UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
HONORABLE DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE PRESIDING

ECHOSTAR SATELLITE CORP., et )
al., )

Plaintiffs, )
vs. ) No. SACV 03-950 DOC
) Day 4, Volume II
NDS GROUP PLC, et al., )
)

Defendants. )
$\qquad$ )

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS Jury Trial<br>Santa Ana, California<br>Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Debbie Gale, CSR 9472, RPR
Federal Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
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Echostar 2008-04-15 D4V2

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## ALSO PRESENT:

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Dov Rubin

I N D E X

WITNESSES
DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS
NICOLAS, Christophe
By Mr. Hagan
4

By Mr. Stone
9

EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT NO.
IDENTIFICATION
IN EVIDENCE
683 12-17-02 e-mail,
Guggenheim to
Nicolas, et al.
816 E-mail
44
1102 3-18-02 CIS invoice
with attachments

1148 Report 65

1234 E-mail
59

1249 E-mail
56

1251 7-2-01 e-mail, Conus
21
to Nicolas, et al.

SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA, TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 2008

Day 4, Volume II
(10:09 a.m.)
(Live reporter switch.)
(Previous proceedings reported by Jane Rule
in Volume I.)

CHRISTOPHE NICOLAS, PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS, PREVIOUSLY SWORN, CURRENTLY ON THE STAND DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. HAGAN:
Q. Mr. Nicolas, is it fair to it say that the basis for your knowledge, at least as of December 2000, comes for your discussions with representatives of NagraStar; isn't that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. So, we'll have him later in the trial.

But I want to focus now on the time period where you were given a copy of the defendant's Headend Report, Exhibit 98, the hack methodology they developed.

THE COURT: Just a moment. I may be able to take this subject to a motion to strike, and we may not have to keep him, as we're trying not to for both sides.

Who is going to testify concerning the allegation that Mr. Tarnovsky is Nipper or NipperClause?

MR. HAGAN: There are several witnesses from

NagraStar's side. It will be Alan Guggenheim.

THE COURT: Just a moment. And he's going to
testify when? Tomorrow?

MR. HAGAN: I believe so, yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And who else?

MR. HAGAN: And also Jerry Gee, J.J. Gee, who will be testifying later in the trial during the defendant's case in chief.

THE COURT: You're not to take this answer for the truth that it was quote/unquote Christopher Tarnovsky. But apparently later in the trial we're going to hear some foundation, some evidence from somebody else involved in this alleged investigation that led, apparently, EchoStar to believe it was a person or persons involved.

So I think instead of holding him from returning to France over the next few days to see how that develops, or weeks, the wise thing for me to do is take that subject to a motion to strike. But $I$ caution you in the strongest terms, if that foundation isn't laid, this information that you obtained, what could be frankly idle conversation about a guesstimate, will be stricken and I'll ask you to disregard it.

So, Counsel, I'll allow it subject to a motion to strike.

MR. HAGAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

BY MR. HAGAN:
Q. Mr. Nicolas, based on your understanding of the investigation into that posting, who do you believe is responsible for the December 21st, 2000, Nipper posting?

THE COURT: Now, before you get to that ultimate conclusion, let me ask you to inquire who he got this from, when this conversation took place, where this occurred, and with how many people. More specifics --

MR. HAGAN: Certainly, Your Honor.
THE COURT: -- instead of just an opinion.

BY MR. HAGAN:
Q. Mr. Nicolas, who were you able to discuss the investigation with within NagraStar? I'll just limit it to that because, $I$ know we'll have a number of other witnesses. But just within the NagraStar corporate entity.
A. So on the subject, my main contact was Alan Guggenheim, which was the CEO of NagraStar at that time.
Q. And --

THE COURT: Now, just a moment. That's going to raise later on how Mr. Guggenheim got this information.

MR. HAGAN: And we'll --

THE COURT: He's an engineer. What's your offer
of proof? What witness is conveying information to

Mr. Guggenheim, who will testify in front of this jury? MR. HAGAN: There are going to be a couple,

Your Honor. We anticipate the testimony of Ron Ereiser, Graham James, Tony Dionisi, and then other witnesses who may have relevant percipient knowledge on this fact, as well as Mr. Guggenheim's investigator, J.J. Gee.

THE COURT: Once again, subject to this motion to strike, I'll let him testify as to how he received the information, but then we'll trace the chain back eventually and see how Mr. Guggenheim testifies he received that information.

You may proceed.
BY MR. HAGAN:
Q. Mr. Nicolas, I'll fast-forward to one final issue that I believe you do have personal knowledge of. Once you saw a copy of the defendant's Headend Report -- we looked at it earlier as Exhibit 98 -- that described the hack methodology they developed for EchoStar's security system, at that point in time did you have any doubt in your mind who was responsible for the development of that hack and the publication of that hack?
A. For me at that time I have no doubt that either the people that have written the report or that have access to the report have been the one attacking EchoStar system. It was so clear that those four key weakness of the card have been used in the very same way in the recipe that is described both in the NipperClause publication and in the

Headend Report, that for me it's no doubt that it's the same person or people.

THE COURT: But you didn't have a specific person at that time. You believed that the method was the same; is that correct?

THE WITNESS: At the time that $I$ had access to the Headend Report is recently through the discovery. So if the question was about that --

THE COURT: All right.
Counsel, please continue.

BY MR. HAGAN:
Q. If I understand your testimony correctly, Mr. Nicolas, when you saw the defendant's report and you performed an analysis comparing their hack methodology to the Nipper hack methodology --
A. Yes.
Q. -- that was the first point in time in your mind that you became absolutely certain they were responsible for developing that hack and publishing that hack?
A. Yes, correct.

MR. HAGAN: Thank you, Mr. Nicolas.
Pass the witness.

THE COURT: Just a moment. We'll let Debbie stretch out for a moment.
(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: All right. Back on the record.

This is Mr. Stone on behalf of Defendant NDS. MR. STONE: Thank you, Your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Good morning, Mr. Nicolas.
A. Good morning.
Q. I wanted to make sure I understand a few things here.

Is it -- you're contending that Exhibit 998 is a posting on
an Internet website?
A. 998 is the one I've seen before.

MR. STONE: If we could show Exhibit 998.

THE WITNESS: Is that the one?

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Yeah. And that's actually -- if you look at the top of the page.
A. Okay.
Q. That's actually a text file, correct?
A. Yes, that's correct, yeah.
Q. And you mentioned some posting on December 21st.

That's the one that you claim was done by NDS or somebody on NDS's behalf; is that right?
A. That's the one I received when we did the analysis, yes.
Q. Have you ever seen any screen shot of any posting from

December 21st, 2000? Anyone ever provide that to you?
A. Do you mean until today?
Q. Yes.
A. Just seen one there (indicating), yeah.
Q. That's not a screen shot of a posting, sir, is it?

There's no information about a website on that document, is there?
A. Okay. So a screen shot for you is when you have the website?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Yes. I've seen some -- some of, yes.
Q. Have you seen any from December 21st, 2000?
A. Maybe, yes.
Q. I want to show you Exhibit 511-A, please, sir. It's in evidence. It's on the screen there, sir.
A. Okay.

MR. STONE: If we could zoom in little bit.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Now, this would be a screen shot of a website, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you understand that people can post things on websites?
A. Yeah. I understand that, yes.
Q. And the date on that posting that you have in front of
is December 23rd, 2000, correct?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And the person who posted it used the name xbr21?
A. That's apparently the alias used for that posting, yes.
Q. And if we can pull it down, I think we can see that's the same text file you're referring to.

MR. HAGAN: Can we get a copy of it?

MR. STONE: Yeah, I have one.

THE COURT: This is 511-A; is that correct? MR. HAGAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: We should have that. We went over
those Saturday or Sunday.
Please proceed, Counsel. All counsel should have that.

MR. HAGAN: We have a copy. Just for the witness, can the witness have a copy?

THE COURT: Do we have a copy for the witness? MR. STONE: I don't. I apologize, Your Honor. We weren't anticipating going into --

THE COURT: No further questions, then, in this area, Counsel.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Did anyone ever tell you who xbr21 was?
A. Not I am aware of.
Q. Has anyone ever told you who a gentleman named Stuntguy is?
A. Not that I'm aware of, no.
Q. Has anyone told you what the group DISH Plex is?
A. DISH Plex sounds familiar. I think it was one of the group working on our system at that time.
Q. And have you heard of a gentleman name Larry Pilon?
A. Could you repeat the name?
Q. Have you heard the name Larry Pilon, P-I-L-O-N?
A. No, that doesn't remind anything. Larry Pilon.
Q. Have you ever become aware that Mr. Pilon is a consultant to NagraStar?
A. No, I am not aware of that.
Q. Have you ever heard of a group called the Barrie Group?
A. Can you spell that?
Q. $\quad B-A-R-R-I-E$.
A. No, that doesn't sound familiar to me.
Q. Have you ever heard of a person named Jazzercz, $\mathrm{J}-\mathrm{A}-\mathrm{Z}-\mathrm{Z}-\mathrm{E}-\mathrm{R}-\mathrm{C}-\mathrm{Z}$ ?
A. I think that's a nickname that I've seen at that time, so, yeah.

