026, then $I$ also agree that this would not -- this argument would not apply to the RICO claim, although I do not believe that there's sufficient evidence of that.

But at a minimum, this argument would not apply to the Communications Act or DMCA claims because the Court has already ruled on the tolling as it relates to those -- I'm sorry, the argument would apply and directed verdict would be appropriate to those.

Plaintiffs' counsel's second argument is that although they were aware of the posting and they were aware that the code was in the hands of pirates, they were not aware of the extent of the damage, just as they were not aware at that time that Nipper was Mr. Tarnovsky. That argument, however, as a matter of law, is unavailing. If the plaintiff is aware of the damage, they need not be aware of the full extent of it for the statute of limitations to
be triggered.

And having changed their theory of the case from one that is based on their first notice occurring at the time of these postings to one that is based on having earlier evidence of postings allegedly by Chris Tarnovsky under the alias of Nipper, they now must live with the consequences of that decision, which is that they had an awareness in November of 1998 that triggered under the law the statute of limitations. And when they brought their claim in 2003, it was barred.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Hagan.
MR. HAGAN: Yes, Your Honor.
We are not seeking damages, nor are we alleging that the November 1998 Nipper posting was the cause of the card swap. Our argument, which has been consistent
throughout the course of this trial and pretrial motions, as
well as the dispositive motions fully briefed by the
parties, is that the significant posting is the

December 2000 Nipper posting. And but for that posting, plaintiffs would not have to have effectuated a card swap or had the lost profits that are associated with, at minimum, the hundred thousand pirate devices estimated in Mr. Tarnovsky's e-mail and the internal NDS document.

Second, with respect to time limitations, I think
that the Court has already addressed this in the jury instructions by including an instruction that advises the jury on when they can and when they cannot consider acts occurring outside the statute of limitations.

Finally, plaintiffs' damages, which consist of the card swap and whether or not that card swap relates to the 1998 Nipper posting or the December 2000 Nipper posting apparently is an issue of contention, which would mean that it's an issue of fact supported by evidence, at least on the December 2000 side and, if I understand Mr. Snyder's position, on the 1998 Nipper posting. And that is an issue of fact that must be resolved by the jury.

THE COURT: Mr. Snyder.
MR. SNYDER: Thank you, Your Honor.

I'm not going to repeat my previous arguments, but Mr. -- plaintiffs' counsel's response does indicate the need to -- if this motion for directed verdict is not granted, to adjust the jury instructions.

The time limitations that the Court has included in the jury instructions prepared to date are based on violations that occur within the relevant period. This motion is addressing a different aspect of the statute of limitations, which is whether or not plaintiffs' claim was timely brought. And if the claim was not timely brought, it does not preserve their ability to recover damages during
any period.

And if the motion is denied, we would then ask for an instruction and a question in the special verdict form asking the jury to determine at what point plaintiffs were sufficiently aware that they were on notice of their claim and thus, in whatever the proper legal language was, started the statute of limitations clock ticking.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Hagan.
MR. HAGAN: Your Honor, unless the Court feels the need for additional briefing on this issue, I think that we have covered the relevant points, the most important being this is a fact issue that must go to the jury for determination.

THE COURT: Okay. The third Rule 50 motion?

MR. STONE: Thank you, Your Honor.

This motion addresses the card swap damages, and it's actually being committed to a written brief that $I$ will file after argument for the Court's edification if it's helpful.

If the Court will recall in ruling on Motion in Limine No. 1, the Court warned that EchoStar has been advised that if it fails to present sufficient evidence concerning the card swap and warranty provisions, the Court is amenable to a directed verdict in this regard.

In essence, the Court was giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove that they took sufficiently reasonable steps to enforce and benefit from the warranty but were unsuccessful in getting Kudelski to comply.

Now that we've heard all the evidence, we know that the only evidence from Kudelski to date was from Christophe Nicolas, and he conceded -- in fact, emphasized -- that the card swap was a result of the system being so badly compromised from the December 2000 Internet postings that the Smart Cards had to be swapped. So the official Kudelski testimony and position in this case is that there was indeed a security breach.

