UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE PRESIDING

ECHOSTAR SATELLITE )
CORPORATION, et al., )

Plaintiffs, )
vs. ) No. SACV 03-0950-DOC

NDS GROUP PLC, et al., )
) Day 5, Volume IV
Defendants. )
$\qquad$ )

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS Jury Trial<br>Santa Ana, California<br>Wednesday, April 16, 2008

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United States District Court
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08-04-16 EchoStarD5V4

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SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 2008

DAY 5 - VOLUME IV
(Live reporter switch with Debbie Gale.) AVIEL RUBIN, PLAINTIFFS' WITNESS (Continued.) REDIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued.) BY MR. HAGAN:

Q Now, could the pirates have gotten around this software patch with glitching?

A Yes.

Q Can you please explain what "glitching" is.

A Sure. Remember when I was talking about sending a message, and you put on a checksum? That's because it might have gone corrupted in transit. Glitching is the process of intentionally corrupting something so as to cause some of the bits to change, and glitching has become very sophisticated, and not everything is checksummed and then checked. And so if you know how to glitch very well, you can actually cause certain parts of the code not to run. For example, the patch that prevents a hack could be glitched out, so to speak.

THE COURT: Just a moment.

Debbie, before you leave, check the real time,
will you?

Just one moment.
(Interruption in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

BY MR. HAGAN:

Q Dr. Rubin, you were also present during the two days when Mr. Mordinson testified; is that correct?

A That's right.

Q And you had an opportunity to listen to all of his testimony; is that correct?

A That's right, I did.
Q Did you find any part of his testimony to be unusual?
A Yes.

Q Can you explain that?
A There were two things that he said that really surprised me and didn't make any sense, actually. The first was he was asked what the index variable was, and he said he didn't know, and he actually named it in his report "the index variable," and the entire attack depends on it very heavily. I don't know if it's a language issue or what. He just didn't know what it was, and it was a key part of his report.

But the thing that probably surprised me even more than that was his comment about his reaction to the Nipper posting. You see, we hacked the iPhone. For us, that was a really big deal, but it was only a few weeks. And then subsequently, later on, other people hacked the iPhone too, and you should have seen my guys running to figure out what
it was those other people did. Did we miss anything? Were they more clever than us, less clever than us? What did they do? I mean, anytime anything happened with the iPhone, everybody scrambled to compare it to what we did.

Now, here is a guy who spent six months of his life developing this complicated hack, disassembling all this code; reverse engineering everything, building a hack; flying to the U.S., going to Canada; testing it all out, and yet, when somebody posts something on the internet that's a hack that supposedly has nothing to do with them, he didn't even know about it, didn't care about it, and when he was told about it, he testified that he spent 15 minutes looking at it. That doesn't make any sense to me.

Q And you were here when he testified that after a review of the Nipper hack for 15 minutes, it was his belief that it was different than the hack that the defendants developed for EchoStar's security system; is that correct?

A That's right.

Q And do you agree with that position?
A Well, I honestly think that no matter how much you immerse yourself in this stuff, it's zeros and ones or it's hex, and you can't look at it and do the index variable calculation in your head to figure out that they are putting the shell code on the stack. You don't have the outcodes memorized to know what that shell code does. I don't see
how anybody in less than several days of analysis could make that determination, much less in 15 minutes.

Q In fact, it is -- wasn't it your testimony at deposition, as well as the defendants' expert, that without the Haifa report, it would have been almost impossible to figure out what was going on in the Nipper hack?

MR. STONE: I think he is summarizing the deposition. Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

You can answer the question.
THE WITNESS: Just repeat it. I got distracted. BY MR. HAGAN:

Q In fact, haven't you testified at deposition, as well as the defendants' expert, that without the Haifa report, it would be significantly hard, almost impossible within a matter of days to figure out what was going on with the Nipper hack?

A Yeah, it took me quite a bit of time, even with the Haifa report, and the Haifa report is an excellent description. It's got all the bits and bytes and all of the details, as well as high-level design descriptions, and even with that, it was a substantial effort to figure all this out and understand what it did. Without the Haifa report, it would have been hopeless. If I was handed this message with zeros and ones, I wouldn't know where to draw the
lines, I wouldn't know what it does. I just don't think I could have figured it out.