THE COURT: The record should now reflect that he has 511-A in front of him.

MR. STONE: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
BY MR. STONE:
Q. Did anyone ever tell you that they had a gentleman
named Charles Perlman who was associated with the dr7 website?
A. Charles -- could you spell that.
Q. $\quad P-E-R-L-M-A-N$.
A. No, that doesn't sound familiar.
Q. Does the nickname GunSmoke or GunSmoke 2 ring a bell?
A. Yes. GunSmoke and GunSmoke 2 were aliases discussing our system at that time, yes.
Q. So was the person who used the name Gunsmoke or GunSmoke 2 a pirate, to your understanding?
A. Those are people discussing pirate item or pirate discussion on the Internet. You never know if it's one of our people, one of our competitor or a pirate discussing over the Internet.
Q. When you say "one of our people," what did you mean? A. Meaning people that are following what is happening on the Internet. And we need to follow that to get better understanding of the threat that our customer are suffering. Q. So it would be somebody who was employed by either your company or NagraStar?
A. Nothing's related to that nickname, but it's in general term people talking or posting on the Internet might be whoever. Might be you and me.
Q. Did you ever learn that there was a gentleman named Charles Perlman who was a consultant to NagraStar who had
access to the dr7 website in December of 2000?
A. I think I answer that. I haven't heard about that name.
Q. Now, did you testify that there was a 1998 posting by someone using the name Nipper of an EEPROM dump?
A. Yes, I did that. Yeah, I say that.
Q. Are you as sure about that as you are of the rest of your testimony?
A. I think so, yeah, I've seen that. Maybe it's ten years ago, but probably, yeah. That's what I recall, at least.
Q. Have you actually seen the posting by somebody using Nipper of an EEPROM dump?
A. In '98, yes.
Q. Did you keep a copy of the screen shot or the posting from that time frame?
A. I think that part of the document is not part of the trial, so $I$ haven't seen it since that time.
Q. What happened to it?
A. Sorry?
Q. What happened to that document that showed that there was an EEPROM dump supposedly by somebody using the name Nipper?
A. I'm not so sure it was a document. There was a publication on the Internet.
Q. Did you keep a copy, save it, a screen shot?
A. I'm not saving everything what's happening on the Internet. It's big, too big. Sorry.
Q. Did you consider that a significant posting?
A. Yeah, definitely it was a significant posting. Yeah.
Q. And did you keep a copy of that significant posting?
A. Maybe, maybe not. I don't know.
Q. You haven't seen that alleged posting in ten years, is what your testimony is?
A. I think the -- from my understanding, the discovery period was not covering that part. We are not allowed to use that piece of evidence for that trial, so we didn't focus on that one anymore since then.
Q. Somebody told you you were not supposed to produce evidence in this case?
A. Yeah. Producing evidence is one thing; using evidence is another things.
Q. Are the -- is that posting somewhere maintained in an investigative file anywhere at NagraCard or NagraVision?
A. So all the investigation were done and managed by

NagraStar, so I suppose -- I think at the time I posted
that, that that document is within NagraStar file.
Q. Before coming here today to testify, did you see that document?
A. No.
Q. And so this is all based on your memory --
A. That's correct.
Q. -- from ten years ago?
A. Exactly.
Q. And the black box, where did that come from?
A. So we received -- if you mention the same black box $I$ was mentioned in my testimony, it's a box that we receive in late 2000, I think, September or October 2000. And that was coming from NagraStar, from Alan Guggenheim. THE COURT: I'm sorry. Coming from? THE WITNESS: NagraStar, Alan Guggenheim.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. And exactly where did Mr. Guggenheim get the black box from?
A. That, $I$ don't know. I just received the black box from him.
Q. And did you bring the black box with you here today for your testimony?
A. No. Because the black box were given back, handed back to Alan Guggenheim after the analysis.
Q. And then what happened to it?
A. That, I don't know.
Q. Have you seen it since you analyzed it in the fall of 2000?
A. Can you repeat that?
Q. Sure. Have you seen the black box since you analyzed
it in the fall of 2000?
A. No. I don't remember having seen the black box since that day. We did the analysis, we handed that back to Alan and that's it.
Q. Do you know what investigation was conducted into the source of that black box device?
A. I think that's just -- because $I$ were not in charge of that, but $I$ think they were trying to investigate who was behind the technical hack and the technical knowledge of that black box.
Q. And so getting to the source of who had the black box would at least be the first step in doing that, would you agree?
A. I don't know. I'm a "poor engineer," so I don't know. Q. And did you talk to any of the "poor investigators" whose job it was to get to the bottom of the source of the piracy?
A. No.
Q. And am I correct, the black box does the same thing as the Internet posting in December of 2000?
A. Which Internet posting? You're referring to the same one that I've...
Q. Yes. The December 23rd, 2000, posting.
A. Yeah. The NipperClause used and described the same recipe as the black box. And as I said, in the recipe you
can replace some of the code with different code. And I think two example have been given in the Headend Report. So the black box is using another type of code than the recipe or than the written report. But the recipe is the same.
Q. All right. I'm going to come back to the black box in
a little bit, sir. Thank you.
A. All right.
Q. Have you had an opportunity to speak to your -- the software security expert who's been retained by plaintiffs in this case, Dr. Rubin?
A. Yes.
Q. When was the first time you did that?
A. When I arrived here in Santa Ana.
Q. So within the last couple of days?
A. Yes.
Q. And you've not had an opportunity to speak to the plaintiff's expert prior to then; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Did you discuss the black box with Dr. Rubin?
A. I think we discussed some of the conclusion he has used on the black box but not the black box itself in detail.
Q. Okay. Who was Mr. Joel Conus?
A. So Joel Conus is a Swiss citizen working for NagraCard since 2001.
Q. And what were his job responsibilities generally?
A. So he had various position. I think he works as a software engineer, as I did in the past. And he was also in charge of what we call monitoring the website, just reading those various website and reporting what might be interesting to know about our system or the pirate activity around digital TV in North America and other place in the world.
Q. I believe it is your testimony that DirecTV made a decision to stay with NDS in the late 1998 or early 1999 time frame. Does that sound right?
A. That sound right, yeah.
Q. And Mr. Conus began in 2001 at NagraCard?
A. I don't recall exactly, but I would say 2000, 2001 time frame.
Q. And am I correct, the DirecTV system for which NDS provided the conditional access services was on a different broadcasting system than the EchoStar system?
A. Can you repeat that or rephrase that?
Q. The DirecTV system uses a DSS satellite transmission protocol, correct?
A. Yeah. The scrambling, what we call the scrambling of the audio and video, DirecTV use a scrambling called DSS, and EchoStar use a scrambling called DVB CSA. So two distinct scrambling for those two system.
Q. Two different broadcasting standards that are not
compatible, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And in June 2001 was Mr. Conus asked to collect
information about the DirecTV system, its hacks and its possible electronic countermeasures?
A. That was not his main task. He may have seen and he may have reported some publication on those website.

As I told you at the beginning, I think dr7, which was one of the main source of information from the web, was used to be a DirecTV hack website. So a lot of discussion there were happening on DirecTV. And from time to time some of those information were reported or so in Joel's report. MR. STONE: Could you show the witness

Exhibit 1251, please.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. If you would look at the second page, it should be a larger copy.

Now, Exhibit 1251 is an e-mail from Joel Conus to Mr. Guggenheim, with a copy to you, dated -- it looks like July 2nd, 2001, if I'm reading the date correctly. Is that correct, sir?
A. Yeah, that's what I'm reading. Yeah.

MR. STONE: Okay. Your Honor, I would move

Exhibit 1251 at this time.

THE COURT: Any objection, Counsel?

MR. HAGAN: Yes, Your Honor. I don't think we've laid a proper foundation. Assuming Mr. Nicolas testifies that he had knowledge of this, and it looks like he was on it, then we would withdraw any objections.

THE COURT: What, Counsel?

Let's make this simple. Received.
(Exhibit 1251 received in evidence.)

Thank you very much, Counsel. Your next question.
BY MR. STONE:
Q. This is an e-mail addressed to you and Mr. Kudelski in addition to Mr. Guggenheim from July of 2001, correct?
A. Yeah. That's an e-mail address to Alan Guggenheim, Henri Kudelski, which is an engineer working for me, and to myself, yes.
Q. And Mr. Conus worked at NagraCard at the time, correct?
A. That's correct, yes.

MR. STONE: Your Honor, I would ask for this to be
published to the jury at this time.

