UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE PRESIDING

ECHOSTAR SATELLITE )
CORPORATION, et al., )

Plaintiffs, )
vs. ) No. SACV 03-0950-DOC

NDS GROUP PLC, et al.,
Day 4, Volume IV
Defendants.
$\qquad$ )

## REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

 Jury TrialSanta Ana, California Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Jane C.S. Rule, CSR 9316
Federal Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
411 West 4th Street, Room 1-053
Santa Ana, California 92701
(714) 558-7755

08-04-15 EchoStarD4V4

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:

FOR PLAINTIFFS ECHOSTAR SATELLITE CORPORATION, et al.:
T. WADE WELCH \& ASSOCIATES

Attorneys at Law
BY: CHAD M. HAGAN
T. WADE WELCH

DAVID M. NOLL
CHRISTINE D. WILLETTS
Attorneys at Law
2401 Fountainview
Suite 700
Houston, Texas 77057
(713) 952-4334

FOR DEFENDANTS NDS GROUP PLC, et al.:
O'MELVENY \& MYERS, LLP
Attorneys at Law
BY: DARIN W. SNYDER
NATHANIEL L. DILGER
DAVID R. EBERHART
Attorneys at Law
Embarcadero Center West
275 Battery Street
Suite 2600
San Francisco, California 94111-3305
(415) 984-8700

- AND -

HOGAN \& HARTSON, LLP
Attorneys at Law
BY: RICHARD L. STONE
KENNETH D. KLEIN
Attorneys at Law
275 Battery Street
Suite 2600
San Francisco, California 94111-3305 (415) 984-8700

ALSO PRESENT:
JEAN-MARIE FEY, French Interpreter

I N D E X

EXAMINATION
Witness Name Direct Cross Redirect Recross

By Mr. Stone
4

## EXHIBITS

Exhibit
Identification
Evidence

Defense No. 1184
28

Defense No. 830 31

SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA, TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 2008

DAY 4 - VOLUME IV
(2:40 p.m.)
(Live reporter switch with Debbie Gale.)
(The following proceedings is taken in the presence of the jury.)

CHRISTOPHE NICOLAS, PLAINTIFFS' WITNESS (Continued.) CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued.)

BY MR. STONE:

Q I'm sorry, is your answer "yes" or "no"?

A Can you repeat the question?

Q Okay. The question was, isn't it true that if you had immediately designed and deployed the software patch after the black box in October of 2000, and before the internet postings, the instructions posted on the internet could not have allowed anyone to commit a buffer overflow attack on the ROM 3 card?

A I'm sorry, I'm starting to get tired. Can you rephrase that? I don't follow you anymore, or maybe you can help me with the translation.

THE COURT: Just ask the question again.

MR. SNYDER: Okay.
BY MR. SNYDER:

Q Isn't it true that if you had immediately designed and deployed the software patch after the black box in October
of 2000, and before the internet postings, the instructions posted on the internet could not have been used for a buffer overflow attack on the ROM 3 card.

A That's not correct, no, because if -- if $I$ follow you correctly, and maybe I'm not following you, the fact that we design and deploy the patch will protect, to some extent, all the cards that we received the patch, because when you broadcast a signal, you need to have your TV on, your set-up box on, and you'll receive that, but it will not protect any card that was not in the set-top box at the time we broadcast that. So it's still a few -- a few million, maybe, that you will have to find in retail store, and so on, so all those cards are not protected and the recipe can be used there.

And then, also at that time, there was some hacker -the commercial group, the E3M group was putting software in what we call "blocker" that would avoid any upgrade of the card. So the answer is "yes," it's true for all the card to have been used at that time and -- and in the normal behavior of the system. The answer is "no" for all the card that were not in the system or that were protected by a blocker software in the card.

Q This patch update was in the system, wasn't it, after it was designed and deployed?

A Yeah, correct, yeah.

Q So if somebody bought a card that was in a warehouse, as soon as they activated their system, it would have been updated with this patch; isn't that true?

A Yes, but what the hackers are doing there -- yeah, I think they were not stupid, so it was published all over the internet that as soon as you purchase a brand new set-top box, you remove the card and send the card as soon as possible to your dealer. It will fix it, it will put the pirate things and send it back. I think it's pretty clear for them because since -- since -- at that time, since two years we are doing regular patches, it was pretty clear for them as soon as they hooked up the set-top box and the dish, they would receive a date. So the normal steps, you know, to do a pirate card was to remove the card as soon as possible and before hooking the set-top box to the TV and putting the dish on.

Q And sir, isn't it true that any card used in the receiver after a patch was issued would receive that patch through the broadcast stream?

A Not any card. That's what I mean. So the card that's been modified before, and while that blocker software has been put into, will not receive the patch and will not receive the fix then, and it can still be used -- and the recipe can still be used against those card.

Q Well, then you had the second feature, though, to deal
with that called the electronic countermeasure, didn't you, sir?

A We -- we had the countermeasure to deal with that, but that's the exact point. As soon as the December 2000 posting happened and the recipe was freely available to everybody, it was not anymore one source that we need to target with the electronic countermeasure, but tens and then thousands of sources, okay?

So each time you want to do a countermeasure, and I think it's important that you understand that, first you need to identify your target, so you need to purchase one of those card. Then you need to -- to extract the information in the cards to know what you will identify as the pirate card, and then design your countermeasure, put that in the system and broadcast it. It's doable when you have one or two source of piracy. As soon as you have thousands of them, which one do you want to pick? So it was useless at that time to have the countermeasure capability, because you don't know where to shoot. You are in the dark, and you don't know where to shoot and which is your target. It might be one guy publishing every day on the internet, but it's just for the fun. And yes, only one pirate card, and you will deploy extensive engineer and testing just to target one card? I think it has no value. It's just economically, it doesn't make sense.

So when you have one source of hacker, for sure you focus on that one and try to do countermeasure and to -- to stop that. When you have thousands of that, and that's what happened after the publication, you don't know where to shoot. So the countermeasure, yes, we have that capability, but it's a useless capability at that time. Q Didn't your countermeasure know exactly where to shoot? Didn't it shoot anyone who tried to overflow the buffer and mark the OTP section of the EEPROM so the card could be killed later?

A That's one feature that we used, but unfortunately, not all the set-top box were always stable and not -- so communication problem at -- at the card level might be seen for the card as an attack, because the communication will not flow properly, and the card will say, "Okay, there is something wrong and may be under attack," and you can imagine that we cannot decide to kill every Smart Card in the field that feel they are under attack because there is a misbehavior on the set-top box because you have a plug -you have a polar issue or there is a strong ongoing -- so yes, on inter -- you can identify that, you can put that in the card, but in practice, you will never take the risk to shoot all of your religious subscriber, the poor guy paying because they don't try to hack into the system.

Q Sir, wasn't there an ECM issue that was designed to
detect if somebody was sending more bytes to the communication buffer than it could handle?

A Yeah, we did that, yes.

Q And the second step of that countermeasure was to mark the EEPROM permanently with a mark that could then be spotted by the next transmission and killed, right?

A Yes, that's correct. But to my understanding, it was dissuasive means, and we never used that feature to kill the card in the end. I think we were told it was too risky to take that decision. If something -- if just one byt is flip in the card, you just want to kill the card. You just imagine the risk and the impact could stop business. It cannot be taken.

So it was a single well-thought engineered design, but business-wise, nobody will take the risk. There was no insurance -- if something was going wrong there, you will not just say, "Okay, sorry. We just tested the wrong byte or maybe some bytes just flipped in the card, and we just killed it. So sorry, Mr. Ergen, you are out of business." Q And who made that decision? Was it Mr. Ergen? A On what, on not to use that?

Q Yes.

A No. I think -- I think most of the times the people involved there were the senior management of EchoStar, but not Charlie directly.

Q Could the electronic countermeasure detect the fact that a card had not taken the software patch?

A So we have -- we have means to try to check what is in the card, so we have means to do what we call, and sorry to be technical again, checksum on part of the memory to say, "Okay, that part of that memory looks okay." So that means it might be located by way of the patch there. To do an entire check of the memory takes times, in time of computation times.

THE COURT: We are going to take a recess at this time, Counsel.