THE COURT: Now, let me stop you for a moment. MR. STONE: Sure. THE COURT: I heard you're going to file a brief. MR. STONE: Yes, sir. THE COURT: When did you expect a response to be and also get this matter to the jury? In other words, I'm happy to accept your brief; but remember, I take my time with those. In other words, you file a brief, I'll read it, I'll respond. But I'm giving an option of response right back to the -- so be careful with that.

MR. STONE: I'll pass on the brief.

THE COURT: No, you don't have to.

MR. STONE: No. But you make sense.

THE COURT: I want to make sure my record's clear. I'm not chilling you. I'm just not going to get pushed into a box where I'm making decisions because of a time schedule by another party. This jury can go home for a week and come back the following Monday.

MR. STONE: I understand. I will waive the briefing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Because otherwise you have the option of responding on EchoStar's part, and I'll give you a couple days for it. Okay?

MR. STONE: Fair enough, Your Honor. I understand that.

THE COURT: So you're not chilled. If you submit the brief, then two more days for EchoStar to respond.

MR. STONE: I will not do so, Your Honor. I will simply argue it orally.

So the testimony from the only Kudelski witness was that there was a security breach; therefore, the warranty would apply. The testimony of Paul Orban, the only EchoStar witness to directly address this, was to the same effect, that the card swap was necessitated by a compromise of the system. Mr. Orban also admitted that the lower warranty price applies if there is a security breach. He also admitted these warranties were in effect in 2004 when the swap was done and that the warranties had never been
amended.

In light of that, there is absolutely no testimony that EchoStar so much as ever demanded compliance with the warranty. Mr. Ergen -- starting with Mr. Ergen -- testified that he never directed anyone to send a letter demanding a card swap, including authorizing a lawyer to do so. There is no letter or any other demand in the record for a card swap pursuant to the warranty. The warranty prices, Your Honor will recall, is the direct marginal manufacturing cost of Kudelski. That is the appropriate warranty price if a swap is necessitated by a security breach.

There has been absolutely no evidence put in of the direct marginal manufacturing costs, nor has any evidence been put in to excuse performance under the warranty.

So what we have is a warranty that clearly applies based on the undisputed testimony of the one Kudelski witness, Mr. Nicolas; the financial person from EchoStar who addressed this issue, Mr. Orban; and we have Mr. Ergan's testimony that no demand was made for the warranty. And no other witness has ever testified in this trial that a demand was made under those warranties pursuant to a security breach of the system.

So plaintiffs have failed to put in any of the evidence the Court invited in ruling on Motion in Limine

No. 1, either that the warranty did not apply, was not enforceable, or that there had been reasonable efforts to enforce it and seek the lower warranty price as described by Mr. Orban, which is the direct marginal manufacturing cost.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel on behalf of EchoStar, Mr. Hagan.

MR. HAGAN: Yes, Your Honor.
I would like to review their brief if that is a possibility, but just going off of Mr. Stone's urging this motion orally, I think there are two points that need to be raised.

First, whether or not EchoStar took diligent efforts to enforce a warranty, whether or not that warranty provision applied in the first instance, or whether or not the cost of the card swap cards was, in fact, a direct manufacturing marginal cost. That goes to the defendants' affirmative defense of mitigation. That does not abrogate plaintiffs' claims for the cost of the card swap. Even assuming that it did, there is sufficient evidence in the record that plaintiffs had an arms-length negotiation with representatives of Kudelski, and that evidence came through Mr. Jackson, Mr. Ergen and/or Mr. Orban, and that the decision was reached between the parties to purchase the card swap cards at a reduced rate. That rate was $\$ 7.50$ as opposed to $\$ 10$, which was the typical cost of Smart Cards at
that time.

In the event that the Court believes it is somehow plaintiffs' burden to prove direct manufacturing costs, Mr. Kudelski, I would imagine, could certainly address that issue. But it is our position that the burden or the onus is not on us. The defendants at no time in this case sought discovery on what the direct marginal costs were for these cards, and the evidence that is in the record -- inclusive of the testimony of Messrs. Jackson, Ergan, and Orban as well as the purchase orders of the Smart Cards that were used in the card swap -- established that the cost of those cards was $\$ 7.50$ as opposed to $\$ 10$, which was the cost of cards not subject to the card swap.

THE COURT: Mr. Stone.