THE COURT: You may.
(Document displayed.)
BY MR. STONE:
Q. If you look at the top, you can see the folks to whom
this is addressed. And this is July of 2001, correct?
A. Sorry. Again?
Q. This e-mail is from July of 2001?
A. Yes. Still from July 2001, yes.
Q. And what is the subject of the e-mail?
A. Subject is DTV.
Q. And is that a shorthand phrase for DirecTV?
A. That can mean digital TV but probably in that case might -- it stands for DirecTV, yes.
Q. And this e-mail apparently at one point had an attachment that was a zip file. Do you see that next to the word "attachment"?
A. Yeah, I see that. Yeah.
Q. What is a zip file?
A. So a zip file is a file which is what we call a compressed file, including one or multiple other file. Q. So, for example, if you have a lot of data that you want to send to someone, you can compress it and put it on a zip attachment and send it by e-mail. Is that a fair summary?
A. I think if you have one or multiple information, you can use the zip file. And I don't know if it was a lot of information or not.
Q. Isn't that typically what zip files are used for, is to compress a lot of information, as opposed to just one attachment?
A. I think engineer are using zip file anyhow just not to have too big e-mail box and to have to archive that too many
times. So that's a typical -- good engineer use zip file for every attachment on the internet.
Q. Okay. So if we look at the actual body of the e-mail, please. It says, "Hi, Alan." That would be Mr. Guggenheim, correct?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And Mr. Guggenheim was the CEO of NagraStar in the United States, correct?
A. Yeah. I've said that, yeah.
Q. And you've testified that NagraStar was competing against NDS in the United States, correct?
A. Yeah. I think NDS and the Kudelski Group, including NagraStar, were competitor at that time, yeah.
Q. And at this point in time, July of 2001, NDS was providing the Smart Cards and other conditional access services to DirecTV; isn't that right?
A. Can you repeat that.
Q. Sure. NDS was the supplier of the cards and conditional access system to DirecTV at this point in time?
A. Yeah. That's correct, yes.
Q. And it says, "Hi, Alan. Here is the information you requested about the DTV system."

That would be the DirecTV system, right?
A. Yeah.
Q. It says, "I've made a summary that should give you a
good overview of the system, its hacks and its possible ECM's."

Do you see that?
A. I see that, yeah.
Q. And what was in the overview of the system that

Mr. Conus provided to you and Mr. Guggenheim and Mr. Kudelski?
A. That, I don't remember. Probably, but that's an assumption, a set of key posting on the Internet about hacking on DirecTV card and then potential reaction of

DirecTV to counteract those hack.
Q. Now, if we had this zip file, we might have a better idea of what was in the overview, correct?
A. Yes, correct.
Q. Do you know what happened to it?
A. I don't know.
Q. When was last time you saw it?
A. The zip file, you mean?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Probably at that date.
Q. Did you save a copy?
A. I think it might have been in my e-mail archive.

THE COURT: In your what?

THE WITNESS: E-mail archive.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. And why did you want to know about the hacks of the DirecTV system?
A. I think -- I don't want to know anything there. It's an e-mail from Joel to Alan Guggenheim.
Q. And who did Mr. Conus report to at this point in time?
A. He was reporting to me.
Q. Did you understand that he was engaging in this project for Mr. Guggenheim at the time?
A. I would not call that a project. I would call it communication between Alan Guggenheim, which was the CEO of NagraStar, that probably asks Joel to help him on the specific topic.
Q. Well, when it says "its hacks," there's no question in your mind that that refers to hacks of the conditional access system that NDS provided to DirecTV, right?
A. I cannot be a hundred percent sure, but in the context, that would be my guess, yes.
Q. And how was Mr. Conus able to get an overview of the hacks? Do you know?
A. Again, I think I mentioned that Joel was in charge of monitoring the website, various website, one being the dr7 website where a lot of information on DirecTV hack have been posted. So most probably when he get that kind of request, he just pull out from the Internet what he can find
and just put that in a zip file and send that to Guggenheim.
Q. Now, what about an electronic countermeasure?
A. Um-hm.
Q. An electronic countermeasure for the NDS DirecTV system would not work for the Nagra system; is that correct?
A. Yeah, that's correct. But the design -- the device used both on DirecTV and on Nagra are somewhat the same. We have seen a lot of pirate devices used against DirecTV that have been reused as raw material against EchoStar.
Q. I'm focusing now on the electronic countermeasures. Do you have any understanding as to how Mr. Conus was able to figure out possible electronic countermeasures for the NDS DirecTV system?
A. My understanding is that the exact same way he get information about the hack itself. Hack and countermeasure are extensively discussed on the Internet when they happen. So as soon as you get hit by your countermeasure hacker's code in the Internet -- not hackers, but user also go to the Internet to try to understand what was happening there. And they are discussing pros and cons and what was the means of the countermeasure or ECM.

And when that's sent -- and some people collect those information and regroup those information in FAQ that just summarize what type of countermeasure is done on one system. And that has been done on DirecTV, and that has been done on
our system.
Q. So why as a competitor would you care about hacks of the DirecTV system and how they might respond to them?
A. So I think it might be interesting for us on the technical side to understand which one will be the next pirate device used or countermeasure done against our system.
Q. So in your mind it would be legitimate to try to figure out if there were vulnerabilities in the DirecTV system or the NDS system and how they might be responded to, correct?
A. I think it's -- it's legitimate to gather or to collect public information on the -- and summarize on the different system.
Q. Did Nagra ever pay for Mr. Guggenheim to subscribe to a DirecTV system so that he could gather competitive intelligence about the DirecTV NDS system?
A. So I was not aware if Alan was paid for that.
Q. Okay. Let me show you Exhibit 1102, please.

This is an invoice dated March 18, 2000. On the first page of Exhibit 1102, it's an invoice from CIS, Inc. You recognize that as Mr. Guggenheim's company, correct?
A. I'm aware that Alan Guggenheim has a consulting firm that is called CIS, yes.
Q. And where it says "bill to Nagra," there's an address in Tennessee. Is that an office that Nagra had in Tennessee
at some point in time?
A. I'm not so sure, but if I'm correct, I think we have -Nagra USA have an office there.
Q. And you did understand that Mr. Guggenheim would be reimbursed for certain business expenses by Nagra during this time period?
A. That was probably the case, but $I$ was not aware of the details of his contract or relationship with Nagra USA.

MR. STONE: Your Honor, I would move

Exhibit 1102 at this time.

THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. HAGAN: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Received.
(Exhibit 1102 received in evidence.)

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Mr. Nicolas, if we could look at the first page of Exhibit 1102.
A. It's the same one?
Q. Yes, sir.
(Document displayed.)

THE WITNESS: Which page?
BY MR. STONE:
Q. The first page, sir.
A. Okay. Okay.
Q. Up at the top is the "CIS, Inc.," which is

Mr. Guggenheim's company, correct?
A. I know that he has a company with that name. I don't know if the address is linked or related to that company. But most probably, yeah. I don't know.
Q. And then down below that, the "Bill To" is the Nagra address you recognize, correct?
A. Yeah. I think we had a -- Nagra USA had an address there.
Q. And then I won't go through all these receipts, obviously, but there's phone bills and meals and all kinds of stuff.

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    If you go to page 1102-43, please.
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A. (Witness complies.)
(Document displayed.)

BY MR. STONE:
Q. This is a receipt for a DirecTV bill, correct?
A. You are telling me. I have never seen a DirecTV bill before that, so -- it looks like.
Q. Okay. This would have been included as a business expense by Mr. Guggenheim to Nagra, correct?
A. If you tell me that, yes.
Q. Did you ever become aware that there was a laboratory set up in NagraStar's offices in Denver, Colorado?
A. What do you mean by a laboratory?
Q. A security engineering laboratory.
A. So we were doing -- I think we explained before that we are delivering the countermeasure from NagraCard to

NagraStar, and NagraStar is in charge of broadcasting that countermeasure. And for that, before broadcasting, they are doing additional tests, and they have a laboratory for that. So if it's the one you're referring to, yes, there is a laboratory in NagraStar.
Q. And were there a couple of DirecTV receivers in that laboratory?
A. I'm not aware of, but maybe they have some DirecTV set-top box there.
Q. Was the security lab used to monitor DirecTV and NDS countermeasures?
A. I don't think it was the main purpose of that, but they may have done that. I don't know.
Q. Was the laboratory used to analyze pirate devices that were used against the NDS DirecTV system?
A. So we were using NagraStar as the first point to identify if the pirate device is working or not on our system. And then the pirate device was shipped to

Switzerland. So if it's what you mean, yes, we were analyzing pirate devices for our system.
Q. For what?
A. For our system.
Q. No. My question is, sir: Were you reverse-engineering
and analyzing pirate devices that were used against the NDS DirecTV system at the laboratory in Denver, Colorado? A. So my understanding, there is -- there was no reverse engineering, I think, in my definition of reverse engineering done there. There was probably some testing done from pirate devices, including DirecTV, in that lab to see if the new device is working or not on the system.
Q. Well, the way you would determine they were working or not was how?
A. Can you repeat that? The way?
Q. Sure. How did you determine that the pirate devices used against the NDS DirecTV system were working or not?
A. I don't know what they were doing there. But typically what we do on our system is that when we receive the first devices, we try to use the device on a legit set-top box to see if we can have access to the various programming without paying. So that's typically, I think, what we -- they will do if they were trying that same things on DirecTV.
Q. And what was the reason you were analyzing the NDS DirecTV pirate devices?
A. I think it was important for us to understand where the pirate were going. We have told you before that we have been suffered from various pirate devices, some of them coming from the DirecTV piracy world. So that's probably the reason they were doing that, on top of understanding
what the main competitor was doing or was suffering from.
THE COURT: Reanswer the question slowly.