Q Now, Dr. Rubin, Mr. Stone also tried to make a point that the aisle buffer overflow method of attack is very common. Can you explain to us what makes the Haifa hack and the Nipper hack so unique?

A Sure. The -- and it gets back to the Rube Goldberg comment. These -- this hack is, you know, not like most hacks. You know, on the iPhone, we basically look for one buffer overflow. We found it. We did what we did. This is kind of convoluted, and the thing that really stands out in my mind is how it -- the things that they utilize in common are things that were not known. The -- the memory aliasing, where you wrap around the index variable, they're strange things, and they're not known, so how could it be that something else was posted with exactly the same properties that were outlined so well in this report unless they came from it?

Q Now, it's not your testimony that all reverse engineering is bad or improper; is that right?

A No.

Q In fact, as long -- according to your testimony, as long as you do ethical reverse engineering, and then you engage in responsible disclosure, it can help better society and better consumer products; isn't that right?

A Yeah. I mean, it depends on a case-by-case basis. There are laws you have to worry about, and once you find the proper project, though, then I agree with that. Q And Mr. Stone -- excuse me. Mr. Stone spent a significant amount of time talking about the way that you handled the -- or your company handled the reverse engineer of the Apple iPhone; do you recall that testimony?

A I do.

Q But you would agree that there are significant differences in what ISE did for the Apple iPhone and what the defendants did for EchoStar Security System?

A Yeah. I mean, I don't think you can compare them. Q In fact, when your company reverse-engineered the Apple iPhone, when you got finished, you notified Apple about it, their management, correct?

A Correct.

Q And you were here last week when David Mordinson testified that he was instructed by the defendants to conceal his efforts from EchoStar and NagraStar and NagraVision, right?

A That's right.

Q Your motivation and your company's motivation for reverse engineering the Apple iPhone was to help Apple make their product better?

A That's part of it, yes.

Q You haven't heard any testimony from the defendants that their motivation in hacking EchoStar's security system was to try to help EchoStar's product; is that correct?

A No, they didn't help them.
Q ISE is an independent evaluation company. You are not a competitor of apple; is that right?

A That's right.

Q You heard testimony from Mr. Mordinson that NDS is the direct competitor for Nagra; is that correct?

A That's right.

Q Now, ISE engaged in the reverse engineering of the Apple iPhone in a controlled university environment, correct?

A We are not in the university. We are near them, but we set up a similar lab.

Q A controlled laboratory environment?

A Right.

Q An official establishment?

A Right.

Q You didn't go to another country, to someone's house that you didn't know and go into their basement, correct?

A I did not.

Q And you heard Mr. Mordinson testify that that's what the defendants did?

A Right.

Q Now, when you prepared, or when your company prepared this report on the Apple iPhone, you gave it to Apple management --

A That's right.

Q -- isn't that right?

You didn't hear any testimony from the defendants that they gave this information to EchoStar?

A No. Well, that's not all we gave them. We gave them all the code that we wrote for the exploit and the patch that we wrote.

Q And we'll get to the patch in a second, but once you had that report and once you had the results, your company published that information at a security conference attended by, among other people, Apple iPhone representatives?

A I don't know about that. They were Apple employees.

Q Apple employees.

You didn't post it on a pirate website?

A No.

Q Now, when you did present that paper, was it your testimony that you redacted out specific codes, instructions and commands that allowed the hack to occur?

A So just a clarification, you know, it was Charlie Miller who made the presentation, and at that point, I believe that the patch had already been released, and I don't know remember us redacting anything from that at that
point.
Q And let's talk about that just for a second.

Once you conducted the reverse engineering, ISE, and I'm saying you, but ISE created a patch, a fix, a way to correct that vulnerability, and then you gave that to Apple; is that correct?

A That's right.
Q You didn't ask Apple for any compensation for that, did you?

A No.

Q In fact, didn't Apple offer you compensation and you declined?

A Yeah, they offered to -- to hire us to help them find other vulnerabilities, but we have a policy -- I mentioned that we plan these things out, and so a long time ago we decided that whenever we went after a product to try to break it, that we wouldn't work for that company that made that product to -- to keep things clean, so we wouldn't get any money from them.