MR. STONE: Actually, Mr. Ergen testified there would be a lower warranty price if there was a security breach. The only testimony about negotiations dealt with negotiations that are ongoing as this lawsuit progresses and involves a reduced price, actually a free card swap for 2008 and a restructuring of the business model.

There was no testimony about any negotiations related to the warranties that apply to this card swap, nor was there any evidence that Kudelski rejected or would reject any claim to apply the warranty price, and nor could there be, given the undisputed testimony of Mr. Nicolas that
the card swap was a result of the compromise of the system from the December 2000 postings, which could only be cured by a card swap, which was the definition of security breach within the warranty.

So nobody has provided any evidence to excuse plaintiffs' affirmative obligation -- and they do have the affirmative obligation -- to mitigate damages and seek the warranty price.

Defendants clearly met their burden by establishing that those warranties existed, that according to Mr. Orban they had not been amended, that there was a security breach that resulted in the card swap. Beyond that, it is plaintiffs' burden to establish, as the Court pointed out in ruling on Motion in Limine No. 1, a reason why that lower warranty price would not apply if indeed the card swap was necessitated by a security breach.

If the card swap was not as a result of the security breach, and that is why they did not avail themselves of the warranty, then they have no causation on the card swap damages at all because it must result from something other than a compromise from the December 2000 postings.

THE COURT: Mr. Hagan.

MR. HAGAN: First, it is plaintiffs' burden to
establish actual damages. We have done that. The
defendants have raised the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate. If they wish to argue to the jury that one component of that failure to mitigate damages was a failure to avail themselves of the specific warranty provision at issue, they are free to do so, and the jury is free to consider that in the event that the Court allows them to consider mitigation of damages for one or more of plaintiffs' claims.

It is the defendants' burden to establish that failure to mitigate affirmative defense, which would include failure to establish -- sorry -- which would include failure to take full advantage of the warranty provision.

Finally, there is sufficient evidence that plaintiffs mitigated their damages as evidenced by the purchase orders, which show a 25 percent reduction in the cost of the cards used for the card swap as opposed to the cost of the cards that were purchased outside of the card swap. That testimony came in through the purchase orders and through Mr. Orban and was supported by the testimony of Charlie Ergan and Mark Jackson and which will be further supported by the testimony of Mr. Andre Kudelski.

MR. STONE: Your Honor, all that testimony -which $I$ don't think states what counsel says -- but in any event, all that testimony would establish is that plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of the warranty, 'cause the
warranty is quite specific that the amount is the direct marginal manufacturing cost of Kudelski, which plaintiffs fail to put any evidence in the record of. And it is quite clear that the negotiations, whatever they were, had nothing to do with the warranty.

Moreover, failure to mitigate can and has been decided as a matter of law. One case, for example, is EEOC v. Farmer Brothers, 31 F.3d 891 at 906, Ninth Circuit 1994.

And again, it is the plaintiffs' affirmative obligation to mitigate their damages.

So on this record, it is clear, based on plaintiffs' own witnesses, that there was a security breach that allegedly resulted in the card swap, that the warranties applied and were not amended, and that the proper warranty price is the direct marginal manufacturing cost. That was the testimony of Mr. Nicolas and that of Mr. Orban.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Hagan.

MR. HAGAN: Your Honor, I believe that there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish plaintiffs have met their burden of proving actual damages. And to the extent that it is plaintiffs' affirmative burden to establish that they mitigated their damages, there's sufficient evidence of that as well through, among other
things, the purchase orders.

And unless the Court would like additional
briefing on this issue, $I$ think that the record is clear that this is a fact issue that goes to the jury and that goes to the defendants' affirmative defense of failure to mitigate and not plaintiffs' establishing the prima facie case in the first instance.

THE COURT: All right. I'll be back to you in a few moments or a few hours.

Let's go off the record.
(Brief pause in the proceedings.)
THE COURT: All right. Counsel, this is the Rule 50 motions brought by EchoStar.

MR. HAGAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

We wish to move for Rule 50 on three issues.

The first is the defendants' CUTSA claim, their only remaining counterclaim. They have failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence or offer any admissible evidence whatsoever on the issue of actual damages. They have provided no evidence of actual loss, out-of-pocket expenses, unjust enrichment to the plaintiffs, or reasonable royalty to the extent that would apply in this particular instance.