THE WITNESS: I think if they have DirecTV set-top box there, it was probably to test if the pirate devices for a given system was working. The way we test -- we do the very first test is that you take the pirate device, you insert that in the set-top box. If nothing happen, it's probably either something wrong with the device or it's not a pirate devices.

If you insert that in the set-top box and it's working, probably you have some enhanced pirate devices. So for that you need to have access to set-top boxes. And you have then to have a normal, legit subscription to do that. And then you remove your legit Smart Card and you insert the pirate devices to see if it works.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. And, sir, how do you get the schematics for the software and hardware out of a pirate device?
A. What do you call "schematics"?
Q. A diagram of the circuitry of the hardware or the logic of the software of a pirate device used against NDS and DirecTV.
A. So to extract that information, you need a specific laboratory which is equipped to do physical analysis of hardware. And you will use that equipment to first
reverse-engineer the card, meaning that you need to understand the block or how you call -- you call that the schematics of the card. And then you will need to extract the memory content to have access to the software. And as soon as you have access to the software, you can start working on the reverse.
Q. Now, am I correct that pirate devices used against the NDS DirecTV system would typically have within them actual legitimate code of the NDS DirecTV system? Right?
A. That, I don't know. They will have to emulate to some extent the behavior of the system.
Q. Now, is the DirecTV broadcast stream capable of being received in Switzerland?
A. Not I'm aware of, no.
Q. And these devices were sometimes sent back to

Switzerland for analysis?
A. I think not the devices. Sometimes the devices -again, if the device are either used or will be used against us, just to understand which hardware is being used on the device. A typical pirate device is what we call a printed circuit board, a PCB, where you will have several chip on top. And that will just emulate the behavior of the Smart Card. So that's one way.

And that device can be seen as a small computer, if you want. And as any small computer, you can reprogram that for
another behavior or another goal. And we've seen that with -- I think I mentioned a battery card, which was one pirate devices used against DirecTV that has been reused against EchoStar, reprogrammed for to be used against

EchoStar.
Q. And am I correct that to monitor electronic
countermeasures for the NDS DirecTV system, you would need to log the broadcast stream?
A. Well, I don't think I said that we -- I'm not aware of any monitoring of the countermeasure, the DirecTV
countermeasure.
Q. Well, if Mr. Guggenheim had testified in his deposition that such monitoring occurred, can you think of any way to do that other than through logging the broadcast stream? MR. HAGAN: Your Honor, I object. I think we talked about this on Saturday.

THE COURT: Overruled. First of all, the question was simply about whether monitoring countermeasures for NDS DirecTV would need to log a broadcast stream.

You're being asked, because of your technical capability, to answer that question. You did not answer that question.

THE WITNESS: Okay. I got you.
THE COURT: You have that technical know-how.

THE WITNESS: Okay. I think I got you.

THE COURT: And so it doesn't matter if, in fact, you know or don't know whether this took place. Other witnesses will testify to that. THE WITNESS: Okay. THE COURT: Please answer the question. THE WITNESS: Okay. I got you. Yeah. If you want to monitor the behavior of the countermeasure on DirecTV on other system, you need to monitor the effect of that countermeasure on the system, meaning on the set-top box or on the card. And for doing that you need to monitor maybe what is sent in the stream and what is sent between the set-top box and the Smart card. That's the technical explanation of my understanding of the monitoring of countermeasure. BY MR. STONE:
Q. And to do that, what you're saying is you would log the communication stream between the satellite signal and the box, correct?
A. I think logging that information might be difficult at that place, but you need to log that somewhere, and might be at the satellite level, but it's a bit more difficult, or in the box itself.
Q. And then you would monitor the communication between the box and the card, correct?
A. Yeah, that's correct.
Q. And would you use something like a sniffer device or a logger to do that?
A. You need a logger in that, and that sniffer or
logger -- $I$ don't know if it's the right term. But, yeah, you need to log the communication. So you need, really, something that will record all bytes going from the set-top box to the Smart Card and all byte or information going back from the Smart Card to the set-top box.
Q. And then for the NDS DirecTV system, if you were monitoring that, wouldn't you have to have some understanding of the encryption methods used?
A. I think you need to understand the format of the message sent between the set-top box and the card to see if there is an unusual or undocumented message sent to the card. And that will be -- then give you some information about something new is happening, so that might be a countermeasure.
Q. Was Mr. Conus monitoring electronic countermeasures in Switzerland for the NDS DirecTV system?
A. No, he was not.
Q. Let me show you Exhibit 683, please.
A. Thank you.
Q. Exhibit 683 is an e-mail dated December 17, 2002, from Mr. Guggenheim to Peter Kuykendall, with a copy to you, Mr. Gee, Mr. Conus and some other folks in Switzerland,
correct?
A. Yeah, that's correct.

MR. STONE: At this time $I$ would move Exhibit 683,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. HAGAN: No objections, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Received.
(Exhibit 683 received in evidence.)
MR. STONE: If we could bring up Exhibit 683.
(Document displayed.)
BY MR. STONE:
Q. There you go. And up at the top is the date and the
folks who were receiving this e-mail, correct?
A. Yeah. Apparently, yeah.
Q. And who is Mr. Kuykendall?
A. My understanding is that it was one engineer working at

NagraStar for Alan Guggenheim.
Q. And Mr. Conus we've talked about, correct?
A. Can you repeat that?
Q. Mr. Conus we've talked about. He was in Switzerland.
A. Yeah, that's correct.
Q. And Cedric Groux, $G-R-O-U-X$, was also in Switzerland?
A. That's correct.
Q. And you, of course, were in Switzerland?
A. Correct.
Q. As was Henri Kudelski?
A. That's correct.
Q. And going down to the text of the e-mail, please, where it says "Peter."
(Document displayed.)
BY MR. STONE:
Q. It says, "This is to confirm what we expect and how we are getting organized for the 'security lab' in Denver."

Is that correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. And do you recall being involved in the decision to set up that security lab in Denver?
A. My understanding, I was -- I was informed that Alan wants to do more in Denver to be able to be more active when a pirate device is operating in the field. And as clearly mentioned, we don't have access to the stream of EchoStar nor DirecTV, and therefore to test or validate that the device is working, you need the set-top box and you need also the stream, so the satellite footprint. And you cannot do that outside the U.S.
Q. Well, this says under Point No. 2, "Set up and maintain the security lab with" -- and the second item is B-E-V. I assume that's Bell ExpressVu?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. It says, "One to three devices most prevalent"; is that
correct?
A. That's what I'm reading, yeah.
Q. And did the Bell ExpressVu stream extend into Colorado?
A. That's my understanding, yes.
Q. And then underneath that it says, "DirecTV one device the most popular." What does that refer to?
A. My understanding, if you read the two -- first line, it means EchoStar want each of the main device -- we are talking about set-top box, same for Bell ExpressVu. So I can guess that for DirecTV, it's talking about also one DirecTV set-top box.
Q. So at any point in time you would have in this security lab in Denver the most popular NDS DirecTV pirate device, correct?
A. My understanding is that we are talking about set-top box, not pirate devices.
Q. Well, it says underneath No. 4, "Send to Cheseaux regular updates on all new devices."

Now, Cheseaux is the city in Switzerland where
NagraCard was?
A. That's correct, yeah.
Q. So when we see e-mails that say "Cheseaux," that means you and your group, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, "all new devices" would be all new pirate devices,
correct?
A. That's my understanding, yeah.
Q. And that would include the NDS DirecTV devices we
talked about, sir?
A. It might be, yeah.
Q. Well, do you recall receiving those in Switzerland, sir?
A. We may have received one or two, yeah. But I don't recall specifically one.
Q. Do you recall Mr. Guggenheim's wife, Suzanne Guggenheim, sending you DirecTV pirate devices to Switzerland?
A. Yeah, that may have happened, which --

THE COURT: Excuse me. I've cautioned all of the witnesses; I'll caution you.

The words "may have happened."

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: Did they or not? In other words, with
all of the witnesses, we've received some of that kind of
testimony. This jury is entitled to know whether that
occurred or not. And qualifying words like "may," "could have" are not acceptable.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: If you don't know, state you do not
know. If you know the answer, please don't qualify it.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: Counsel, reask the question.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Sure. Did Alan Guggenheim's wife, Suzanne Guggenheim, send to Switzerland NDS DirecTV pirate devices for analysis?
A. So I don't recall any specific date for that, but -sorry, I want to say "may" because that's the -- during those ten years we -- we might have received specific devices. I don't recall a specific date or a specific devices.
Q. What ten-year period are you referring to, sir?
A. During the beginning -- I'm in the company, within Kudelski since 12 years, and the system is on since ten years almost. So that's what I'm referring to.
Q. Now, looking at No. 4, still of Exhibit 683, it says, "Send to Cheseaux regular updates on all new devices, including schematics, software, hardware, how to make it work for Dummies document."

Did I read that correctly?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, we've talked about how one obtains schematics, we've talked about hardware and software. What is "how to make it work for Dummies document"?
A. My understanding is that some of those pirate devices need to be assembled to be working. So sometimes you will
have not only the finished devices but a set of chips that you need to solder on a printed circuit board to make it work.