Q In other words, that's part of your protocol for ethical reverse engineering and responsible disclosure?

A That's right. You know, Texas Instruments tried to hire us as well after the Exxon Mobil Speed Pass, and we turned them down.

Q Now, finally, Dr. Rubin, does anything that was brought
out or discussed in your testimony with Mr. Stone in cross-examination, does that in any way change your conclusions that the Nipper hack could not have been done without access to the information in the Haifa report?

A No. I mean, that -- there was nothing that changed my opinion at all.

Q And does anything that came out in your questioning impact your opinion in any way that the Nipper hack and the Haifa hack are identical in all the fundamental respects?

A Yes. They are not identical in their code, but they are identical in the fundamental way that the hack is built.

Q The four key elements that you talked about earlier.
A Exactly, yes.
Q Now, does -- did anything in your cross-examination or in any of the other documents that you looked at in your testimony change in any way your conclusion that whoever wrote the Nipper hack, published it on that pirate website, either was the same person that worked on the Haifa project or someone that got the information from the defendants' Haifa project?

A No, I still believe that -- that that is -- is either the same person or someone that had access to the information from that person.

Q Thank you very much, Dr. Rubin.
Pass the witness, your Honor.

THE COURT: Recross by Mr. Stone on behalf of NDS. MR. STONE: Thank you, your Honor.

BY MR. STONE:

Q Dr. Rubin, when you did your hacking of the iPhone, $I$ take it you didn't get any equipment from Satan's Playhouse either?

A I don't know where Satan's Playhouse is, and we did not; you're right.

Q And would it have been better or worse for EchoStar if the patch had been deployed prior to the posting?

A I imagine it would have been better. It would have been better.

Q And you heard Mr. Mordinson testify about the various differences between his report and the posting, correct?

A Yes.

Q Did you disagree with any of those differences?
A Can you remind me what they were?
Q Well, it's the ones we've covered. You were here testifying --

A Right. I just --

THE COURT: Is this from his expert report?

MR. STONE: No. This is from sitting in the courtroom, apparently.

THE COURT: Oh, I see.

THE WITNESS: You're talking about Mr. Mordinson testified that there were differences between his report and the Nipper posting, and I'm just trying -- I'd like you to refresh my memory as to those before I tell you whether I agree with them or not.

BY MR. STONE:

Q Well, you just testified when other counsel was asking you questions about that same testimony. You don't recall the other part of that testimony?

A Those particular things that I testified about were things I was really struck with at the time that I listened to him, and the thing that you are saying now must not have had the same impact on me.

Q Now, is it your testimony that the patch you developed for Apple would have closed their vulnerability?

A It would have. We tested it.

Q But it's your testimony that the Nagra patch would not close the vulnerability here?

A I did not say that.
Q Is it your testimony that it would?
A I didn't say that either. I think that the -- the -- a patch, if you can get it working without ruining the card, would prevent future cards that weren't protected by a blocker from having that vulnerability.

Q Now, you just testified that you hadn't seen any
evidence that the blockers were not effective or useful in
preventing the patch from taking?
A I didn't test the blockers, and I don't know how
effective they were.
Q Let me show you Exhibit 1186 and see if this is
evidence you considered.
1186 is an e-mail from Joel Conus dated March 2nd,
2001.
A I had not seen this before today.
Q And so you hadn't seen that Mr. Conus wrote on
March 2nd, 2001, that "The hacking is stalling, it seems.
The number of hackers who still have non-updated cards is
very limited, and therefore, the blocker code that has been
published cannot be widely used."
Do you see that?
A I don't see it.
Q It's right in the middle of the large paragraph in the
first --
A I see it.
Q You weren't aware of that before testifying, correct?
A I hadn't seen this before.
Q And what is the status of the ROM 3 as of March 2nd,
2001, according to Mr. Conus?
A Where?
Q Under "devices status."

A He says, "Secured VIP rights and some cards, cards and blockers, not affected by the update."

MR. STONE: Your Honor, I would move Exhibit 1186. THE COURT: Any objection? MR. HAGAN: No objection, your Honor. THE COURT: Received. (Defendants' Exhibit No. 1186 is received in evidence.)