The Court already addressed this issue at the summary judgment stage.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Snyder, you were going to
look back in the record. We've looked back. We don't see any additional -- I want you to be satisfied.

MR. SNYDER: Thank you, Your Honor.

There was testimony by Mr. Dov Rubin regarding the damage to NDS if the documents he identified, the DirecTV materials, would be in the hands of a competitor.

He did not identify a specific dollar amount for that damage, nor do I believe that he is required to for the issue of damages to at least go to the jury.

Mr. Hasak also testified, although we do not yet have the transcript, that if the information taken from Mr. Adams' hard drive was in the hands of pirates or in the hands of a competitor, it would be damaging to NDS because it could expose their agents and internal security operations.

Again, Mr. Hasak did not identify a specific dollar amount, but $I$ do not believe that that is required for the issue of damages to go to the jury.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.
Your next issue, Counsel.

MR. HAGAN: Plaintiffs also move under Rule 50 for an order striking the defendants' affirmative defense of unclean hands as it relates to plaintiffs' claims. I know we have had several discussions off the record about this, Your Honor, but for purposes of preserving our record, we
move for Rule 50 on the grounds that the affirmative defense of unclean hands only applies if the relationship between the plaintiffs' alleged misconduct and the plaintiffs' harm is direct and not incidental.

There are several cases that address this issue. One citation for the record is Blain v. Doctors Company, 222 Cal.App. 2d, 1048 at Page 1063. It's 1990.

And the Unilogic case, which we have already briefed.

The defendants have failed to produce any evidence showing that plaintiffs' unclean hands, which relates to the alleged theft of these documents, is directly related to plaintiffs' claims or ability to recover for those claims against the defendants for hacking the security system, providing that information into the pirate community, or publishing that information on the Internet.

MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, allow me to supplement the briefing on this issue with only two points.

First, Mr. Alan Guggenheim testified that when he went to France and met with lawyers for Canal+ and four lawyers from EchoStar, they agreed that they would participate in a joint defense, thus creating an agreement among all of those parties to participate in this conduct and the related misconduct.

Second, plaintiffs proved the relationship, or at
least their claim about the relationship of this material to the allegations in this case, when they repeatedly questioned Mr. Hasak using as exhibits documents that were part of these stolen materials, including questioning him about operations in which NDS was participating.

I believe the other issues have all been identified in our briefing on the topic.

THE COURT: Counsel.

MR. HAGAN: That still doesn't have a direct relationship to the claims that plaintiffs have asserted, which is required under controlling law.

THE COURT: Counsel.
MR. SNYDER: I think, Your Honor, we may just have a disagreement of what "related to the conduct" means. The plaintiffs' conduct in hiring pirates, participating with them in the creation of materials that are proffered as evidence, purchasing stolen documents, purchasing -acquiring, whether or not directly or indirectly purchased, materials stolen from the defendant, and using that in the name -- all of that material and effort -- in the name of prosecuting a case is certainly related to the conduct at issue.

THE COURT: All right. Your third motion under Rule 50.

MR. HAGAN: Yes, Your Honor.

Plaintiffs' claims for disgorgement under the California Penal Code allow for disgorgement of revenues. We have met our burden of establishing revenues through numerous witnesses, most recently with Mr. Kahn today.

We would ask that the Court strike Exhibit 1597 and any testimony by Dov Rubin or any other representative of the defendants as to any costs that they believe offset the revenues.

The standard under the California Penal Code is not disgorgement of profits. If it was, that evidence may be relevant. Since it is not, it is not properly before the jury, and the jury should be instructed not to consider it.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, I don't think that Mr. Kahn testified about the revenues, although he did read from an exhibit. But with the fundamental -- I think the fundamental issue can be correctly stated; whether or not NDS has evidence of expenses related to DirecTV is relevant.

If the Court has decided that the standard under the Penal Code is disgorgement, then I would agree that DirecTV's -- I'm sorry -- NDS's expenses related to the DirecTV contract would not be deductible.

If, however, the Court finds that the standard under the Penal Code is the defendants' profits, which particularly in this context would seem far more appropriate
and reasonable, then this is certainly relevant and appropriate for the jury's consideration.