MR. STONE: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, why don't you take a recess. You are admonished not to discuss this matter amongst yourselves, nor form or express any opinion concerning this case. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, sir. If you will please step down and return at 10 minutes after the hour.
(The following proceedings is taken outside the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: Counsel, let me hold all of you for just a moment, and the gentleman who are counsel in the office -- or in the audience representing some of the respective parties.

Why don't you have a seat, and thank you for your
courtesy. I am still shocked when people stand in my court after being seated for so long on criminal matters, but thank you.

Along the way I've tried to indicate to counsel for both parties some areas of concern that may place the parties in a difficult position at the time of argument, and I think that this is at the beginning of this gentleman's testimony, and I foresee many other witnesses who are going to testify for EchoStar, and later for NDS, the same problem may present itself.

Counsel, why don't you have a seat. Thank you.
This Court has repeatedly stated this Court's concern about the respective parties withholding potentially material information, and I've left that statement in a rather neutral position over the last three years. This Court has repeatedly praised the laboring attorneys in this court, but also, frankly, applied as much pressure as possible concerning discovery requests and the full compliance with these orders.

Now, this Court humbly recognizes that I have limited jurisdiction limited to 150 miles, but I've also repeatedly warned the parties that the best evidence is to be produced in front of this jury. International companies, their management, their ownership may perceive that either distance or lack of jurisdiction make a court impotent.

I've repeatedly said to counsel that I would not allow, at least the justice system $I$ believe in so strongly, to be manipulated, and there's been a course that I repeatedly say and continue to say to you on this day of literally pirates, witnesses and our corporate decisions, bluntly, leading to depositions being taken by hard-working attorneys for both sides, and then the choice through whatever tactical or managerial decisions, whether it's attorneys or ownership, deciding that this case initially was going to be postured so that the plaintiff and defendant would literally have the access to many of these alleged pirates and literally the power to bring these persons to court but are not doing so. We need to recall all of those discussions. This is a repeated mantra, and it will lead to some of the discovery disputes that are now forthcoming before this Court.

I've stated to counsel, both on the record and in some of the Saturday sessions, that much of the evidence that each you rely upon come from an alleged pirate community across the world that, quite frankly, the Court doesn't have jurisdiction through -- or of, except through your willingness to bring people to court so that the jury has a full and fair proceeding, and that each of you have the opportunity to cross-examine. And I've repeatedly said to you that $I$ was concerned with a witness giving consent to
have a deposition two years ago in another jurisdiction and choosing to answer the questions that they chose to answer, and you were placed in the untenable position as esteemed counsel of presenting a case were the pirates were really making a choice or witnesses or corporations were making a choice who to present.

You recall that I've divided out most of the witnesses in this case trying to labor and find which of them has received past compensation, present compensation or have a nexus to your various companies, and that was simply in an effort, frankly, to apply pressure to you to send messages to the multinational corporations that a jury needs to have available witnesses subject to cross-examination with the most recent discovery possible. And I think we've all informally agreed and formally agreed and statements have been made on the record that we probably have discovered and had more discovery literally in the last few weeks to a month than we had in the last three years, you know, of broad and far-reaching discovery requests that don't seem to have complied with until recently, or some of them, anyway.

So I state to you now, as I've repeatedly stated, that this Court will not allow, at least in this American system of jurisprudence, these issues to be decided by snippets of depositions or by testimony that the pirate
community or corporate structure, and I don't include counsel, but just in case, tactical decisions made by the attorneys. This is old hat; we've talked about this numerous times.

Now, these depositions have reeked of various witnesses outside of the Court's jurisdiction failing to answer questions, choosing not to and, frankly, just ignoring some of the questions, and it set this Court on alert early on in the proceedings. Some of the witnesses were literally available to both the plaintiff and the defendant, and so this is a broad statement finding fault with neither party at this point, but you'll see the warning I'm about to send.

And then after literally repeated and threatened adverse inferences have you been successful as counsel with the Court's full compliment, frankly, to the trial attorneys on both sides, I think have been able to persuade whoever those entities are to bring these witnesses to court, and it's about as fair, finally, as we can have a proceeding, I think, with where we started. I think we counted literally 14 to 16 people who were not going to testify who now are going to testify. I believe the message was certainly received by each of you as counsel, and I think eventually by the ownership and management.

I've counseled the parties that putting a face
also on corporate entities may be critical, and so you've been forewarned when Mr. Ergen testified and, in fact, was literally requesting his testimony at the last moment when $I$ used my discretion. And apparently, Mr. Kudelski, or Henri, will be present, not Andre. The Court has no intention, of course, of forcing Andre Kudelski to come to court.

But I've also counseled you that the arguments regarding knowledge of satellite piracy and the conduct that this Court is hearing could be perceived by a jury or other entities to be so egregious that privacy of this type can only be condoned, sanctioned or blinked at at the very highest levels of corporate management and/or corporations. And I think just recently I placed both of you on notice that when it comes to argument, whether Mr. Peled testifies or not, I've simply counseled you in terms of fairness and counseled the Kudelskis through their counsel in terms of fairness, and I believe Mr. Murdoch in terms of fairness, that if you choose to produce those people, so be it, but if you choose not to, though, you enter at your own risk, because jurors are entitled to see when these types of allegations of satellite piracy to this alleged extent occur and/or the stealing of NDS's documents in some nondescript airport near the Arctic Circle in Canada someplace in the middle of the night that each of the corporate heads or owners are able to look at the jury in the eyes, as

Mr. Ergen did, and state, "I didn't do it. I didn't know about it. It never came to my attention." So therefore, everybody is on your own risk.

I know you're making up your mind about Mr. Murdoch, Mr. Peled and one of the Kudelskis. You are on fair notice about that because the Court intends to have far-ranging arguments, and I am not going to bring either party in. So therefore, once again, I'm placing you on notice about who appears and whether you choose to put a corporate face lies totally with your responsibility, and the Court will not countenance or hear at the last moment, "Judge, this is unfair." You've been placed on notice at least three times, at least on the record, and on more times imaginable on our Saturday sessions.

Their absence may be detrimental to your respective arguments, and I'll leave it at that.

I want to turn to the real reason for my discussion with you at this juncture, and that is -- finding no fault with the last witness, nor with any future witnesses -- the lack of production of material evidence that each of you have been chagrined about as counsel and have made accusations about the other party over the last three years. I think it's been almost equal.

I think, Mr. Hagan, you've been affronted and concerned on behalf of EchoStar, as Mr. Snyder has been
affronted and concerned on behalf of the NDS Group, and you've come into my court ably at 7:00 in the morning, 7:30, after hours, I've seen a lot of you in the last couple of years, and you've repeatedly asked the court not to put this case on the fast track because you needed time. These omissions or the perceived lack of compliance concerning material evidence that's been requested by the parties over the last years may now have tragic consequences at trial. This Court may be giving a neutral, a nonspecific instruction regarding material evidence within the control of a party. It would not be pinpointed, and the offending party would not be left with a specified or a specific instruction. My belief is that at the end of the case, this may turn out to be coequal with the discovery disputes that the two of you had in the past, but I'm going to use one example that just occurred, and then leave it to NDS in the future or EchoStar at present.

In taking example 816, if you have that document in front of you, counsel may be allowed -- I am not saying you will be yet -- to argue that the attempt to show NagraStar hacking of DirecTV or the reverse engineering was common, which was your attempt on cross-examination, Mr. Stone, of the present witness.
And in the e-mail, there was supposedly a zip
drive or attachment, if you turn to that, that was not
produced that you believe that Mr. Nicolas may have in his position, and my memory is that you asked him about that, and he basically said, "I don't know," or "I haven't checked."

Now, whatever corporate entity, whether it's your entity as NDS or EchoStar, choose to present as a witness, so be it, but so far I've gotten a rather low level, and I don't mean that disparagingly, but people who are coming in who, of course, have climbed the corporate chain of leadership and responsibility, whoever gave allegedly some of these orders, if they were given, will get lost in the minutia of the corporation. I'm wise enough to know that. So where does the responsibility lie if these accusations that each of you are leveling at each other? This potential instruction will be discussed later with counsel, but it is only fair to give the parties a chance to go back and search their files and place themselves in the most righteous and compliant position in front of this jury.