BY MR. STONE:

Q Now, didn't you testify that the author of the ROM 3 code deliberately chose to locate the communications buffer at an absolute address, which was at the end of memory? A That is correct. Q And in all of the programs you've written, you have never placed a buffer in an absolute address; isn't that correct?

A When you write assembly language programming, you can decide where to put your buffers. When you write in $C$ and other program languages that $I$ write in usually, you don't have control over where the buffers go, so I have never deliberately placed a buffer anywhere.

Q And have you ever seen anyone deliberately not check a communications buffer like occurred here --

A For -- for the balance?

Q Yes.

A I have seen that many times, yes.
Q And didn't you testify that dumping the EEPROM of the ROM 3 card using a buffer overflow method was easier if the buffer was located at the end of memory?

A I said that, but after the deposition, I thought about it some more, and I changed my mind.

Q You've changed your mind a lot in this case, haven't you, sir?

A As I get more information, I, you know, am flexible with -- with my opinions on them.

Q Now, Nipper used library calls and Mordinson used his own routine, correct?

A That's right.
Q And Haifa stored the show code and the communications buffer while Nipper's stored in the stack, correct?

A That's correct.

Q And the programming styles were different as well, correct?

A That's correct.

Q And Haifa did not have the 7381 jump or the passing of parameters, correct?

A That's correct.

Q And you saw no evidence that Haifa even knew about those, correct?

A I didn't see any of the evidence.

Q And Mr. Mordinson's code just hangs at the end of it, correct?

A That's right.
Q Thank you.

Nothing further.

THE COURT: All right.

Sir, I'm going to ask you to remain available.
I assume he'll be here during the testimony of the
opposing expert as well? MR. HAGAN: Yes, sir, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Then you will be here or around or back --

THE WITNESS: Yeah, back and forth.

THE COURT: -- back and forth, okay. Obviously you are on call. I'll give you the same admonition, and that is -- you are in the United States, though? THE WITNESS: Yeah, Baltimore. THE COURT: Okay. It's close. That's the United States.
(Laughter.)

THE COURT: Within 48 hours, remain on call, would you?

THE WITNESS: Sure.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, sir. THE WITNESS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Counsel, $I$ know that we were trying to fly down a witness that was available. I assume he's here, Mr. Orban?

MR. NOLL: John Norris, your Honor.

THE COURT: John Norris?

MR. NOLL: Yes.

All right. Call Mr. Norris.

MR. NOLL: Okay. The plaintiffs call John Norris, head of NDS security NDS Americas.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Thank you, sir. If you'd be kind enough to raise your right hand, please, and the clerk will administer the oath to you.

MR. NOLL: Where is he?

THE COURT: There is Mr. Norris.

Mr. Norris, if you you'd come forward.

Thank you. My apologies. I had the wrong person.
Sir, if you'd raise your right hand, please.

JOHN NORRIS, PLAINTIFFS' WITNESS, SWORN

THE WITNESS: I do.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

If you'd please be kind enough to be seated in the witness box to my left.

Now, sir, if you'd be kind enough to state your full name for the jury.

THE WITNESS: John Carter Norris.

THE COURT: Can you spell your last name, please. THE WITNESS: Norris, N-o-r-r-i-s.

THE COURT: And this is direct examination by -MR. NOLL: Mr. Noll for the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Mr. Noll on behalf of EchoStar and DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. NOLL:

Q Good afternoon, Mr. Norris.

A Good afternoon.

Q We've met before, sir; is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q In fact, we've met a couple of times at depositions you've given in this case; is that right?

A That's correct.

Q You work for NDS Americas; is that correct, Mr. Norris?

A Yes.

Q In fact, you are the head of NDS's conditional access security in the United States, right?

A Yes. Yes, it is.
Q And DirecTV is a client of NDS?

A Yes.

Q NDS protects DirecTV's television signals by way of providing software that goes into a Smart Card, correct?

A Essentially.
Q And focusing back to the 1997 time frame, DirecTV's conditional access system was hacked, correct?

A Correct.

Q And you understood that DirecTV was considering changing its conditional access provider from NDS, correct?

A I've -- I've heard that, but I don't recall hearing that in 1997.

Q You did come to understand that in the late 90 s , DirecTV was considering changing its conditional access provider, right, sir?