And I think that the plaintiffs' argument that disgorgement could apply in this context highlights the strain that they are putting on those Penal Code statutes. Those statutes, on their face, are directed to recovering either the revenue or profit that a pirate obtained by selling a pirate device to an end user.

There is no indication that the legislature ever contemplated that those statutes would apply to a situation where someone would argue that, as a result of some indirect participation in piracy, they had achieved a long-term contract and thus would have to disgorge hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue.

There are several steps of causation that are nowhere contemplated in the text of that statute, which appears on its face to be directly related to the sale of pirate devices.

THE COURT: Mr. Hagan.

MR. HAGAN: Yes, Your Honor.

I believe that the statute clearly says that
disgorgement is to revenues and not to profits, and so we would ask that the Court strike Exhibit 1597 and instruct the jury to disregard that as well as any testimony from any of the defendants' witnesses related to it.

And one thing that $I$ need to add to our first Rule 50 motion -- and that is there has been no evidence that Plaintiff EchoStar engaged in any wrongdoing to obtain what the defendants have mischaracterized as stolen documents. Reuven Hasak testified that even he did not believe that Mr. Adams' hard drive or his computer was stolen, but rather that he provided that information freely into a number of different communities, including Gilles Kaehlin and Canal+.

The only evidence in the record that any of the plaintiffs had any involvement in the obtaining of those documents is as to Plaintiff NagraStar. Both sets of documents went from Gilles Kaehlin and Canal+ to Alan Guggenheim in Paris, France and from Ron Ereiser to Alan Guggenheim and J.J. Gee in Canada.

Both of those individuals are employed by Plaintiff NagraStar, and because there is no evidence to suggest that Plaintiff EchoStar was involved, we would ask that at minimum the Court strike the counterclaim and grant a Rule 50 motion and unclean hand -- and defendants' unclean hands affirmative defense as to Plaintiff EchoStar.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Snyder.
MR. SNYDER: Thank you, Your Honor.
First, the plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. They cannot argue on the one hand that they're entitled to
disgorgement, even though DirecTV's contracts were with Kudelski SA, and at the same time argue that there is sufficient separateness between EchoStar and NagraStar that the unclean hands defense cannot apply to both.

THE COURT: I think I've either formally or informally already indicated that they go hand-in-hand.

So there's a good possibility if disgorgement does not lie, that unclean hands doesn't, and if disgorgement does, unclean hands does.

MR. HAGAN: But that is a separate issue as to --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Mr. Snyder wasn't done.
MR. SNYDER: Second, Your Honor, whether or not the hard drive was actually stolen from Mr. Adams does not resolve the issue of whether it was by Mr. Adams or by someone else from Mr. Adams. The material was stolen from NDS. There was no authorization for that material to leave NDS. It was affirmative obligation to maintain its confidentiality. And it was somehow transferred from Mr. Adams to Mr. Kaehlin, and we then pick up the trail from Mr. Kaehlin through their pirate consultant Ron Ereiser or directly into the hands of NagraStar.

And Mr. Guggenheim testified, in fact, that counsel for EchoStar was also present, and they agreed to enter into a joint defense for that purpose.

So under the law of misappropriation, whether or
not it was -- whether or not people believed that Mr. Adams' car was broken into and the hard drive stolen from the back, the material was misappropriated from NDS, and that misappropriated material ended up under circumstances which would qualify as misappropriation under the law of trade secrets.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.
If you would remain a little while, I want to go into chambers and hopefully will rejoin you.
(Proceedings recessed at 4:18 p.m.)
(Proceedings resumed at 5:41 p.m.)
(Outside the presence of the jury.)
THE COURT: We're on the record. All counsel are present.

Counsel, thank you for your courtesy this evening. It's almost 6:00 o'clock. And the Court holds as follows and rules as follows:

Rule 45 requires the Court to quash a subpoena if it requires a person who is neither a party nor a party's officer to travel more than 100 miles from where that person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business.

Some Courts have thus implied, even in foreign corporations, that officers living in foreign countries can be compelled to give testimony in the United States. The Court cites Younis, Y-O-U-N-I-S, v. American University of

Cairo, 30 F.Supp. 2d 390, Southern District of New York 1998. Also, In Re Teknek LLC, 206 WL 2136046, which is a bankruptcy court in the Northern District of Illinois, 2006, which this Court was the District Court in, and Judge Cox was the bankruptcy court. Also, Application to Enforce Administrative Subpoena's Duces Tecum of SEC v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, Tenth Circuit 1996.