Three or four weeks from now, I will not countenance an argument that there is some unfairness in arguing for either party those material pieces of evidence that the party has in their control or should have in their control, so you go forward with this fair warning. Lack of resources will not be an excuse. The unwillingness to
search or just the flippancy of "I didn't look in the file" will not be an excuse when the best source often exists, but a thorough search hasn't been undertaken. Inconvenience with the flying across multinational boundaries will not be an excuse.

So I find no difficulty with Mr. Nicolas' testimony, but $I$ believe this is simply the beginning of a long litany for both sides, and therefore, I apologize to EchoStar if it seems targeted towards Mr. Nicolas, it's not. Your frustration has been equal to NDS's frustration and EchoStar's frustration; they've matched. I have no way of knowing in three or four weeks of how that plays out, but by placing you on fair warning, I give you a chance to go back and search your file, have Mr. Nicolas back within 72 hours or by next Monday or Tuesday.

I give NDS fair warning to search their files, but I promise you the instruction that I draft will be neutral in that regard and not pinpointed, but a jury listening to this evidence $I$ think is well going to understand when a question is asked why an e-mail is produced but the attachment is not available, and an answer is forthcoming of "I just didn't check," or that nobody looked in the file for EchoStar or, later on, NDS, how devastating that will be.

Now, I've decided to talk to you about this now because unless given forewarning, I don't want you to be
caught by surprise with such a broad neutral but potentially devastating instruction in three to four weeks, so you are all on notice. I am going to give you 10 minutes for a recess. We will promptly resume at 3:15.
(Recess.)
(The following proceedings is taken in the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: All right. The jury is present, all counsel are present, and the witness is present.

And Counsel, your next question.
Mr. Nicolas?

Thank you, sir.
MR. STONE: Thank you, your Honor. I'd like to approach with these two demonstratives.

THE COURT: Counsel, you may. CHRISTOPHE NICOLAS, PLAINTIFFS' WITNESS, RESUMED. CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued.) BY MR. STONE:

Q The first one has a number A040, and it's basically the buffer memory. And all I want to do, Mr. Nicolas, is just give the folks on the jury just a sense of what we were talking about when we say "buffer overflow." And if I understand it correctly, you've got a buffer of a certain size, and this is 64 bytes, which is actually hexadecimal bytes. I think the decimal is a hundred bytes with the

ROM 3 card; does that sound about right?
A I think it's more that 64 bytes, so maybe the 100 is right. I think we need to check that when I --

Q Depending on whether it's hex or decimals --

A Yeah.

Q Well, it won't matter for purposes of my demonstration, but as bytes come in, it goes down through the buffer, right? And when you get to 64, that's the limit of the buffer. But if you put more in, it will wrap around because of the memory aliasing effect, and then it comes back up to RAM, correct --

A That's correct.

Q -- in essence?

So to stop the overflow, what you want to do is put some code that says, "Hey, when you get an incoming message that's 64 bytes or less, okay; if it's more than 64 bytes, I'm going to stop listening"?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. So all the code does is count the number of bytes coming in to the buffer and cuts it off if it's beyond the size?

A That's correct.

Q All right. The next demonstrative is 1586. It's actually an exhibit. It's the original code from the ROM 3.

And your Honor, for the record, I'm just going to write
in blue marker on Exhibit 1586.

THE COURT: No demonstrative will be going into evidence. You may be able to use them in argument, but no demonstratives are going in for evidence.

MR. STONE: For record purposes, it's been designated as 1586.

THE COURT: Thank you.

BY MR. STONE:

Q Mr. Nicolas, $I$ don't know if you can see it.
A I have a copy of it in front. That's fine.
Q And these would be the comments to the ROM code for the IO buff, or the communications buffer; is that correct?

A That's correct, yes, sir.
Q And these are the comments that Mr. Osen wrote?
A Yeah, that was the comment in the file, so most probably Mr. Osen. I cannot make sure that it's him, but most probably.

Q And what we've done is blurred the code itself, but these are the comments that correlate to the code.

And that's his comment that says, "Note, that one should better check the value of APDU_index to make sure it does not go beyond the end of IO buff." The APDUX -- excuse me, the APDU_index is the index variable, correct?

A I think it's another index. The index variable will finger-point to the byte of where you need to write. The

APDU index is the length of the message that you need to store in the buffer.

Q And so you can check that value if it's more than the 64 or less than the 64 as we showed --

A That's correct.

Q All right. The next demonstrative is the patch code. It's actually just the comments to the patch code.

And for the record, your Honor, I'll just write 1587 on the demonstrative.

And can you read what Mr. Osen wrote there?

A Yes. That was part of the patch code, not all of the patch code. I think it's important to understand, and that's the part which will deal with the execution if that APDU LEN or lens in the code is greater than the buffer size.

Q And I know we can't see the code, but am I correct that the author of the code is doing two separate and different checks for buffer overflow?

A If I recall -- let me read the comment again.

I think on that part of the software it's not where you check the length. I think the lengths has already been checked before, that part of the code. And here, what you do is you do a clean up of the variable use, so you clear the LEN and you clear the APDU, and that's the first comment, so you would erase that information, and then you
would set one byt in the OTP, as you mentioned that we have depicted an attempt to write onto the card. So that part of the code has nothing to do with the check itself. It's more of the steps followed after the -- the overflow has been detected.

Q Yeah, I didn't -- I didn't make a demonstrative of the test, but there was a test that dealt with the APDU index and a test that dealt with the buffer, LEN, correct?

A Yeah, maybe. I don't recall the --
Q But there were two checks to make sure that the message coming in was the correct size, right?

A That's what $I$ don't remember, so if you can show me that, $I$ can tell you. Without showing me that, it's difficult.

Q Well, you can see that there are two remedial measures here that clears LEN, that is one remedial measure -A No. I think that's the two variable that was used, the length of the message and the APDU index, and those two are clear there because it's -- the detection has already been done, and you just clean up the -- the -- the -- the parmitter (phonetic) used there, and you just flag the flag that you have detected something wrong.

Q When you say "cleared," do you mean that if it was more than the 64 bytes, it would stop receiving the communication and then clear it?

A Again, if you reach that part of the software, you have already detected the fact that you are -- you have an attempt to use that buffer for overflow. It's not the part of the software which is used to detect that buffer overflow.

Q No, I understand. There is a detection mechanism, and once it's detected, it actually clears these variables so that nothing bad, no hanky-panky can occur, right?

A Yeah. The fact is that you clean up that to make sure that we will not start to receive more byte from the outside. Until you have the APDU index, which has reached zero, you are still thinking that you will receive more byte, so by clearing them -- by forcing them to zero, you make sure that you stop the reception of the byte in the -Q I'm sorry. Go ahead.

A -- in the card.

Q And then there is no way to overflow the buffer with this check and these clearing of the LEN and APDU index, correct?

A Can you repeat that?
Q There is no way to overflow the buffer once this process has been followed, correct?

A Again, it's not that process that prevent an attempt to overflow the buffer. It's another part of the code.

Q And this makes sure that it doesn't happen, correct?

A Not really. Again, it's another part of the software that do that.

Q Maybe I can be clearer.
What is it about clearing LEN and APDU index ensures there is no hanky-panky?

A Again, if $I$ recall correctly, after the check, we just want to make sure that we don't keep any trace of a parmitter which stall a value which exceeds the size of the buffer. We will suffer different types of attack afterwards, and if you can glitch or disable the check, the previous check, you don't want to have the card continue executing the reception of the byte there, so we detect those things. We remove all the wrong information in the card that may be misinterpreted by the code, and you mark in the OTP the fact that you have seen something wrong happening, and then you stop the card.

Q And did this change indeed make the card more robust?
A So those change for sure alter the -- the -- the usage
of the recipe as it was designed there until -- for some times, and then unfortunately they find all the flavor or other mean to attack against the ROM 3 card.

Q When you say "other mean," do you mean glitching?
A Yeah, glitching is one, and as soon as -- just to take
a few seconds to explain that. By "glitching" we mean an electrical glitch done on the card, and that glitch, which
is mainly hackers playing with the polar line on the card, will avoid the normal execution in the card of the software. So let's say you have a little check, and you glitch the recent time that the CPU needs to execute those code, you make a glitch, and the code is seen as a no -- a no operation, so the -- the -- the check itself is not done, and then you are back in business as a hacker, because the test that you have added to prevent the usage of the recipe is gone, and that was really what happened after a few times.