So my understanding of how to make it work for Dummies is how do you assemble that devices and where do you insert that devices in the set-top box to make it happen and to make it used.
Q. And who was supposed to figure that all out for you folks in Switzerland so they could write a document called "How to make it work for Dummies"?
A. That's something that we were receiving, not sending. Sent to Cheseaux, not sent from Cheseaux.
Q. Well, who would prepare the "How to make it work for Dummies document"?
A. My understanding, looking at that e-mail, it's the description of the job of Peter Kuykendall.
Q. In the laboratory in Denver?
A. Correct.
Q. And do you know what happened to all the reports that were generated of the analysis of these NDS DirecTV devices?
A. I don't know.
Q. Where would those reports have been kept?
A. That I don't know.
Q. Now, No. 5 says, "Report on effect on your lab of ECMs and fixes." Did I read that correctly?
A. Yeah, that's correct.
Q. When it says "your lab," I assume it means the receivers and devices you had set up in the laboratory?
A. When you mentioned "you," who do you mean?
Q. Well, "you" meaning NagraStar, NagraVision.
A. Yeah, my understanding there is it's mentioning the lab that will be set up in 2002 at NagraStar to do that type of testing. So my understanding of that was what Peter Kuykendall was doing since December 2002: He was trying to maintain a set of set-top boxes for EchoStar and to make sure he can test and validate the efficiency of countermeasure there and to then to inform Cheseaux about if that one is working or not. It was kind of a pre-filtering on knowing if one devices was working or not. Because on Internet you have a lot of scam devices. You sell a lot of things, and maybe not all of them are working, so you need to test that. And that was, from my recollection, the job description of Peter Kuykendall and the usage of that lab. Q. Now, Mr. Nicolas, based on your review of the Headend Report, you understand that Mr. Mordinson analyzed the ROM code from a ROM 3 card and disassembled it and studied it. A. At least he had the information on that, and he write that in his report for sure, yeah.
Q. And the ROM code is not visible to the physical eye, is it?
A. Can you explain or rephrase that?
Q. Well, if you look at a Smart Card, you can't see the ROM code; it's in the chip, correct?
A. Yeah, that's correct. You need to attack the chip and remove the chip from the Smart Card to access that.
Q. And the ROM code is the same in every card of that version, correct?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And if I could show you Exhibit 816, please.

Exhibit 816 is an e-mail from Joel Conus to you and

Mr. Guggenheim and Mr. Gee and some other folk in
Switzerland, dated November 21st, 2001, correct?
A. Yeah, that's correct.
Q. And you recognize all the names on this e-mail, correct?
A. That's correct, yes.

MR. STONE: And at this time I would move

Exhibit 816 into evidence.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. HAGAN: No, objections, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Received.
(Exhibit No. 816 received in evidence.)

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Now, what was your position with the company in

November 2001?
A. In November 2001, I was probably VP R\&D, research and development, for NagraCard, so heading the development team for Smart Card and as well as the team doing the countermeasure, the electronic countermeasure for

NagraStar -- for NagraCard, sorry.
Q. And November 2001 was long after DirecTV had said they would stick with NDS and were not going to use Nagra, correct?
A. Yeah, that's correct. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And on the second page, if you would, please, of Exhibit 816, sir, there's an e-mail from Christophe Gaillard, G-A-I-L-L-A-R-D. Who is Mr. Gaillard?
A. So Christophe Gaillard is a Swiss citizen working now for NagraVision, and I think at that time he was based in Denver working for NagraStar.
Q. And if we could go down -- well, strike that.

This is an e-mail to Mr. Guggenheim on November 20th, the day before, the first page, correct?
A. That's what's written there, yeah.
Q. If we could look at the text -- it's in French, I
know -- but $I$ believe you testified that this language means, "The floppy that you gave to me looks like the dump of ROM code to DirecTV and not just keys"?
A. Yeah, that's correct.
Q. And the way you read this is that Mr. Gaillard had a
floppy disc with dumps of the ROM code from six DirecTV HU cards, right?
A. To be precise, $I$ think he's saying he received that floppy disc from Alan Guggenheim, and he reports to him that at first glimpse, the floppy is containing not only keys, DirecTV keys, but more, meaning source code or ROM code. Q. And you understood at this point in time that NDS was providing the ROM code to the DirecTV system in the Smart Cards?
A. Yeah, that's my understanding. Yes.
Q. And a dump of ROM code would be getting the code out of the chips of the NDS card, correct?
A. Can you repeat that?
Q. Sure. Getting a dump of the ROM code would be pulling the ROM code out of the chips in the NDS cards, correct?
A. What do you mean by "giving"? You said, "giving the ROM code"?
Q. Getting.
A. Oh, getting.
Q. Obtaining.
A. Okay. Yes, someone needs to do that to extract the ROM code, yeah.
Q. And I believe it's your testimony you don't know how Mr. Gaillard or Mr. Guggenheim was able to extract that ROM code; is that correct?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. So you have no idea how Mr. Guggenheim all of a sudden had a floppy disc that had ROM code to an NDS card on it, correct?
A. That's correct, yeah.
Q. And you never asked him; isn't that correct?
A. No. I think after the -- if you go back to the other page, I think that was sent to Joel, which explained that that was information published on the Internet. And he explained also what does it mean, so that they confirm that is part of the ROM code for DirecTV and that publication on the Internet is definitely damaging for DirecTV and might be used by hackers.
Q. Okay. My question was simply when Mr. Guggenheim ever told you how he was able to get ROM code out of NDS cards.
A. You said how?
Q. How.
A. How, no, he never told me that.
Q. And you never asked, correct?

MR. HAGAN: Your Honor, I'm going to object.
Mr. Stone is mischaracterizing the witness's testimony. He said that the code came from the Internet, not that

Mr. Guggenheim extracted it.

THE COURT: Overruled. Counsel, no more speaking objections.

Thank you.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. And wasn't it your testimony that when you discovered the information on the floppy disc with ROM code did not concern Nagra, you did not pursue any further analysis of the floppy disc?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. But the very first e-mail from Mr. Gaillard on November 20th made it clear this was DirecTV ROM code, correct?
A. You say -- translate that.

THE INTERPRETER: (Translates.)

THE WITNESS: It looks like a dump. It was not
fully affirmative. It looks like.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Well, would a dump of the NDS DirecTV ROM code concern Nagra or not concern Nagra?
A. What do you mean by "concern"? THE INTERPRETER: (Explains.) THE WITNESS: It would not be a concern for Nagra, no.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. But despite the fact that Mr. Gaillard's original e-mail says this appears to be DirecTV ROM code, further analysis was conducted on this, wasn't it?
A. What do you mean by "further analysis"?

MR. STONE: Well, if I may approach, Your Honor, to set up a demonstrative?

THE COURT: You may. (Document displayed.)

BY MR. STONE:
Q. What I'm going to do is go over the first page of that exhibit with you, sir.

All right. Looking at the first page of Exhibit 816, please. The very bottom, it looks like Mr. Guggenheim forwarded the floppy disc with the ROM code to Mr. Conus of NagraCard, correct?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. And Mr. -- and also to you as well, it looks like, if I'm reading the e-mail line correctly?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. That's on November 21st, 2001?
A. That's correct.
Q. And in Mr. Guggenheim's e-mail, he said, "This is the file mentioned by Renee in her e-mail. We need to get familiar with this. What's the value?" Correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And didn't you testify you have no understanding why Mr. Guggenheim was advocating getting familiar with the six ROM code dumps from the NDS DirecTV system?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. And it's your testimony you have never discussed with Mr. Guggenheim why he wanted to get familiar with the NDS DirecTV ROM dumps; isn't that right?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. And after Mr. Guggenheim wrote, "We need to get familiar with this," he wrote, "What's the value?" Right?
A. That's what's written there, yeah.
Q. What did he mean by "what's the value" of ROM dumps of NDS DirecTV code?

MR. HAGAN: Calls for speculation.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: I don't know.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Well, let's look.

Up at the top, after Mr. Conus got familiar with the ROM dumps, he wrote back to Mr. Guggenheim in the last sentence of his e-mail at the top, "This is highly valuable information for the DSS community." Do you see that?
A. Yes, I see that.
Q. And it was your testimony that "the DSS community" refers to the black market community of pirates attacking DirecTV, right?
A. At least my understanding is the community discussing piracy on the Internet about DirecTV.
Q. And it's your testimony you don't know what Mr. Guggenheim had in mind when he wanted to know the value of these ROM dumps to the DirecTV pirate community.
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. Now, that's odd. Is there any doubt in your mind the dump of ROM code would be valuable to pirates to have?
A. Yeah, that's correct. If it's a dump of the ROM code, yeah, some value to DirecTV -- to pirate against DirecTV, yes.
Q. And so is it your testimony that Mr. Conus would not know before getting familiar with that code that ROM code would be valuable to pirates?
A. I think that he would be aware that it might have value to pirates, yes, for sure.
Q. What does it mean to disassemble ROM code?
A. You mean technical terms, what does it mean?
Q. No. I mean, just generally for a layperson like me.