Likewise, it has been held that, quote, "a foreign corporation doing business in a district is subject to all processes, including subpoenas in that district," citing Less v. Taber Instrument Corporation, 53 FRD 645, 646, Western District of New York, 1971. Moreover, the Court has discretion to require the corporation to produce the individual director named in the subpoena; see also, Elder Beerman, $B-E-E-R-M-A-N$, Stores Corporation v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 45 FRD 515, Southern District of New York, 1968.

This Court sees no reason why such a conclusion would not equally apply to a CEO of a party company. The trial court's discretion extends to issuing sanctions if a party fails to produce a corporate officer or director in compliance with such an order. The Court once again cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Comments 45 and 16.

Now, there isn't a lot of discussion in the Northern District, California case that we saw. They just
simply cited rule 45. They didn't cite the bankruptcy court. We've also found some other case law that we believe supports our position. Therefore, I'm going to order Dr. Peled to return to this Court and appear in this court. Now, having made that order, I'm going to turn to NDS and let them have a conference for a moment. That can be done in two ways: He'll either be here, ready to testify at 8:00 o'clock in the morning, as a courtesy. And $I$ will preclude EchoStar from going into the area about his leaving and returning, et cetera. The prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value, as far as the Court's concerned.

If there is some concern, I'm going to order NDS, if -- unless there's a representation to this Court by Mr. Snyder on behalf of NDS, then $I$ will simply delay the proceedings. I'll order EchoStar to subpoena him, so that I keep building my jurisdiction in London, and we'll simply wait. But he will be returning.

So, Mr. Snyder, why don't you have a consultation with your co-counsel and make your decision.
(Pause in the proceedings at 5:44 p.m.)
(Proceedings resumed at 5:53 p.m.)
THE COURT: We're back on the record. All counsel are present.

Mr. Snyder, what's your position?
MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, we've heard the Court's
order. And I understand that it requires us to produce Dr. Peled.

I have not been able to speak to Dr. Peled, nor have I been able to talk to my client, so it's difficult for me to give the Court any answer other than $I$ have heard the Court's order.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SNYDER: And I -- and if there is some time -if the Court can give us some time to get ahold of them and give the Court and the parties an answer about whether Dr. Peled will appear, I would appreciate that.

THE COURT: I'll absolutely pay you that courtesy.
My thought is this: I want to do this as humanly as possible. And if you want, I'll put this out in a minute order; but, because of the press coverage, I'd recommend against it. I think the easiest way to resolve this is by transcript, and by you relaying that to your client first.

If there's any difficulty, then $I$ will simply
require -- to make sure I've dotted all my "I's" and crossed
the "T's," I will simply stop the proceedings on Tuesday.
(To plaintiff's counsel:) And require you to serve the gentleman, also.

I believe I absolutely have this power because it's a corporation, multinational, but focused here in the United States, doing business here, receiving money here.

Focusing on the corporate entity, there's no question in my mind that it's an appropriate order.

MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, may I make one additional --

THE COURT: No. Let me finish, and then you've got the rest of the day.
(To plaintiff's counsel:) That means you're probably going to London. You're probably going to serve him if it requires service in London, and I may just stop. And the problem with that is Andre Kudelski. So I don't know that Andre Kudelski should suffer, nor should you suffer bringing the gentleman here, so I'm going to give you the option.

But no matter what, it will not go forward until I'm certain that every effort's been made on my part. And I may take that one extra step of subpoenaing. I don't think I have to. I just want to be cautious.

Oh, I said the "Northern District of New York," I meant the Southern District of New York simply refers to Rule 45. There is not much of an analysis there. But I have a much stronger fact situation here than even the Court in the Southern District of New York has.