So we did the patch, and it was successful for some times, and as soon as they were mastering the glitch effect, by knowing the exact piece of information they need to glitch, by knowing the exact exit patch, the patch that we were using to do that by just glitching at the right time at the right instruction, the card was full open again. Q Now, sir, the ROM 3 card came with security registers that could detect attempts to glitch, correct?

A I think the card came with very basic, unfortunately, ways to detect attempt of the glitch, which was definitely not strong enough for that type of attack.

Q Are you aware that that security register was not even used in the ROM 3 card?

A Because $I$ think that one has been -- we tried, if $I$ recall correctly, to use them, to use it, but in the normal
set-top box, it was detecting almost glitching every --
every time, because the set-top box communication was so bad
in terms of perturbation, electrical perturbation, the card
was thinking it was under attack, so we cannot afford to --
to have a card that --
Q Sir, my question was simply, isn't it true that the
security register to detect glitching was not set in the ROM
3 code?
A Yeah, that's my point. We tried, and then we said it
was not usable, so we didn't use it.
Q Okay. I'd like to direct your attention to
Exhibit 1184, please.
A Is that the new one?
Q It's the new one, I'm sorry.
A Thank you.
Q Do you recognize Exhibit 1184, an e-mail exchange
including yourself and Andre Kudelski and Mr. Guggenheim?
A Yes, I do.
MR. STONE: Your Honor, I would move 1184.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. HAGAN: No objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: Received.
(Defense Exhibit No. 1184 is received in
evidence.)

BY MR. STONE:

Q Okay. Looking at the top, there is a question from Mr. Guggenheim to Henri, and that's Henri Kudelski?

A I don't have either of the first e-mail, but there is Henri mentioned in the other one, so I can assume that it's Henri, yes.

Q Did you say or testify earlier that Mr. Kudelski worked with you?

A Yeah, that's correct.

Q And did he work on the patch and the electronic countermeasure for the ROM 3 code?

A Henri was not directly working on the design there. He was more working -- sorry, not on the design, on the development. He was working on the design of the countermeasure in general terms.

Q Okay. The question to Henri from Alan Guggenheim was, "Thanks, but can we say categorically that the method described does not work anymore, and that the patch blocks all attacks of that type?" And then down below there is Mr. Kudelski's e-mail that included a copy to you that says, "Hi Alan, the last post gives you the answer," and it goes on to quote a post that's an attachment. It says, "I haven't analyzed the February update yet, but if it does check, to make sure the packet size is under 64 byte, then there is no way to send the packet to wrap around and
overwrite the stack." Do you see that?

A Yeah. I'm a bit confused the way you interpret that, because normally in a chain of e-mail, the answer -- you have the question, and then the answer come on top and not below that.

Q Was Mr. Guggenheim the customer for the cards that received the patch?

A What do you mean by "the customer"?

Q Well, the cards were issued to NagraStar, correct?
A The card was issued to NagraStar, that's correct, yes.

Q And Mr. Guggenheim was the CEO of NagraStar, correct?
A That's correct.

Q So he's the customer, correct?

A Yeah, he's the -- the CEO of the company that we sell the card, from NagraCard to NagraStar, that's correct, yes. Q And Mr. Guggenheim, the CEO, your customer, never said anything to you to indicate the patch did not prevent all buffer overflow attacks; isn't that true?

A Can you see that again?

Q Sure. Mr. Guggenheim, the CEO, the customer, never told you anything to indicate that he didn't believe the patch prevented all buffer overflow attacks.
(Witness consulting with Interpreter.)

THE WITNESS: We did talk about the effect of the patch with Mr. Guggenheim, if I understand correctly your
answer. Is there a statement from Mr. Guggenheim that there is other way to do the attack? I don't recall that specific statement.

BY MR. STONE:

Q Okay. If you could go to Exhibit 830, please.
Do you recognize Exhibit 830?

A It's an e-mail from Joel Conus to a lot of people along with myself.

MR. STONE: At this time $I$ would move Exhibit 830? THE COURT: Any objection? MR. HAGAN: No objection, your Honor. THE COURT: Received.
(Defense Exhibit No. 830 is received in evidence.)

BY MR. STONE:

Q And the date of this is February 23rd, 2001, correct?

A Correct, yes.

Q And one of Mr. Conus' responsibilities was to monitor the effectiveness of patches or electronic countermeasures, correct?

A That's correct, yes.
Q And it looks like this e-mail was also sent to Mr. Guggenheim who, as we've heard, is the CEO of the customer NagraStar, right?

A Yes.

Q And on the first page underneath the heading "Device" or "Devices Status"; do you see that?

A Yes, I see that.
Q And the reference to DNASP 003 would be the ROM 3 card, correct?

A That's correct, yes.
Q And the status that Mr. Conus listed was secured, correct?

A I think we have already debated that during the deposition. I think the status that he gave is secure but also VIP write in some card and card in -- in blocker not affected by -- by the update. So I think we -- we have described already before that after the -- the -- the broadcast of the patch, Smart Card that were in the set-top box may have received the -- the -- the patch, and then we would be secured against that flavor of the recipe. But some of the card would have already VIP write or $3 M$ write in the card, and those write will remain in the card, so those are not secured. And the third type of card is the one that has a blocker software that will avoid the reception of the recipe in the card, and those card would not be secured. So it's a three-step answer to your question, not only the first part.

Q What is the difference between "compromised" and "secured"?

A I think compromised, we have approved that something has happened on the card, and that some people might take advantage of that compromise. And "secured" means that we are just in the process to try to resecure the card by doing a patch, and you will see in those report for a given ROM, the status is moving from uncompromised, then compromised and then secured or resecured, going back to compromised each time the hacker starts to attack our card.

Q Well, did you ever report to your customer for the ROM 3 that it was no longer secured or that the hole was no longer closed?

A Yeah, probably we were hoping that the patch was -will be successful to keep the -- the card secure, definitely, yes.

Q So it's your recollection that Mr. Conus sent some kind of e-mail at some point after 2001 that listed the ROM 3
status as something other than secured or hole closed?

A I think that's -- that the time he's using, so according to the date, we were just after the broadcast of the patch, so hopefully just after that, we can say that the card that received the patch are in a secure state. (Live reporter switch with Sharon Seffens.) -OOO-
-OOO-