What does that mean, to disassemble ROM code?
A. A ROM code, you can have different -- how can $I$ call that -- different representation of ROM code. It can be a binary image, zero and one. It can be a hexadecimal image. And out of that you need to go back to the source code. So you need to go back to a code which is readable by a human. And my understanding that disassembling the code is going from binary or hexadecimal image to a readable code.
Q. And that was the process that Mr. Mordinson did on the ROM code in the Headend Report, correct?
A. That's a small part that is documented in the Headend Report, yes.
Q. And am I correct, it's your testimony that you don't know whether Mr. Conus disassembled the NDS DirecTV ROM code when he got familiar with it?
A. Can you repeat that?
Q. You don't know whether Mr. Conus disassembled the NDS DirecTV ROM code when he got familiar with it; is that correct?
A. Yeah, that's correct, but I think he didn't do anything there.
Q. And am I correct that you did not ask NDS or DirecTV's permission before getting familiar with their ROM code?
A. I think we need to be clear on familiar and not
familiar. The answer of Joel Conus is given, if you look at the time of the e-mail, something like 30 minutes after receiving the e-mail. So I don't know what he's done during those 30 minutes, but $I$ think it's not an extensive work on that file.
Q. Did you ask for permission from NDS or DirecTV to get familiar with their ROM code?
A. No. I'm not aware of that.
Q. Now, you were in charge of the production of documents
by NagraVision in response to NDS' requests in this case; is that right?
A. That's correct.

THE COURT: Excuse me, Counsel. Are you done with this exhibit now?

MR. STONE: Yes.

THE COURT: Take it down. Thank you.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Do you know why the file containing the NDS DirecTV ROM dumps have not been turned over to NDS despite its requests?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you know what happened to the file containing the ROM dumps?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you know why the e-mail from Renee referenced on the first page of Exhibit 816 has not been turned over in this case?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you know what happened to that e-mail?
A. Which one?
Q. The one from Renee, where Mr. Guggenheim says, "This is the file mentioned by Renee in her e-mail"?
A. No, I don't know.
Q. Okay. I'd like to back up a little bit, Mr. Nicolas.

Now, am I correct that you joined NagraVision
straight out of school from the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. And I believe you said that was April 1996?
A. April '96, yes.
Q. And working for NagraVision was your first full-time job, correct?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. And I believe you testified that when you joined NagraVision in 1996, the ROM 3 card was almost completely developed?
A. The ROM 2 was completely developed and in production. The ROM 3 was almost developed, yeah.
Q. And when was the development of the ROM 3 cards completed?
A. I think we -- what we call "released" the ROM code. So we finalized the ROM code. It was somewhere in October or November of that same year, October or November '96.
Q. Now, in performing your job duties, did you ever become aware of an NDS card supplied to DirecTV called the P4 card?
A. What? Sorry.
Q. In performing your job duties for NagraCard, did you ever become aware of an NDS card supplied to DirecTV called the P4 card?
A. Yeah. When it appeared it was not in 196 , so it was
after.
Q. If I could show you Exhibit 1249, please.

Exhibit 1249 is another e-mail from Joel Clonus to you and some others dated March 5th, 2002, correct?
A. My exhibit says May 2002 .
Q. I'm sorry. You're correct. It's May 3rd, 2002. I apologize. It's the continental dating.

You recognize this e-mail, I take it?
A. What do you mean by "take it"?

THE COURT: Excuse me. That should be clear to the jury also.

In Europe the date is reversed from our perspective. From their perspective, it's reversed from the United States perspective. So the "May" would appear as "05" on this document.

Why don't you put that up on the screen, because later on the jury's going to be looking at a series of United States-generated e-mails and European e-mails. And Counsel, would you just explain for a moment.

MR. STONE: Yeah. Thank you, Your Honor. I apologize.

If you go down, in the PGP section, Charlie, there will be the actual numbers 'cause that's in French.

THE COURT: And this will be equally valuable to the plaintiffs and defendants. It doesn't matter who's
explaining this, but just explain that briefly. MR. STONE: Sure.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. The PGP signature is done at the time the e-mail is encrypted and sent, correct?
A. That part of the signature, the part called "signed," yes. The part verified is when it's written, it's read.
Q. And that will match the day of the e-mail typically?
A. That's correct.
Q. And where it says "3/5/2002," in the European system, the "3" would be the date; in other words, the 3rd?
A. That's correct.
Q. And the "05" would be the month, which would be May?
A. That's correct.
Q. And then the year, of course, is 2002?
A. (Nods.)

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. STONE: I would move 1249 at this point,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. HAGAN: No, objections, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Received.
(Exhibit No. 1249 received in evidence.)

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Now, once again, Mr. Conus has attached some kind of
file related to DirecTV to this e-mail. Do you see that?
A. Yes, I see that, yeah.
Q. And do you know what happened to that file?
A. I don't know.
Q. Was there a particular place where information about the NDS DirecTV system was maintained at NagraCard or NagraVision?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Going down to the e-mail itself, looking at the very first line, looks like Mr. Conus is reporting on information in Satellite Business News that reported that the P4 has been cracked. Many hackers have expressed their opinions on various DTV forums. Here is what comes out. Did I read that correctly?
A. Yes.
Q. And the P4 card was the latest generation of the NDS

DirecTV card at this point in time?
A. Yeah, that's correct. Yeah.
Q. And was one of Mr. Conus' responsibilities to track the state of piracy of the $P 4$ card?
A. I think it was not his task.
Q. Pardon? I couldn't hear you.
A. I don't think it was his specific task to track the state of specific card from competition.
Q. Do you know why this e-mail was exclusively devoted to
the P4 card by NDS?
A. My understanding reading the e-mail, it seems that the Satellite Business News, which is a publication, reported that the P4 card has been hacked. And my understanding is that he's explaining what does it mean, this technical aspect, from what was read from the publication.
Q. So this entire e-mail deals exclusively with the NDS P4 card, correct?
A. That's my understanding. It deals on the Satellite Business News publication reporting about that P4 hack.
Q. Well, the very last sentence says, "The attachment also contains some interesting technical information."
A. That's what I read -- I'm reading, yes.
Q. Pardon?
A. That's what I'm reading, yes.
Q. My question is, do you recall what interesting technical information about the $P 4$ card was provided by Mr. Conus?
A. No, I don't recall that.
Q. And that would have been in the attachment to this e-mail, correct?
A. The attachment seems to be only one file, so -- a text file, so it might have been in there or somewhere else.
Q. Have you heard the term "Cam, C-A-M, ID" before?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. If I understand it, CAM means "Conditional Access Module," which is the same thing as a Smart Card, right?
A. Yes. That's my understanding, yes.
Q. And "ID" refers to the identification number, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And if you could look at Exhibit 1234, please.
(Document displayed.)
BY MR. STONE:
Q. This is no surprise. Another e-mail from Mr. Conus. This one is dated October 15th, 2002, and you are one of the recipients of this e-mail, correct, sir?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And what's subject of this e-mail?
A. I think there's the same subject, DTV, so stands for DirecTV.
Q. Which means DirecTV, right?
A. That's my understanding, yes.

MR. STONE: I would move 1234 at this time.
THE COURT: Any objection? MR. HAGAN: No, objections, Your Honor. THE COURT: Received. (Exhibit No. 1234 received in evidence.)

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Was there a particular reason Mr. Conus was routinely
reporting on the status of the DirecTV system? Do you have any understanding?
A. I think that I explained that Joel Conus' job was to monitor pirate website where amongst all pirate information DirecTV or NDS pirate information have been published also. And from time to time he was reporting that information the same way he was reporting our information.
Q. Okay. And it looks like he attached another attachment that related to DirecTV 2002, correct?
A. Yeah, I think the way all the reporting from Joel is done is each time he kind of does a kind of executive summary in the body of the e-mail, and in the attachment you will find the extract of the website where the quote or the publication have been done.
Q. Well, at the bottom where it says -- or in the text, I apologize -- it says, "The CAM ID slash ZKT pair posted on a form yesterday doesn't come from a P4 card." Do you see that?
A. I see that, yeah.
Q. And that's Mr. Conus' writing?
A. Apparently. It's one he made from him, so...
Q. He says, "While the CAM ID is in the P4 range, it doesn't pass all the ZKT challenges," correct?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. Now, "the P4 range" would mean a card number that

DirecTV assigned to its $P 4$ cards?
A. Yes. Probably, yeah.
Q. And ZKT is a zero-knowledge table that is used in an encrypted password challenge in the NDS DirecTV system to make sure the Smart Card is in the right receiver; isn't that correct?
A. That I don't know.
Q. Well, your system doesn't use a zero-knowledge table as part of its authentication process, does it?
A. If you can explain me what a zero-key table -- I can answer that question, but...
Q. My understanding is limited, but I believe it was developed by Adi Shamir, and it's asymmetrical encryption system used to authenticate Smart Card communications between a Smart Card and a receiver?
A. Okay. So on the ROM 3 or DNASP-II family, we are not using that scheme.
Q. Do you know how Mr. Conus was able to determine that the CAM ID was in the $P 4$ range?
A. That I don't know.
Q. Do you know how Mr. Conus was able to determine that that CAM ID did not pass all the zero-knowledge table challenges?
A. That I don't know.
Q. Can you think of any way Mr. Conus would be able to
determine whether a particular $P 4$ card ID would not pass the encryption challenge response?
A. Sure. I think the only way he can have that
information, it means that those information have been published on those pirate website he was monitoring. And reading that information, he get the -- he get the knowledge, he get the knowledge of that information, and that was about report.