Now, Mr. Snyder, please.
MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, $I$ wanted to inquire, if $I$ could, about the scope of the testimony that plaintiff's
will be allowed to elicit from Dr. Peled. And my concerns fall into two categories:

First, matters that are not -- that have not been at issue in this trial. The Court has, over our objection, allowed query into the Canal+ and DirecTV litigations. And I certainly understand that order and would anticipate that Dr. Peled would be asked questions about that. But there are other matters involving NDS affairs of various vintages that, based on plaintiff's counsel's comments and some of the questions at deposition, I anticipate they intend to question Dr. Peled about while he's in front of the jury. And it puts -- that puts us in the difficult position of either allowing that testimony or objecting and thus making an issue out of it in front of the jury.

Second, Your Honor, there is a -- I'm frankly concerned about the intentions of plaintiff's counsel to question Dr. Peled repeatedly about matters over which he admits he has no knowledge. And while $I$ understand that the plaintiffs have a right to show Dr. Peled documents, to find out whether he has information, to ask him questions whether he has information, $I$ think that it is unfairly prejudicial for the Chief Executive to essentially sit in the witness stand and -- for what is essentially argument in the form of questions.

THE COURT: If I knew with more particularly what
those concerns were, I could respond to them. But I will not bargain with Dr. Peled nor hand down a ruling that gives him the choice of either coming or not coming based upon my ruling. He's here first, and then we discuss the issues. And I'll take the time to do that with you.

And I share your concern. He shouldn't be embarrassed. But by the same token, he should be able to be asked relevant information. And if he's here, maybe I can find out what that is.

So the first question is, do I have this power. And I believe I do pursuant to the case law that we've been researching. And frankly, I've been hesitant to use that in the past, but I've always believed that $I$ have the power to order in some of these persons who were or were not going to appear.

Quite frankly, I thought an equitable balance had been reached; that there was no reason to really pursue Kudelski anymore; that was his choice -- or Murdoch; that was his choice -- and that the balance-out, if you will, just equitably between Ergan and whomever, which turned out to be Dr. Peled, was the end of the discussion.

But I'm quite convinced that $I$ have the power.
MR. SNYDER: I'm not trying to bargain with the
Court, Your Honor. I have heard your order.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SNYDER: I wanted to raise my concerns so that the Court would understand them.

THE COURT: And if you get the information to me -- Mr. Snyder, if you get the information to me, I can look at it. I can see what those categories are. So maybe over the weekend you can set forth what the concerns are. Nobody's trying to embarrass him. And I don't want that to happen either with any of the CEO's.

I mean, Ergan had a pretty strenuous direct and cross-examination, so I'm not going to protect him; but by the same token, he shouldn't be asked repeated questions. But if it pertains to Kommerling, for instance, or Tarnovsky, certainly that appears to be appropriate.

You can raise the double hearsay objection. One seems to be "exception against penal interest" and the other is an "adverse party." But at least I can deal with those. Right now, I'm just dealing with whether $I$ had the power to bring him back. And I'd assumed I had before, but I was being, I thought, somewhat of a gentleman with both sides and encouraging you to do that, and then letting you argue if you chose not to. But in Peled's position, it's moved far beyond that.

As far as Kudelski, that's his choice, though. And it's Murdoch's choice. I'm not going to employ this kind of power.

Peled presents a unique problem to me now. So I think the guidelines for each of you is simply this: If Peled is here, as I'm ordering, at 8:00 o'clock in the morning on Tuesday, we're not going to act surprised. You're simply going to move to reopen. The Court's going to say it was aware of that earlier on, so there's no insinuation that anything has happened, because all this has been outside the presence of the jury.

And I'm limiting NDS so that there's no discussion about this. I think the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value with whatever occurred concerning why he left.

If he's not present, then I've got two options. One is a series of sanctions, and the Court doesn't want to employ those. They range all the way up to default, which is rather ridiculous and not the option this Court would chose, frankly. But it does potentially call for other sanctions. I would be remiss to employ any of those sanctions, frankly, until I took the next step; and that is, I would cause a subpoena, although I think he's a corporate officer, obviously, and I have -- under my ruling power, I would take that extra cautious step.

I probably would look to EchoStar at that time to determine, you know, whether or not Peled, who's eventually going to be here, would have a tactical advantage through

NDS of having him called afterwards, or if you want to wait until he arrives. And, unfortunately, we've got to send Mr. Kudelski home. But Mr. Kudelski should be here on Tuesday. And that deposition should take place, also, I think, on Monday. Monday?