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

Date: April 16, 2008

JANE C.S. RULE, U.S. COURT REPORTER CSR NO. 9316

| A | APDU 23:1,14,24 | author 23:17 | broadcast 5:8,11 | 30:6,9 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| able 14:17 15:25 | 24:7,18 25:11 | available 7:5 | 6:19 7:15 32:14 | CARTER 1:3 |
| 22:3 | 25:18 26:4 | 13:13 14:10 | 33:19 | case 10:16 12:9 |
| ably 17:2 | APDUX 22:22 | 19:21 | buff 22:12,22 | 13:4,8 14:2 17:5 |
| above-entitled | APDU_index | avoid 5:17 27:2 | buffer 4:16 5:2 | 17:13 |
| 34:7 | 22:21,23 | 32:20 | 8:8 9:2 20:20,22 | categorically |
| absence 16:15 | apologize 19:8 | aware 27:22 | 20:23 21:7,9,20 | 29:17 |
| access 12:11 | apparently 15:4 | A040 20:19 | 22:12 23:2,14 | caught 20:1 |
| accusations 16:22 | APPEARANCES |  | 23:18 24:8 25:3 | Center 2:14 |
| 18:14 | 2:1 | B | 25:4,17,21,24 | CENTRAL 1:2 |
| activated 6:2 | appears 16:9 | back 6:9 18:17 | 26:9 30:18,22 | CEO 30:11,14,16 |
| added 27:8 | applied 11:17 | 9:13,14 21:10 | business 9:12,19 | 30:20 31:23 |
| admonished | apply 13:11 | 27:7 33:7 | 27:7 | certain 20:23 |
| 10:14 | approach 20:14 | bad 25:8 28:2 | business-wise | certainly 14:22 |
| advantage 33:3 | approved 33:1 | basic $27: 19$ | 9:15 | CERTIFICATE |
| adverse 14:15 | April 1:18 4:1 | basically 18:3 | byt 9:10 24:1 | 34:2 |
| afford 28:4 | 34:11 | 20:19 | byte 9:17 22:25 | certify 34:4 |
| affronted 16:24 | Arctic 15:23 | Battery 2:14,20 | 25:10,13,14 | CHAD 2:5 |
| 17:1 | areas 11:5 | beginning 11:7 | 26:12 29:24 | chagrined 16:21 |
| ago 13:1 | argue 17:20 | 19:7 | bytes 9:1,18 20:24 | chain 18:9 30:3 |
| agreed 13:15,15 | arguing 18:22 | beh | 20:25,25 21:2,7 | chance 18:16 |
| ahead 25:15 | argument 11:6 | behavior 5:20 | 21:16,16,20 | 19:13 |
| airport 15:23 | 15:14 18:21 | belief 17:13 believe 12.2 14:22 | 24:24 | change 26:17,18 |
| al 1:6,9 2:3,10 | 22:3 | believe 12:2 14:22 15:17 18:1 19:7 | C | Charlie 9:25 |
| Alan 29:16,21 alert 14:9 | arguments 15:7 16:7,16 | 150:21 | California 1:2,17 | $\begin{gathered} \text { check } 10: 3,8 \\ 10 \cdot 2221 \cdot 3 \end{gathered}$ |
| alert 14:9 <br> aliasing 2 | asked 17:4 18:2 | best 11:22 19:2 | 1:23 2:15,21 4:1 | 22:21 23:3,21 |
| allegations 15:21 | 19:20 | better 22:21 | call 5:17 10:4 | 24:3 25:18 26:6 |
| alleged 12:11,19 | ASSOCIATES | beyond 21:20 | called 7:1 | 26:10,11 27:3,6 |
| 15:21 | 2:4 | 22:22 | Canada 15:23 | 29:24 |
| allegedly 18:10 | assume 29:5 | bit 30:2 | $\underset{8.5,6}{\text { capability } 7: 18}$ | checked 18:4 |
| allow 12:2 13:23 allowed 4:16 | attachment 17:25 19:21 29:22 | black 4:14,25 <br> blinked 15:11 | $\begin{aligned} & 8: 5,6 \\ & \text { card 4:17 5:3,10 } \end{aligned}$ | 23:22 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { allowed } 4: 16 \\ & 17: 19 \end{aligned}$ | attack 4:16 5:3 | blocker 5:17,22 | 5:18,18,20,22 | $\begin{array}{\|c} \text { checks } 23: \\ 24: 10 \end{array}$ |
| alter 26:18 | 8:14,16,18 26:9 | 6:21 32:11,20 | 6:1,7,7,14,14,17 | checksum 10:5 |
| American 13:23 | 26:21 27:21 | blocks 29:18 | 6:20,20,24 7:12 | choice 12:7 13:5,6 |
| Ana 1:17,23 4:1 | 28:4 31:2 33:8 | blue 22:1 | 7:14,22,24 8:9 | choose 15:18,19 |
| analyzed 29:23 | attacks 29:19 | bluntly 12:6 | 8:13,14,15,17 | 16:9 18:6 |
| Andre 15:5,6 | 30:18,22 | blurred 22:18 | 8:22 9:9,11,11 | choosing 13:2 |
| 28:17 | attempt 17:20,22 | bought 6:1 | 9:18 10:2,4 21:1 | 14:7 |
| and/or 15:12,22 | 24:2 25:3,23 | boundaries 19:4 | 24:2 25:16 | chose 13:2 |
| answer 4:10 5:18 | 27:20 | box 4:14,25 5:9 | 26:11,14,16,17 | CHRISTINE 2:6 |
| 5:20 13:2,2 14:7 | attempts 27:18 | 5:10 6:7,12,15 | 26:21,25 27:1,2 | CHRISTOPHE |
| 19:21 29:21 | attention 16:2 | 8:12,19 28:1,2 | 27:16,17,19,23 | 3:7 4:7 20:16 |
| 30:3,4 31:1 | 28:11 | 32:15 | 28:3,5 30:10,15 | Circle 15:23 |
| 32:22 | attorneys 2:4,7,11 | brand 6:6 | 32:4,11,11,14 | clean 23:23 24:20 |
| anymore 4:19 7:6 | 2:13,18,20 | bring 12:12,22 | 32:17,18,18,19 | 25:9 |
| $29: 18$ | 11:16 12:7,9 | 14:18 16:7 | 32:21,21 33:2,4 | clear 6:9,11 23:23 |
| anyway 13:21 | 14:3,16 audience | $\begin{array}{r} \text { broad 13:19 } \\ 14: 1120: 1 \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} 33: 8,13,21 \\ \text { cards 5:7,13 7:13 } \end{gathered}$ | 23:24 24:19,25 |


| clearer 26:3 | concerned 12:25 | 20:9,10,15 | 33:19 34:11 | designed 4:13,24 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| clearing 25:13,18 | 16:25 17:1 | counseled 14:25 | DAVID 1:3 2:6,13 | 5:24 8:25 26:19 |
| 26:4 | concerning 10:16 | 15:7,15,16 | day 1:10 4:2 7:21 | detect 9:1 10:1 |
| clears 24:16 25:7 | 11:18 17:6 | count 21:19 | 12:4 | 25:4 26:12 |
| climbed 18:9 | condoned 15:11 | counted 14:20 | deal 6:25 7:3 | 27:18,20 28:7 |
| closed 33:11,17 | conduct 15:8 | countenance | 23:13 | detected 24:5,22 |
| code 21:15,19,24 | Conference 34:9 | 16:11 18:21 | dealer 6:8 | 25:2,7 |
| 22:11,18,19 | conformance | countermeasure | dealt 24:7,8 | detecting 28:1 |
| 23:6,7,11,12,14 | 34:8 | 7:1,3,7,9,14,18 | debated 32:9 | detection 24:19 |
| 23:16,17,22 | confused 30:2 | 8:2,5,7 9:4 10:1 | Debbie 4:4 | 25:6 |
| 24:3 25:24 | consent 12:25 | 29:11,15 | December 7:4 | detrimental 16:15 |
| 26:14 27:4,5 | consequences | countermeasures | decide 8:17 | devastating 19:23 |
| 28:8 29:11 34:5 | 17:8 | 31:19 | decided 13:24 | 20:2 |
| coequal 17:14 | consulting 30:23 | couple 17:3 | 19:24 | development |
| come 12:19 15:6 | continue 12:4 | course 12:3 15:6 | deciding 12:9 | 29:14 |
| 17:2 21:7 30:4 | 26:11 | 18:9 | decimal 20:25 | Device 32:1 |
| comes 15:14 | Continued 4:7,8 | court 1:1,22,22 | decimals 21:4 | Devices 32:2 |
| 21:10 | 20:17 | 4:21 10:10,13 | decision 9:10,20 | difference 32:24 |
| coming 18:8 | control 17:10 | 10:21 11:1,12 | decisions 12:5,8 | different 23:17 |
| 21:20 24:11 | 18:23,24 | 11:16,17,20,25 | 14:2 | 26:9 |
| comment 22:15 | Conus 31:7,18 | 12:13,16,20,22 | defendant 12:10 | difficult 11:6 |
| 22:20 23:19,25 | 32:7 33:15 | 13:23 14:8,18 | 14:11 | 24:14 |
| comments 22:11 | copy 22:10 29:20 | 15:5,6,9 16:6,11 | Defendants 1:10 | difficulty 19:6 |
| 22:14,19 23:7 | corporate 12:5 | 17:2,4,9 20:8,15 | 2:10 | DILGER 2:12 |
| commercial 5:16 | 14:1 15:1,12,24 | 22:2,7 28:20,22 | Defense 3:14,15 | direct 3:6 28:11 |
| commit 4:16 | 16:10 18:5,9 | 31:10,12 34:14 | 28:23 31:13 | directly 9:25 |
| common 17:22 | corporation 1:6 | courtesy 11:1 | definitely 27:20 | 29:12 |
| communication | 2:3 18:12 | Court's 11:12 | 33:14 | DirecTV 17:21 |
| 8:13,14 9:2 | corporations 13:5 | 14:6,16 | demonstration | disable 26:10 |
| 24:24 28:2 | 13:12 15:12 | CPU 27:4 | 21:6 | discovered 13:17 |
| communications | correct 5:4,25 9:7 | criminal 11:2 | demonstrative | discovery 11:18 |
| 22:12 | 21:11,12,18,22 | critical 15:1 | 21:23 22:2 23:6 | 12:15 13:14,17 |
| community 12:20 | 22:12,13,23 | Cross 3:6 | 23:9 24:6 | 13:19 17:14 |
| 14:1 | 23:5,16 24:8,11 | cross-examinati... | demonstratives | discretion 15:4 |
| companies 11:23 | 25:19,22,25 | 4:8 13:13 17:22 | 20:14 22:4 | discuss 10:14 |
| 13:10 | 27:18 29:9 30:9 | 20:17 | Depending 21:4 | discussed 18:15 |
| company 30:14 | 30:10,11,12,13 | cross-examine | depicted 24:2 | discussion 16:18 |
| compensation | 30:15 31:16,17 | 12:24 | deploy 5:6 7:23 | discussions 12:14 |
| 13:9,9 | 31:20,21 32:5,6 | CSR 1:21 34:15 | deployed 4:13,25 | dish 6:12,16 |
| compliance 11:19 | 32:8 34:6 | customer 30:6,8 | 5:24 | disparagingly |
| 17:6 | correctly 5:5 | 30:13,16,20 | deposition 13:1 | 18:8 |
| compliant 18:18 | 20:23 26:6 | 31:24 33:9 | 32:10 | disputes 12:15 |
| complied 13:20 | 27:25 30:25 | cuts 21:20 | depositions 12:6 | 17:14 |
| compliment | correlate 22:19 | C.S 1:21 34:14 | 13:25 14:5 | dissuasive 9:8 |
| 14:16 | counsel 2:1 10:11 |  | described 29:18 | distance 11:25 |
| compromise 33:3 | 10:21,22 11:4 | D | 32:13 | District 1:1,2,22 |
| compromised | 11:11 12:1,17 | D 2:6,19 3:1 | design 5:6 7:14 | divided 13:7 |
| 32:24 33:1,6,7 | 13:4 14:2,15,23 | DARIN 2:12 | 9:14 29:12,13 | DNASP 32:4 |
| computation 10:9 | 15:16 16:21 | dark 7:19 | 29:14 | doable 7:15 |
| concern 11:5,13 | 17:19 18:16 | date 6:13 31:16 | designated 22:6 | document 17:18 |