What we see, for example, on our system hackers report, the card ID or CAM ID range to differentiate one version to the other because it's easier for them if we do a countermeasure on one version to know if the CAM ID in their own box will suffer from the countermeasure or not.
Q. Well, if you didn't use the ZKT, how is this knowledge helpful to improving the Nagra system?
A. I think it was not.
Q. Had Mr. Conus or anyone at Nagra analyzed a P4 card to allow him to make these determinations?
A. Not I'm aware of.
Q. Am I correct that there was never any evidence that the P4 card was used in EchoStar piracy?
A. The P4 card was not used on EchoStar piracy; that is correct.
Q. Now at some point in time, did Kudelski or NagraVision begin developing an ASIC for its Smart Cards, an
application-specific integrated circuit?
A. Yeah, that's correct.
Q. And the NDS DirecTV system had used an ASIC since the late '90s, including in the $P 3$ card, as far as you knew, right?
A. That I don't know. I'm aware about the P4. Seems to use that, but I don't know all the detail.
Q. Did Kudelski or NagraVision hire any former DirecTV employees or consultants who worked on the P4 card?
A. I know that we were -- we are working with different consultants, and maybe some of them have -- might work with DirecTV at that time, yes.
Q. Including Mr. Kocher?
A. Are you referring about Paul Kocher?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Yeah, we are working with Paul Kocher today.
Q. And when did Kudelski first start beginning development
of an ASIC for its cards like DirecTV had already done?
A. I think -- I think we start developing that in 2003, 2004 .
Q. Now, does NagraCard or NagraVision have any
laboratories in Switzerland that can be used to analyze
Smart Cards?
A. Yes, we have laboratory. Yes.
Q. What kind of equipment?
A. Very basic equipment. We don't have all the tools to do a full reverse engineering of those card.
Q. Do you have equipment that's used to conduct quality assurance checks on the manufacturing?
A. Could you repeat?
Q. Sure. Do you have equipment used for quality assurance checks?
A. Yes, we do.
Q. And where is the laboratory located in Switzerland? Is it in Cheseaux?
A. It's in Cheseaux, yeah.
Q. Did you ever learn that NagraStar hired a private investigator to purchase P4 cards from a satellite pirate business in Canada so they could be analyzed in Switzerland?
A. I'm not aware of that, no.

MR. STONE: Could you show the witness

Exhibit 1148, please.
(Document displayed.)
BY MR. STONE:
Q. By looking at Exhibit 1148, this is a

June 28, 2002, Pinkerton investigation report to NagraStar,
"Attention J.J. Gee, Special Projects Investigator."
Do you see that?
A. I see that, yeah.
Q. And NagraStar was the company that was responsible for
investigating piracy, amongst other things, correct?
A. Yes. That's correct.
Q. And you know Mr. Gee, right?
A. I know J. J., yeah.
Q. And you were aware that Mr. Gee had hired private investigative firms on occasion to conduct investigations?
A. I'm aware of that, yes.

MR. STONE: Your Honor, I would move 1148 subject to connection.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. HAGAN: Subject to motion to strike, no objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Received into evidence.
(Exhibit No. 1148 received in evidence.)

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Have you looked at the assignment that Mr. Gee gave to Pinkerton? It's the first paragraph?

It says, "We are directed to research satansplayhouse.com and confirm their operating locations in the greater Toronto area. In addition, we were tasked to purchase in person their $P 4$ access card, instructed to purchase three cards if modified and two units if not modified." Do you see that?
A. I see that, yeah.
Q. And did you ever learn from Mr. Gee that they had sent
a private investigative firm to Canada to purchase P4 cards?
A. I was not aware of that.
Q. And were any of those $P 4$ cards ever sent to

Switzerland?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Do you have any understanding why NagraStar would need to purchase NDS P4 cards from satansplayhouse?
A. I don't know.
Q. Didn't you testify that the laboratory in Colorado had
a DirecTV receiver in it?
A. Reading the file, that's my understanding, yes.
Q. Let me show you, please, Exhibit 1190.

Now, Mr. Nicolas, since you were in your charge of the production by NagraVision, I take it you recognize the Bates stamp at the bottom "NVNC," which stands for NagraVision NagraCard, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And this is a picture of a P4 card, correct?
A. Yes, correct.
Q. And this was produced by NagraVision NagraCard in this case, correct?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. And I assume you produced a photograph rather than the card itself?
A. No. I recall that posting. That was, I think, one
posting done on Internet, the very first time the hackers have seen the P4 operating in the field. So if you hook that posting with the report that was with that, you will probably confirm my understanding.
Q. I have not seen any portion connected to this photograph in the production, sir. You're saying this is a photograph taken off of some website?
A. Yeah, that's typically the way hackers publish those things. The fact that they have put in black the com ID was to make sure that they will not be tracked or recognized. Q. Isn't what happened that the folks in Switzerland blacked out the CAM ID because they were analyzing the P4 card?
A. I don't see -- so first I tell you that I don't think we received any P4 card. So I don't know why we will have blackened a number or so there if we have received one of those cards.
Q. Would you have blackened a number if kP4 cards were purchased from satansplayhouse in Toronto, Canada?
A. I don't know why we would have first received that card and then blackened the number.
Q. Well, by blackening the number, it can't be traced. Isn't that what you said?
A. Yeah. And that was the purpose of the publication. That's my understanding.
Q. And do you know why the alleged website posting that went with this was not produced with the photograph of the P4 card?
A. I don't know if it was produced or not. That's what you are saying.
Q. Who was the person who was in charge of the development of the ROM 3 version card?
A. So when I joined the team, Cal Osen, O-S-E-N, was in charge of the development of the ROM 3 card.
Q. And had you ever worked on the development of a secure Smart Card prior to working on the ROM 3 development team?
A. No.
Q. Had you had any experience prior to joining NagraVision in writing or developing software for any Smart Card?
A. No.
Q. And do you have any understanding of what Mr. Osen's qualifications were to design a secure Smart Card for a conditional access system?
A. Yeah. It was the principal engineer that was involved in all development of all our Smart Card before that. So before the digital or the DNASP-II family, we developed an analog system using Smart Card since, I think, late '80s until '96. So Cal was the principal engineer in charge of that development from -- as I said, '88, '89 until '96, when I joined.
Q. And am I correct that the chairman of the company, Henri Kudelski, was also involved in the design of the security aspects of the ROM 3 card?
A. I don't know he was directly involved in the development of the ROM 3. He was probably involved in the overall design of the system before that, but not in the specific design and development of the card itself.

MR. STONE: Your Honor, I would like to play from Mr. Nicolas' deposition Page 25, Lines 12 through 23.

THE COURT: You may.

MR. STONE: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Deposition played as follows:)
QUESTION: "Okay. I apologize. Who was responsible for designing the security aspects of the ROM 3 card, as you understand it?

ANSWER: "Mr. Osen was responsible for the development of the card.

QUESTION: "Mr. Osen was responsible for the development of the card?

ANSWER: "In terms of the design and conception, other people were also involved.

QUESTION: "Who else was involved in the design of the security aspects of the ROM 3 card as you recall it?

ANSWER: "I think that in view of the importance of the project, Andrea Kudelski himself was involved in the
project."

BY MR. STONE:
Q. And you headed up the project to develop the

ROM 7 version, correct?
A. Can you repeat that?
Q. Sure. Were you in charge of the development of the ROM 7 card?
A. So I was involved in ROM 7 and ROM 10, the develop, I don't recall if I was in charge of ROM 7 already. I think I was in charge of ROM 10 for sure, but ROM 7, it might be the case.
Q. So you might have been in charge of the ROM 7
development?
A. Yes, correct.
Q. And when might you have been involved and in charge of the development of ROM 7?
A. You say when?
Q. Yes.
A. So we finish the development of ROM 3, it was the end of '96, so probably during the time of '97 somewhere we started developing the ROM 7. So it will be my guess '97, '98 time frame.
Q. When was the development completed on the ROM 7
version?
A. Yeah, I will say somewhere end of '97 or in '98. But I
don't recall the exact date.
Q. I assume there would be records of that somewhere?
A. Yeah. I think we can find that, yeah.
Q. Was the ROM 7 card ever deployed in North America?
A. My understanding is that that was not deployed at

EchoStar, and I need to check, but it might have been
deployed at Bell ExpressVu in Canada, but I don't recall
exactly.
Q. Were there any ROM versions that you worked on between ROM 3 and ROM 7?
A. So we are developing a ROM 4 also for another system, and I think that's it. So after ROM 3, there was ROM 4 and ROM 7.
Q. And then you headed you development of the ROM 10 card, correct?
A. Sorry. Can you repeat?
Q. Sure. You were in charge of development of the ROM 10 card?
A. Yeah, that's correct. Yes.
Q. And the ROM 10 card was the next generation after

ROM 7, correct?
A. So it was still part of the same DNASP-II family, but we were introducing a new hardware platform. So I think we have seen before the ST16CF54 platform used for ROM 2 and 3. We introduced a new hardware platform for ROM 10 within that

DNASP-II family.
Q. And -- I'm sorry -- were there any ROM versions in between ROM 7 and 10?
A. No.
Q. And when did the development of the ROM 10 card begin?
A. I would say, I think, in '99, 2000 time frame.