A It's possible.
Q I mean, possibly --
A I -- I don't recall the date, I'm sorry.

Q But the fact is you heard that, right?
A I've heard that, yeah.

Q And you understood that the conditional access provider

DirecTV was considering changing to was a company called Kudelski, right?

A There were rumors.

Q And Kudelski is a company that owns the Nagra conditional access technology, correct?

A Correct.

Q And you understand, sir, that EchoStar uses Nagra conditional access technology, right?

A Yes.

Q Now, in the 1997 time frame, you also understand that NDS hired an individual named Christopher Tarnovsky, correct?

A Yes.

Q At the time NDS hired Mr. Tarnovsky, you knew Mr. Tarnovsky was a very talented hacker, correct?

A Yes.

Q And to use your words, "Mr. Tarnovsky had substantial skills when it came to hacking," correct?

A Yes.

Q And NDS decided in 1997 to hire Mr. Tarnovsky so that you could learn from him, correct?

A That's fair, yeah.

Q And NDS also wanted to remove Mr. Tarnovsky from the hacker community, correct?

A Yes.

Q In fact, NDS wanted to control Mr. Tarnovsky, correct?

A Yes.

Q You didn't want Mr. Tarnovsky hacking your systems anymore; is that right?

A That's correct.

Q And you will agree with me, sir, that when NDS hired Mr. Tarnovsky, you knew that Mr. Tarnovsky's work on DirecTV Smart Cards was illegal, correct?

A He injured our -- our technology, yes.

Q But you would agree with me, sir, that his work was illegal as it relates to what he was doing to DirecTV's conditional access system.

A Yeah, that's true.

Q 1998, DirecTV's conditional access system was still hacked, correct?

A Correct.

Q 1999, DirecTV's conditional access system was hacked, correct?

A I believe so, yes.
Q 2000, DirecTV was hacked?

A I believe so.

Q 2001, DirecTV was hacked?

A Yeah.

Q 2002, DirecTV was hacked?

A I don't know if that's when we introduced our current generation Smart Card that's not hacked. I -- I don't recall the date.

Q Okay. Sometime DirecTV became secure, 2002, 2003 time frame?

A When they introduced the P4. I don't recall the date.

Q Okay. But your testimony here today would be that DirecTV became secure at some point in time, right?

A Yes.

Q And that was probably around the 2002, 2003 time frame?

A I don't recall the date.

Q Well, was it after that time frame?
A I'm sorry, I don't recall the date.

Q Okay. And you recall that News Corporation purchased a controlling interest in DirecTV, correct?

A Yes.

Q And after News Corporation --

THE COURT: Counsel, we don't have the year.
That's eventually going to cause some confusion.

MR. NOLL: All right.
BY MR. NOLL:

Q What's your best testimony, Mr. Norris, here under oath
in front of this jury as to when DirecTV became secure?

MR. KLEIN: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I am going to sustain the
objection. I am going to put a stop to that for either
party. He knows he is under oath. All of the witnesses
know that they are under oath. I have ways of taking care
of that, Counsel. No witness needs a reminder, believe me.

MR. NOLL: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I am very effective with that. MR. NOLL: Okay.

BY MR. NOLL:

Q Mr. Norris, can you tell us what your best estimate of
when DirecTV became secure is?

MR. KLEIN: Objection. Asked and answered, your
Honor. Calls for speculation.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: When we introduced the fourth
generation Smart Card, I don't recall the date, sir.

BY MR. NOLL:

Q Okay. And you are aware that News Corporation purchased a controlling share in DirecTV?

A Yes, sir.

Q And after that time, were you also aware that DirecTV was secure as it relates to piracy of its system?

A Yes.

Q Now, changing gears and focusing back on Nagra and
EchoStar, before 1998, you understood that Nagra's
conditional access system was not hacked in the United

States, correct?

A Before 1998? I guess that's probably correct.
Q You don't have any reason to dispute --

THE COURT: Now, wait just a moment.

Do you know or not?

THE WITNESS: I don't know, sir.

BY MR. NOLL:

Q Let me ask you one more time.

A Sure.

Q Before 1998, did you ever have an understanding that NagraStar's conditional access system was not hacked?