| documents 15:22 | erase 23:25 | 25:2,9 26:15 | 10:19 20:6 | 28:1,7 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| doing 6:4,11 | Ergen 9:19,20 | failing 14:6 | forcing 15:6 | go 18:17,24 19:13 |
| 12:13 23:17 | 15:2 16:1 | fair 12:23 14:19 | 25:13 | 22:22 25:15 |
| 33:4 | essence 21:13 | 16:6 18:16,24 | foregoing 34:5 | 31:5 |
| draft 19:17 | esteemed 13:3 | 19:13,16 | foresee 11:8 | goes 21:7 29:21 |
| drive 17:25 | et 1:6,9 2:3,10 | fairness 15:15,17 | forewarned 15:2 | going 9:16 10:10 |
| E | eventually 14:23 | 15:17 | forewarning | 11:8 12:10 |
| E3:1 E | everybody 7:6 | far 18:7 | 19:2 | 14:21,22 16:7 |
| E 3:1 | 16:3 | far-ranging 16:7 | form 10:15 | 17:15 19:19 |
| er 29:7 | evidence 3:13 | far-reaching | formally $13: 15$ | 20:3 21:17,25 |
| early 14:9 | 11:22 12:18 | 13:19 | format 34:8 | 22:2,4 33:7 |
| EBERHART | 16:20 17:7,10 | fast 17:5 | forthcoming | gotten 18:7 |
| 2:13 | 18:22 19:19 | fault 14:11 16:19 | 12:15 19:21 | greater 23:14 |
| EchoStar 1:6 2:3 | 22:3,4 28:24 | feature 6:25 8:11 | forward 18:24 | group 1:9 2:10 |
| 9:24 11:9 16:25 | 31:14 | 9:8 | Fountainview 2:7 | 5:16,16 17:1 |
| 17:17 18:6 19:9 | exact 7:4 27:13,14 | February 29:23 | four 18:20 19:12 | Guggenheim |
| 19:23 | exactly $8: 7$ | 31:16 | 20:2 | 28:17 29:3,16 |
| EchoStarD4V4 | EXAMINATION | Federal 1:22 | Francisco 2:15,21 | 30:6,11,16,20 |
| 1:25 | 3:4 | feel 8:18 | frankly 11:17 | 30:25 31:1,23 |
| EchoStar's 19:11 | example 17:16,18 | FEY 2:24 | 12:20 13:11 | guy 7:21 8:23 |
| ECM 8:25 | exceeds 26:8 | field 8:18 | $14: 7,16$ freely $7 \cdot 5$ | H |
| ${ }_{\text {economically }}^{\text {7:25 }}$ | exchange 28:16 <br> excuse 18:25 19:2 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { file } 19: 1,14,22 \\ & 22 \cdot 15 \end{aligned}$ | freely $7: 5$ <br> French 2:24 | hack 8:24 |
| EEPROM 8:9 9:5 | 19:5 22:22 | files 18:17 19:16 | front 11:23 17:19 | hacker 5:15 8:1 |
| effect 21:10 27:12 | execute 27:4 | finally 14:19 | 18:18 22:10 | 27:7 33:8 |
| 30:24 | executing 26:12 | find 5:12 13:8 | frustration 19:10 | hackers 6:4 27:1 |
| effectiveness | execution 23:13 | 19:6 26:20 | 19:10,11 | hacking 17:21 |
| 31:19 | 27:2 | finding 14:11 | full 11:18 12:23 | Hagan 2:5 16:24 |
| effort 13:11 | exhibit 3:13 21:24 | 16:18 | 14:16 27:16 | 28:21 31:11 |
| egregious 15:10 | 22:1 28:12,16 | fine $22: 10$ | fun 7:22 | handle 9:2 |
| either 11:24 16:7 | 28:23 31:5,6,9 | finger-point | future 16:19 | hanky-panky |
| 18:22 29:4 | 31:13 | 22:25 | 17:17 | 25:8 26:5 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { electrical 26:25 } \\ & 28: 3 \end{aligned}$ | EXHIBITS 3:11 | first 7:10 20:19 | G | happen 25:25 happened 7:5 |
| electronic 7:1,7 | exit 27:14 | 32:23 | Gale 4:4 | 27:9 33:2 |
| 10:1 29:10 | explain 26:24 | fix $6: 8,23$ | general 29:15 | happening 26:16 |
| 31:19 | express 10:15 | flag 24:21,21 | gentleman 10:22 | hard-working |
| Embarcadero | extensive 7:23 | flavor 26:20 | gentleman's 11:7 | 12:6 |
| 2:14 | extent 5:6 15:21 | 32:16 | gentlemen 10:13 | HARTSON 2:18 |
| engineer 7:23 | extract 7:12 | flip 9:10 | give 18:16 19:13 | hat 14:3 |
| engineered 9:14 | eyes 15:25 | flippancy 19:1 | 19:16 20:3,21 | heading 32:1 |
| engineering 17:21 | e-mail 17:24 | flipped 9:18 | given 18:11 19:25 | heads 15:24 |
| ensures 26:4 | 19:20 28:16 | flow 8:15 | 33:5 | hear 16:11 |
| enter 15:19 | 29:4,20 30:3 | flying 19:4 | gives 29:21 | heard 31:23 |
| entire 10:8 | 31:7,22 33:16 | focus 8:2 | giving 12:25 17:9 | hearing 15:9 |
| entities 14:18 | E3M 5:16 | folks 20:21 | glitch 26:10,25,25 | held 34:7 |
| 15:1,10 |  | follow 4:19 5:4 | 27:3,5,12,14,18 | help 4:19 |
| entitled 15:20 | F | followed 24:4 | 27:20 | Henri 15:4 29:3,3 |
| entity 18:5,6 | face 14:25 16:10 | 25:22 | glitching 26:22,23 | 29:5,6,12,16 |
| equal 16:23 19:10 | fact 5:5 10:1 15:2 | following 4:5 5:5 | 26:24 27:15 | hex $21: 4$ |