MR. HAGAN: Monday afternoon. THE COURT: Monday afternoon. Okay. MR. SNYDER: Is it your intention, Your Honor, that Dr. Peled would be called by the defendants -THE COURT: Absolutely. MR. SNYDER: -- as opposed to the plaintiff's rebuttal case?

THE COURT: Yeah, if you chose to. I'm giving you the first option all the way along the line. The only option I'm not giving you is having Dr. Peled not return. If you want to fit him into your case and reopen, so be it. If you want him called by the plaintiffs, so be it.
(To plaintiff's counsel:) But if I'm bringing him back and NDS decides not to call him, I want to hear your true representation that you are going to call him, 'cause I'm not bringing him back across the world to inconvenience the gentleman. I'm bringing him back 'cause he's a material witness, quite frankly. MR. HAGAN: Yes, Your Honor, we will call him.

THE COURT: You'll call him in your rebuttal case? MR. HAGAN: If he appears. THE COURT: Well, he -MR. SNYDER: Would -THE COURT: You mean, if he voluntarily appears. He'll appear. It's just how long it takes, that's all.

MR. SNYDER: And I've heard the Court's order, Your Honor. If he is called in plaintiff's case as a rebuttal witness, would he be treated as a rebuttal witness?

THE COURT: Yes. But the rebuttal is so broad, that's the problem. You've got general denials running through this case on both sides. And I need to have you narrow that for me on paper and express what your concerns are if he's called. Because it's not fair for me to make a general ruling and then feel -- you know, you or the EchoStar feel that I've said one thing and done something else. So I need to know what those concerns are. Certainly, as to Kommerling and Tarnovsky, that's certainly relevant -- amongst other things that I've heard. But a repeated badgering of him is not. Documents should be shown in good faith. Those documents that a corporate representative of his stature would be expected to see can certainly be shown.

The question becomes -- I don't know what's out
there. I wasn't at the deposition. I don't know if there's an e-mail, for instance, from Hasak to somebody else and, you know, they're parading that in front of the CSO, who might not ever see that document but, by the same token, should. I mean, I've got to see those documents. I don't know enough, I think, to make a ruling right now -- a sweeping ruling.

So I think the best we can expect is this: He'll either be here pursuant to this order, or I'll deal with it at that time on Tuesday morning.

And Kudelski should be deposed if he's coming, and he should be prepared to testify on Tuesday. If -- I don't want to look ahead. The order's the order. It says what it says. And the only question I've got is, if you need this further explained to Dr. Peled, I'm happy to issue this other than the oral ruling that's contained in the transcript, which takes time to prepare and probably won't be out until Monday or Tuesday. Or I can simply issue this in a memo form, which then becomes widespread and, quite frankly, everybody knows about it quickly.

MR. SNYDER: Transcript's sufficient, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. At least for this time, that's
a courtesy $I$ can pay you, and that takes Dr. Peled, hopefully, off the hook; and hopefully, he hears this order loud and clear.

I think I'd appreciate Monday evening an informal phone call to Kristee. I'm going to be out of the jurisdiction for some period of time on Monday, and then back in. And so $I$ won't know on Monday -- although you can reach me tomorrow, and you can reach me Sunday. There's part of Monday I'm just not available.

And I'd appreciate it if the two of you would talk to each other on EchoStar and NDS's respective sides, because we don't want to inconvenience, if we can help it, Dr. Peled and Andre Kudelski. I'd like to get them into court and out of court as a courtesy.

Okay. So in short, with all the things we have left to do, I hope we're going to the jury on Tuesday afternoon and Wednesday. But I'm not confident of that right now. And a lot of that depends upon Dr. Peled.

Now, is there anything further this evening?
Otherwise, I'm going to let Debbie go home to her family -who's my court reporter, for the record, and it's 6:10 on Friday.

Counsel on behalf of EchoStar?

MR. HAGAN: Nothing, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. And on behalf of NDS?
MR. SNYDER: Nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you want this in written form so you can do some research? That is the order.

MR. SNYDER: You mean an informal writing,

Your Honor?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. SNYDER: Yes, that would be helpful.
THE COURT: Sure, sure.
(At 6:09 p.m., proceedings were adjourned.)
-OOO-


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