A I understood it wasn't hacked. I heard that.

Q Okay. You first learned that Nagra was hacked in the late 1990s or early 2000, right?

A Yes.

Q And you came to understand that there was Nagra code or data posted on an internet website called www.dr7.com?

A Correct.

Q And DR7 is a nickname for an individual named Allen Menard, right?

A Yes.

Q And Mr. Menard, to your knowledge, ran the DR7 website?

A Yes.

Q And at a later point in time, Mr. Menard would enter into a consulting relationship with NDS, correct?

A That's correct.

Q In fact, Mr. Menard entered that relationship with NDS in 2003, correct?

A I don't recall the date.

Q Okay. We'll discuss it later, and I'll show you the agreement.

A Sure.

Q Maybe that will refresh your recollection?
A Thank you.

Q I am going to ask you to turn to Exhibit 74. Can you provide him with that, Christine, please?

A Thank you.
Q Can you identify Exhibit 74, Mr. Norris?
A It's a summary of -- of the Kudelski-NagraVision piracy situation in approximately 2000.

Q And Exhibit 74 is an NDS document; is that correct?
A That's correct.

Q In fact, it's an operational security group document, correct?

A That's correct.

Q And you were the head of operational security for NDS Americas; correct?

A For Americas, yes.
Q Okay. You don't have reason to believe that Exhibit 74 is somehow not a true and correct copy?

A No reason.

Q Okay.

Plaintiffs offer Exhibit 74, your Honor.
THE COURT: It will be received.
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 74 is received in
evidence.)

MR. NOLL: Can you pull it up, please.
BY MR. NOLL:
Q See at the top, there, it says "NDS Operational

Security Group."

A Correct.

Q That's the group we just talked about that you head up for the U.S.

A No. That's the operational security group for the global operation. I work for NDS Americas, which is part of that global group.

Q Okay. Thank you for the clarification.

Now, if you focus your attention in the center, it says "Nagra piracy situation, May 2000."

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, I want to direct your attention down to the middle of the first page here on Exhibit 74, and I'll read it for you. It says, "Chronicle of the Nagra hack"; do you see that, sir?

A Yes, I do.

Q And I'll read for you, it says, "Chronicle on the Nagra hack. In September of 1998, a well-known and respectable hacking website known as DR7, http:\\www.dr7.com, created an EchoStar section which provided a discussion forum as well as a tools section for hackers." Did I read that correctly, sir?

THE COURT: No, you didn't. It said for "other hackers."

MR. NOLL: I'm sorry, "for other hackers." Thank
you, your Honor.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

BY MR. NOLL:

Q Did NDS believe that Mr. Menard's DR7 website was a respectable hacker website?

A Yes. In this context, the respectable quote is respected among the pirate community.

Q You respected Mr. Menard enough to hire him later on in 2003, right?

A We found his skills of value to us.

Q And you would agree, sir, that Mr. Menard was an individual who was a member of the so-called "Old Boys" group, correct?

MR. KLEIN: Objection. Vague and ambiguous, your

Honor.

THE COURT: Well, if you are familiar with that phrase, in the pirate community. "Old Boys" group can be -THE WITNESS: I haven't heard of that before, sir. THE COURT: Okay. Sustained.

BY MR. NOLL:

Q I'm sorry?

A I don't know that I've heard "Old Boys" group before. THE COURT: In relation to the pirate community, Counsel.

BY MR. NOLL:

Q Do you know what the "Old Boys" group is, sir?

A I don't know that I've heard the "Old Boys" group before.

Q As it relates to the pirate community?

A No.
Q You don't know?

THE COURT: Counsel, it's been asked and answered. He does not know.

MR. NOLL: Well, your Honor --

Christine, if you could hand the Court page 318 of Mr. Norris' exhibit, line 22 through 25.

THE COURT: Is this his deposition? Counsel, is this his deposition?

MR. NOLL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there a contra answer in the deposition of some kind?

What page, Counsel?
MR. NOLL: It's page 318, lines 22 through 25.

THE COURT: Well, Counsel, I'm not certain. I
think the fairest thing to do is let the witness refresh his recollection. I don't know if that's impeaching at all. It was a leading question, frankly, that you asked. He simply agreed.