| hexadecimal | informally 13:15 | K | line 27:1 | measures 24:15 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 20:24 | information 7:12 | 2 | listed 32:7 33:16 | mechanism 25:6 |
| Hey 21:15 | 11:14 23:25 | KENNETH 2:19 | listening 19:18 | memory 10:5,6,8 |
| Hi 29:21 | 26:13 27:13 | kill 8:17 9:8,11 | 21:17 | 18:2 20:20 |
| highest 15:12 | initially 12:9 | killed 8:10 9:6,19 | litany 19:8 | 21:10 |
| HOGAN 2:18 | instruction 17:10 | kind 33:15 | literally 12:5,11 | mentioned 24:1 |
| hold 10:21 | 17:13 18:15 | KLEIN 2:19 | 12:12 13:17 | 29:5 |
| hole 33:10,17 | 19:17 20:2 | know 6:13 7:13 | 14:10,14,20 | message 14:22 |
| Honor 10:12 | 27:16 | 7:19,20 8:4,7 | 15:3 | 21:15 23:1 |
| 20:13 21:25 | instructions 4:15 | 13:19 16:1,4 | little 27:3 | 24:10,18 |
| 23:8 28:19,21 | 5:1 | 18:3,12 22:9 | Live 4:4 33:22 | messages 13:12 |
| 31:11 | insurance 9:16 | 23:16 | LLP 2:11,18 | method 29:17 |
| HONORABLE | intends 16:6 | knowing 19:12 | located 10:7 | middle 15:24 |
| 1:3 | intention 15:5 | 27:13,14 | long 11:2 19:8 | miles 11:21 |
| hooked 6:12 | inter 8:21 | knowledge 15:8 | longer 33:10, 11 | million 5:11 |
| hooking 6:15 | International | Kudelski 15:4,6 | look 15:25 19:1 | mind 16:4 |
| hopefully 33:20 | 11:23 | 28:17 29:3,7 | looked 19:22 | minutes 10:18 |
| hoping 33:12 | internet 4:14,15 | Kudelskis 15:16 | Looking 29:2 | 20:3 |
| hour 10:18 | 5:1,2 6:6 7:21 | 16:5 | looks 10:6 31:22 | minutia 18:12 |
| hours 17:3 19:14 | interpret 30:2 | Kudelski's 29:20 | lost 18:11 | misbehavior 8:19 |
| Houston 2:8 | Interpreter 2:24 |  | lot 17:3 31:7 | misinterpreted |
| humbly 11:20 | 30:23 | L | low 18:7 | 26:14 |
| hundred 20:25 | involved 9:24 | L 2:12,19 | M | modified 6:21 |
| I |  | labor 13:8 |  | 10:22 |
| Identification |  |  | making 13:5,5 |  |
| 3:13 |  | lack 11:25 16:20 | 16:4 |  |
| identify 7:11,13 |  | . 6 |  |  |
| 8:21 | es 13:24 | Ladies 10:13 |  | month 13:18 |
| ignoring 14:8 | :10 4:2 | Law 2:4,7,11,13 | 15:12 | morning 17:2 |
| imaginable 16:14 | J |  | managerial 12:8 | moving 33:6 |
| imagine 8:17 9:12 | Jane 1:21 34:14 | leadership 18:10 | manipulated 12:3 | multinational |
| immediately 4:13 | JEAN-MARIE | leading 12:6 | mantra 12:14 | 13:12 19:4 |
| 4:24 | 2:24 | leave 16:16 17:16 | mark 8:9 9:4,5 | Murdoch 15:17 |
| impact 9:12 | Joel 31:7 | left 11:14 17:12 | 26:14 | 16:5 |
| important 7:10 | Judge 1:3 16:12 | LEN 23:14,24 | marker 22:1 | MYERS 2:11 |
| 23:12 | Judicial 34:9 | $24: 8,1625: 18$ | mastering 27:12 |  |
| impotent 11:25 | juncture 16:18 | $26: 4$ | matched 19:11 | N |
| include 14:1 | jurisdiction 11:21 | length 23:1,21 | material 11:14 | N 3:1 |
| included 29:20 | 11:25 12:21 | $24: 18$ | 16:20 17:7,10 | NagraCard 30:15 |
| including 28:17 | 13:1 14:6 | lengths 23:21 | 18:22 | NagraStar 17:21 |
| incoming 21:15 | jurisprudence | \|lens 23:14 | matter 10:15 21:6 | 30:9,10,11,15 |
| Inconvenience | 13:24 | let's 27:3 | 34:7 | 31:24 |
| 19:3 | jurors 15:20 | level 8:13 18:7 | matters 11:2 | Name 3:6 |
| index 22:23,24,24 | jury 1:16 4:6 | leveling 18:14 | mean 6:20 18:8 | NATHANIEL |
| 23:1 24:7,18 | 10:20 11:23 | levels 15:12 | 24:23 26:21,22 | 2:12 |
| 25:11,18 26:4 | 12:22 13:12 | lie 18:13 | 26:22,24 30:8 | NDS 1:9 2:10 11:9 |
| indicate 11:4 | 15:9,25 18:19 | lies 16:10 | means 9:8 10:3,4 | 17:1,16 18:6 |
| 30:17,21 | 19:18 20:7,8,21 | limit 21:8 | 10:6 33:3 | 19:16,23 |
| inferences 14:15 | justice 12:2 | limited 11:21,21 | measure 24:16 | NDS's 15:22 |


| 19:10 | once 16:8 25:7,21 | 29:10,18 30:7 | polar 8:20 27:1 | properly 8:15 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| near 15:23 | ongoing 8:20 | 30:17,22,25 | poor 8:23 | protect 5:6,9 |
| need 5:8 7:6,11, 11 | oOo 33:23 34:1 | 32:14,15 33:5 | position 11:6,15 | protected 5:13,21 |
| 7:12 12:13 21:3 | open 27:16 | 33:12,20,21 | 13:3 18:2,18 | publication 8:4 |
| 22:25 23:1 | operation 27:6 | patches 6:11 | possible 6:8,15 | published 6:5 |
| 27:13 | opinion 10:15 | 31:19 | 11:18 13:14 | publishing 7:21 |
| needed 17:5 | opportunity | paying 8:23 | post 29:21,22 | purchase 6:67:11 |
| needs 13:12 27:4 | 12:24 | Peled 15:14 16:5 | posted 4:15 5:2 | purposes 21:6 |
| neither 14:12 | orders 11:19 | people 9:23 11:1 | posting 7:5 | 22:5 |
| neutral 11:15 | 18:11 | 12:22 14:21 | postings 4:15 5:1 | pursuant 34:4 |
| 17:9 19:17 20:1 | original 21:24 | 15:18 18:8 31:7 | postured 12:10 | put 6:8,22 7:14 |
| never 8:22 9:8 | Osen 22:14,16 | 33:2 | potential 18:15 | 8:21 16:9 17:4 |
| 16:2 30:16,20 | 23:10 | perceive 11:24 | potentially 11:13 | 21:9,14 |
| new 6:6 28:13,14 | OTP 8:9 24:1 | perceived 15:9 | 20:1 | putting 5:16 6:16 |
| nexus 13:10 | 26:15 | 17:6 | power 12:12 | 14:25 |
| Nicolas 3:7 4:7 | outside 10:19 | permanently 9:5 | practice 8:22 | p.m 4:3 |
| 18:1 19:6,9,14 | 14:6 25:11 | persons 12:12 | praised 11:16 |  |
| 20:11,16,20 | overflow 4:16 5:3 | persuade 14:17 | presence 4:6 | $\mathbf{Q}$ |
| 22:9 | 8:8 20:22 21:14 | perturbation 28:3 | 10:20 20:7 | question 4:11,12 |
| night 15:24 | 23:18 24:4 25:3 | 28:3 | present 2:23 | 4:21 19:20 |
| NOLL 2:6 | 25:5,17,21,24 | phonetic 24:21 | 11:10 13:6,9 | 20:10 28:6 29:2 |
| nondescript | 30:18,22 | pick 7:17 | 15:5 17:17,23 | 29:16 30:4 |
| 15:22 | overwrite 30:1 | piece 27:13 | 18:6 20:8,9,9 | 32:22 |
| nonspecific 17:9 | owners 15:25 | pieces 18:22 | presenting 13:4 | questions 13:2 |
| normal 5:19 6:13 | ownership 11:24 | pinpointed 17:11 | PRESIDING 1:3 | 14:7,8 |
| 27:2,25 | 12:9 14:24 | 19:18 | pressure 11:17 | quite 12:20 |
| normally 30:3 | O'MELVENY | piracy 7:16 15:8 | 13:11 | quote 29:22 |
| Note 22:20 | 2:11 | $15: 21$ | pretty 6:9,11 | R |
| 16:9,12 20:3 | P | 7:22 12:19 | 27:8 30:17 | R 2:13 |
| number 20:19 | packet 29:24,25 | 13:25 | prevented 30:22 | RAM 21:11 |
| 21:19 | page 32:1 34:8 | pirates 12:5,12 | previous 26:11 | reach 25:1 |
| numerous 14:4 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { parmitter 24:21 } \\ & 26: 8 \end{aligned}$ | 13:4 | privacy 15:10 | reached 25:11 read 23:10,19 |
| 0 | part 10:5,6 23:11 |  | $22: 16,1733: 12$ | real 16:17 |
| O 1:3 | 23:13,20,22 | 16:12 | problem 8:13 | really 13:4 $26: 1$ |
| objection 28:20 | 24:2 25:1,3,24 | placing 16:8 | 11:9 | 27:9 |
| 28:21 31:10,11 | 26:1 32:23 | 19:13 | proceeding 12:23 | reason 16:17 |
| occur 15:21 25:8 | parties 10:24 11:5 | plaintiff 12:10 | 14:19 | recall 12:13 13:7 |
| occurred 17:16 | 11:6,13,22 | 14:10 | proceedings 1:15 | 23:19 24:9 26:6 27.25 31:2 |
| October 4:14,25 | 14:25 17:7 | Plaintiffs 1:7 2:3 | 4:5 10:19 14:9 | 27:25 31:2 |
| offending 17:11 | 18:16 | 4:7 20:16 | 20:6 34:7 | receive 5:9 6:13 |
| office 10:23 | party 14:12 16:8 | playing 27:1 | process 25:22,23 | $\begin{aligned} & 6: 18,22,23 \\ & 25 \cdot 1012 \end{aligned}$ |
| Official 1:22 <br> okay 4:12,22 7:8 | 16:22 17:11,12 | plays 19:12 | 33:4 | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline \text { 25:10,12 } \\ \text { received 5:7 13:9 } \end{array}$ |
| okay $4.12,227: 8$ $8: 159: 17$ 210:6,6 | 18:22,23 | PLC 1:9 2:10 please 10:17 | produce 15:18 produced 11:23 | 14:23 28:22,23 |
| 21:16,19 28:11 | 5:7,23 6:3, 18, 18 | 28:12 31:5 | produ 19:20 | 30:7 31:12,13 |
| 29:2,16 31:5 | 6:22 10:2,7 23:6 | plug 8:19 | production 16:20 | 32:1533:21 |
| old 14:3 | 23:7,11,12 | point 7:4 14:12 | promise 19:17 | receiver 6:18 receiving 24:24 |
| omissions 17:6 | 27:11,14,14 | 28:9 33:16 | promptly 20:4 | receiving 24:24 |

reception 25:14 26:12 32:20
recess 10:10,14 20:4,5
recipe 5:13 6:24
7:5 26:19 27:8 32:16,21
recognize 28:16 31:6
recognizes 11:20
recollection 33:15
record 12:17
13:16 16:13
21:25 22:5 23:8
Recross 3:6
Redirect 3:6
reeked 14:5
reference 32:4
regard 19:18
regarding 15:8 17:10
register 27:22 28:7
registers 27:17
regular 6:11
regulations 34:9
religious 8:23
rely $12: 19$
remain 32:18
remedial 24:15,16
remember 24:12
remove 6:7,14 26:13
repeat 4:11 25:20
repeated $12: 14$ 14:14
repeatedly 11:12
11:16,22 12:1,4 12:24 13:22 17:4
rephrase 4:18
report 33:5,9
reported 34:6
reporter 1:22 4:4 33:22 34:14
REPORTER'S 1:15
representing 10:23
requested 17:7
requesting 15:3
requests 11:18 13:19
resecure 33:4
resecured 33:7
resources 18:25
respective 10:24
11:13 16:16
responsibilities 31:18
responsibility
16:10 18:10,13
resume 20:4
RESUMED 20:16
retail 5:12
return 10:18
reverse 17:21
RICHARD 2:19
right 9:6 20:8
21:1,3,8,23 23:6
24:11 25:8
27:15,16 31:24
righteous 18:18
risk 8:22 9:12,15
15:19 16:3
risky 9:9
robust 26:17
ROM 4:17 5:3
21:1,24 22:11
26:21 27:17,23 28:7 29:11 32:4 33:5,10,16
Room 1:23
Rule 1:21 34:14
S
SACV 1:8
San 2:15,21
sanctioned 15:11
Santa 1:17,23 4:1
satellite 1:6 2:3
15:8,21
Saturday 12:18 16:14
saying 17:19
says 21:15 22:20 29:20,22
search 18:17 19:1 19:3,14,16
seat 10:25 11:11
seated 11:2
second 6:25 9:4
seconds 26:24
section 8:9 34:4
secure 32:10 33:13,21
secured 32:7,16 32:19,21,25 33:3,7,10,17
security 27:17,22 28:7
see 14:12 15:20 22:9 23:16 24:15 30:1,19 32:2,3 33:5
seen 8:13 17:3 26:15 27:5
Seffens 33:22
sell 30:14
send 6:7,9 13:11 14:13 29:25
sending 9:1
senior 9:24
sense 7:25 20:21
sent 31:22 33:15
separate 23:17
sessions 12:18 16:14
set 14:8 24:1 $28: 7$
set-top 5:10 6:6 6:12,15 8:12,19 28:1,2 32:14
set-up 5:8
Sharon 33:22
shocked 11:1
shoot 7:19,20 8:5 8:7,8,23
show 17:20 24:12
showed 23:4
showing 24:13
sides 12:7 14:17 19:8
signal 5:8
simply 13:10 15:15 19:7 28:6
single 9:14
sir 6:17 7:2 8:25
10:17 20:12 22:13 27:17 28:6
size 20:24 21:21
23:15 24:11
26:8 29:24
Smart 8:17 32:14
snippets 13:25
Snyder 2:12 4:22
4:23 16:25
software 4:13,25
5:16,22 6:21
10:2 23:20 25:1
25:4 26:1 27:2
32:20
somebody 6:1 9:1
someplace 15:23
soon 6:2,6,7,12,14 7:4,16 26:23 27:12
sorry 4:10,18 9:17,19 10:4 25:15 28:14 29:13
sound 21:1
source 7:6,16 8:1 19:2
sources 7:8
specific 17:12 31:2
specified 17:12
spotted 9:6
stable 8:12
stack 30:1
stall 26:8
stand 11:1
start 25:10
started 14:20
starting 4:18
starts 33:8
state 13:22 16:1 33:21
stated 11:12 12:17 13:22
statement 11:14 14:11 31:1,3
statements 13:15
States 1:1,22 34:5 34:9
status 32:2,7,10 33:6,17
stealing 15:22
stenographically

34:6
step 9:4 10:17
steps 6:13 24:4
Stone 2:19 3:7 4:9
10:12 17:23
20:13,18 22:5,8
28:19 29:1 31:4 31:9,15
stop 8:3 9:12 21:14,17 24:24 25:14 26:16
store 5:12 23:2
stream 6:19
Street 1:23 2:14 2:20
strong 8:20 27:21
strongly $12: 2$
structure 14:1
stupid 6:5
subject 13:13
subscriber 8:23
successful 14:15 27:11 33:13
suffer 26:9
Suite 2:8,15,21
supposedly $17: 24$
sure $8: 122: 16,21$ 24:10 25:9,14 25:25 26:7,18 29:24 30:20
surprise 20:1
switch 4:4 33:22
system 5:20,21,23 6:2 7:15 8:24 12:2 13:24

## T

T 2:4,5
tactical 12:8 14:2
take 8:22 9:10,15
10:10,14 26:23
33:2
taken 4:5 9:13
10:2,19 12:6 20:6
takes 10:8
talk 19:24 30:24
talked 14:3
talking 20:22
target 7:7,11,20