So why don't you take a look at that for a moment,
sir.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Take a look at the bottom four lines, and Counsel had asked you a question about the "Old Boys" group, and then you stated "I agree."

MR. NOLL: Okay.

THE WITNESS: I did say "I agree." I never used the "Old Boys" group --

THE COURT: You must be away from it.

Just read the question and --

MR. NOLL: I would like to refresh his recollection.

If you would, Christine, hand him page 317, lines 22 through 25.

THE COURT: Pages I haven't seen yet. It's before this page. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Counsel.

MR. NOLL: Okay.

THE COURT: You should have given me that page
first.

MR. NOLL: My apologies, your Honor.
BY MR. NOLL:

Q Mr. Norris --

Well, I'd like to direct his attention to it. Maybe it will refresh his recollection. If not, maybe we need to
play the video.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Right in the middle of the page. And now, Counsel, you can read that in if you'd like to.

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MR. NOLL: Okay.
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BY MR. NOLL:

Q Have you had a chance to refresh your recollection, Mr. Norris?

A I have.

Q Okay. I am going to ask you again. Do you understand the "Old Boys" group to be a group of Canadian residents that modified and distributed hacked Smart Cards?

A I never heard of -- this was my expression at the time. I never heard it as a published comment that this is an "Old Boys" group. This is a statement that I made, it was an "Old Boys" group. It was the "old guard."

Q Okay. But do you disagree that Mr. Menard was a part of this, quote-unquote, "Old Boys" group as it was used in your deposition --

A No.

Q -- that distributed hacked, modified Smart Cards?

A (No audible response.)
Q You don't disagree that Mr. Menard was a part of this group --

THE COURT: Excuse me, Counsel. I think this is taking too much time. Under 403, Counsel, this is duly consumptive of time. Just read the question and answer.

Ladies and gentlemen, I caution you that
probably -- I don't know if there is an "Old Boys" group or club running around. Maybe it was made in a vernacular, like Mr. Menard's an oldtimer, that he's been around a long time in the buisness of piracy and satellite insemination.

We are wasting a lot of time, Counsel.

MR. NOLL: That's fine.

THE COURT: Read it and do it now or move on. MR. NOLL: All right. I think I can expedite this.

THE COURT: Move on.

BY MR. NOLL:

Q You knew that Mr. Menard was a satellite pirate and hacker, correct?

A I knew he ran a website.

Q Did you know he was a hacker and a pirate?

A We were never able to buy anything from him, so to say he was a hacker and a pirate, we were never able to purchase anything from him. He ran a website.

THE COURT: Just read the section. I am allowing you to do that. MR. NOLL: Okay. I'll read the section.

BY MR. NOLL:

Q Page 317:
"So there were a group of Canadian residents, correct?"
Answer: "Correct."
"That distributed modified or hacked Smart Cards, correct?"

Answer: "Correct."

And I said, "You would agree with me, sir, that Mr. Menard was one of the individuals of this 'Old Boys' group?"

Answer: "I would agree." THE COURT: Now, ladies and gentlemen, you can decide whether there is an "Old Boys" group -- I'm just joking with you -- or if that's a vernacular. Thank you. Counsel, your next question. MR. NOLL: Okay. BY MR. NOLL:

Q Sir, I want to shift gears, Mr. Norris, and I want to talk to you about Christopher Tarnovsky. And you've testified that NDS hired Christopher Tarnovsky, correct?

A Correct.

Q He was a $W$-2 employees of NDS?
A Correct.
Q In other words, he wasn't a contractor or a 1099
employee, right?

A He was an employee.

Q You removed him from the pirate community?
A (No audible response.)
Q Yes?

A Yes.

Q You wanted to control him?

A Yes.

Q In fact, once Mr. Tarnovsky was removed from the pirate community, you instructed him to develop a circumvention device relating to DirecTV's conditional access system, correct?

A That's correct.

Q And you knew that Mr. Tarnovsky was meeting with satellite pirates in Canada about hacking DirecTV's conditional access system, correct?

A Correct.

Q And you instructed Mr. Tarnovsky to give this circumvention device to a satellite pirate, correct?

A I believe we gave him software. I don't recall that we gave him a device.

Q Software to use in satellite piracy?
A Correct.

Q And you knew that by doing this, this satellite pirate would be able to reprogram DirecTV Smart Cards, right?

A Correct.

Q And then you later knew that Mr. Tarnovsky received cash payments stashed in electronic devices at his mailbox in Manassass, Virginia, for these acts of piracy, correct? A That's correct.

Q In fact, Mr. Tarnovsky would inform you when shipments of cash would arrive to his mailbox; is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q You understood that the payments were for present and future pirate acts he may commit against DirecTV's conditional access system, correct?

A I believe it was for past support or pirated activities and for what they intended to be future pirate activities. Q And at this time Rubin Hasak was your direct superior, correct?

A Correct.

Q And Mr. Hasak is the head of the global security group for NDS, correct?

A Correct.

Q He is still your boss today?

A Yes.

Q And you reported to Mr. Hasak that Mr. Tarnovsky had received approximately $\$ 20,000$ in cash at his Manassass, Virginia, mailbox, correct?

A I don't recall that.

Q Did you speak to Mr. Hasak about Mr. Tarnovsky
receiving the cash?
A Yes, at the beginning, correct.
Q Isn't that the same thing as reporting it to Mr. Hasak?
A I understand he received it over a year or two-year
period, and I didn't report every time. I wasn't told every
time, as my memory serves me.
Q And to your knowledge, sir, Mr. Hasak had no problem
with that; isn't that right?
A Correct.
Q And in fact, concerning the cash, you instructed
Mr. Tarnovsky to keep the money, right?
A I instructed him to put it into an escrow account.
Q You didn't tell him to return it to the satellite
pirate, correct?
A I told him we would get it back at some point and
hopefully use it against the pirates.
Q But you never did get it back and use it against the
pirates, right, sir?
A Right, correct.
Q In fact, as of today, NDS has never gotten that cash
back from Mr. Tarnovsky; isn't that true?
A I believe that's correct.
Q You said Mr. Tarnovsky escrowed the money; did you say
that?
A He put it into an account like an escrow account.

Q You never had access to that escrow, did you?
A No.
Q And isn't it true, sir, that it's doubtful according to you that you ever told DirecTV about the cash Mr. Tarnovsky was receiving in the 1999 to 2000 time frame, correct?

A That's correct.

Q In fact, you never notified any government official or any government agency that Mr. Tarnovsky was in possession of this $\$ 20,000$ cash, correct?

A I don't recall notifying anybody.
Q Let's focus on what you did when you hired Mr. Tarnovsky.

You didn't train Mr. Tarnovsky; isn't that correct, sir?

A I didn't train Mr. Tarnovsky?
Q Yeah. You didn't give him any -- NDS didn't do anything to train Mr. Tarnovsky for his job duties as an NDS employee, correct?

A We supervised him.
Q You didn't give him any formal training, did you?
A Not that $I$ can think of.

Q And you knew that Mr. Tarnovsky was analyzing codes that were posted on the internet relating to piracy, correct?

A Yes, he was analyzing DirecTV code.

Q And you also knew that some of the codes that he was analyzing related to EchoStar's conditional access system, correct?

A Later on, that's correct.

Q And sir, you are aware that EchoStar claims that Mr. Tarnovsky posted his conditional access codes on the internet; is that correct?

A I'm sorry, could you repeat that?
Q You were aware that EchoStar claims that Mr. Tarnovsky posted EchoStar's conditional access codes on the internet. A I'm aware of EchoStar's claims, yes.

Q Okay. Focus your attention on Exhibit 103, please.
THE COURT: Do you want to start there tomorrow; would that be convenient?

MR. NOLL: That would be great, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I think that's a logical breaking point this evening.

You are admonished not to discuss this matter amongst yourselves, nor form or express any opinion concerning the case. We will see you at 8:00 tomorrow morning. Please drive safely.
(The following proceedings is taken outside the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. You may step down.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Now, if Mr. Saggiori is here, we can commence now or start him at 5:30.

MR. HAGAN: I believe he is here, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you get him. (Live reporter switch with Sharon Seffens.) (Volume $V$ of the proceedings reported by Sharon Seffens.)
-OOO-

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

Date: April 17, 2008

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