Probably '99.
Q. 1999?
A. Yes.
Q. And what happened to Mr. Osen? Do you know why he wasn't in charge of ROM 7 and ROM 10?
A. At that time he was still involved in the development. He was not the project manager of that project.
Q. All right. So you worked on the ROM 3 development right out of school, and then eventually you were in charge of the development of the ROM 10 in 1999?
A. I think I said 1999/2000 for the ROM 10, yes.
Q. And am I correct that the hardware chip chosen for the ROM 10 card that was used in 1999 does not have this memory aliasing feature in it, correct?
A. That's correct. But now -- now, you mentioned that, I think we were not aware still of the ROM ghost effect when we pick the next platform.
Q. So it was just by luck that you happened to pick a new chip that was not subject to memory aliasing?
A. Yeah. I think we pick the new ST family. So we move from ST16 family to ST19, and that was the next one which was available.
Q. And the ROM 10 card was finalized in February of 2000 , the code, that is; is that correct?
A. That we need to check. I think it will be somewhere in that time frame.
Q. I will tell you we've looked at the ROM 10 source code, and it indicates it was completed in February of 2000. Does that sound right to you?
A. I trust you if you checked that, yeah.
Q. And it went out in the field in March of 2000 or to the customer?
A. That's probably the right time frame. I don't know the exact date, but $I$ don't have all those dates in mind. That's probably the right time frame.
Q. And would you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury if the ROM 10 card suffers from any buffer overflow vulnerability?
A. So the RAM ghost effect that I've tried to explain to you was hardware weaknesses that were in the ST16 chip. And the ROM 10 card, based on a new chip, the so-called ST19, was not suffering from that hardware weaknesses. So we were still managing the buffer the same way, but not the -- that feature or that weakness didn't exist in that ST19 family.
Q. That's not exactly correct, sir.

Isn't it true that the ROM 10 code specifically checks to make sure the buffer cannot be overflowed?
A. That we need to check. That might be something that was -- I did at that time.
Q. You were in charge of the ROM 10 development. Do you recall that you made a conscious decision to check the communications buffer in the ROM 10 to make sure it could not be overflowing?
A. Yeah, that's my point. I don't recall. But if you check the code yourself and you tell me that, I will trust you for sure.
Q. You have no reason to dispute that fact. Is that a fair statement?
A. If you say that it's in there, I fully understand it's in there.
Q. I say it and I'll have my expert say it because I don't really understand code, so...
A. Fine.

THE COURT: While you're here, we can check that over the lunch hour, can't we? THE WITNESS: Yeah. If I have the source code, sure. MR. STONE: This might be a good time, then, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, it's not.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. Okay. Now, when the ROM 10 card was created, it was created for which customer?
A. I think the way we were developing cards, we were trying to introduce a new generation of cards every one or two years. And the same family, DNASP-II family, was shared amongst all our customer at that time. So DNASP-X introduction was for -- they did get it both for EchoStar, but also for other customers.
Q. Who was the largest customer of the ROM 10 version card?
A. I think it's difficult. I think EchoStar that had the most volume of the ROM 10 code card in production, yeah.
Q. Now, when the ROM 10 card was produced, how many
millions were shipped to EchoStar in the year 2000?
A. So again, just try understand. How many ROM 10 code Smart Card were produced and sent to EchoStar in 2000? Was that your question?
Q. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
A. At that time $I$ don't know, but I think multiple million. I don't know the exact number. But --
Q. Does 9.6 million sound about right to you?
A. In 2000, I think, yeah, EchoStar was growing something like that number, but we need to check. I don't have the
number. But it looks fair.
Q. Do you recall that in 2000 the total subscribers to the EchoStar DISH Network were slightly more than 5 million?
A. If you say so, I will trust you, too.
Q. It's in the $10-\mathrm{K}$, so yes, sir.
A. Yeah.
Q. How many ROM 3 cards -- well, strike that.

Before the ROM 10 came out, there was both ROM 2 and
ROM 3, right?
A. Again, for EchoStar?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Yes.
Q. And if $I$ recall from the $10-K s$ correctly, there were little over 3 million, 3.4 million, $I$ think, subscribers in 1999, and a little over 5 million subscribers in 2000 to EchoStar. Do you recall how many ROM 2 cards existed in that system in 2000 and how many ROM 3?
A. No, I don't recall. I don't recall the split.
Q. But there was some split between subscribers between ROM 2 and ROM 3? In other words, they weren't all ROM 3 cards in the year '99 or 2000?
A. No. There were probably a few million of each version, yes.
Q. And a few million, you would agree, is less than 9 million?
A. I think it's a hard question, yeah -- but yeah.
Q. And when EchoStar got the 9 million ROM 10 cards that don't have memory aliasing and aren't subject to buffer overflow, did they immediately change out all the ROM 3 cards with those?
A. My understanding is that we didn't start any card exchange until -- we started that, I think, in 2002 to exchange the full -- the whole DNASP-II family.
Q. Do you have an understanding what EchoStar was doing with the 9 million ROM 10 cards that have no memory aliasing and no buffer overflow in the year 2000?
A. I'm missing a piece. What do you mean by 9 million Smart Card?
Q. $\quad 9$ million total.
A. Delivered to them?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. So my understanding, all the card that we were delivering at that time were going in the field for customer.
Q. And were they replacing the ROM 3 and ROM 2 cards?
A. Well, I think the main purpose was to use those cards for new subscriber.
Q. Now, when you got the black box device in -- I think you said September of 2000 -- and you said that uses a buffer overflow method and is similar to the recipe on the

Internet. Do you recall that testimony?
A. Yeah, I recall that.
Q. Did you call up EchoStar and say, "You know what? You ought to go and swap all your ROM 3 cards for our new ROM 10 card"?
A. I think we were -- we were clear that at that time that there is a major attack on both on ROM 3 card, but also on the DNASP-II family because the family shared some secret between different ROM. So ROM 2, ROM 3, and therefore ROM 10 and 11 are sharing the same secret code and secret information amongst that family. So no matter what we decide to do on ROM 3, the whole family is exposed and under attack.
Q. Sir, isn't it true that there is no buffer overflow attack that would work on a ROM 10 card?
A. I think overflow the way we have seen that on ROM 3 in conjunction with the ROM ghost effect, it is not possible on ROM 10. That's correct.
Q. How many lines of code does it take in assembly language to check one communications buffer to ensure it does not overflow?
A. I think it depends on the way you design that.
Q. How many did it take in the ROM 10? Do you have any recollection?
A. I think -- so what we have done is that we have
completely reviewed the way we were doing the communication and changed the code structure to take that into account. And probably we will have to check it over lunch, but it's probably a few lines of code to achieve that.
Q. Does two lines of code --
A. A few line of code.
Q. Does two sound about right?
A. Might be.
Q. Two?
A. It might be.
Q. And with those two lines of code, there is no way to overflow the one communications buffer in the ROM 10 card; isn't that correct?
A. That's my understanding, yes, if it's in there and if there is no ROM ghost effect. So it means that there is no "treat" like that, we cannot do a buffer overflow on the buffer.
Q. Even without the memory aliasing or RAM ghost effect, as you call it, if you can't overflow the communications buffer in the first instance, you can't make use of the memory aliasing; isn't that correct?
A. I'm not sure I'm following you. But can you rephrase that, please?
Q. Sure.

The memory aliasing cannot be used for any malicious
purpose unless you can overflow the buffer in the first place; isn't that correct?
A. That's a good question. I haven't think about it, all the detail, but on the exact same recipe you cannot use that one, but didn't mean that you cannot do anything else.
Q. Pardon?
A. Maybe you can do something else in term of attack using that --
Q. I'm just talking about a buffer overflow attack.
A. Yeah.
Q. There's no way to take any advantage of this RAM ghost effect or memory aliasing unless you can overflow the communications buffer as a first step. Isn't that a true statement?
A. No. That's my point. I didn't note about all the other type of attack you can do with that information. So the buffer overflow is one of them, but I cannot state today that it's the only one. That's what you are trying to -Q. I'm focusing on the buffer overflow.
A. Got that, yeah.
Q. Is the accusation in this case?
A. Sorry?
Q. Which is the accusation in this case. I'm focusing on buffer overflow.
A. Yes.
Q. Am I correct that without using a buffer overflow in the first instance, you cannot take advantage of memory aliasing for purposes of an attack?

THE COURT: Raise your voice.

BY MR. STONE:
Q. -- purposes of an attack?
A. I think you cannot do that purpose of the attack. You might do other one.
Q. Are you aware of another way?
A. I don't think so, no.

MR. STONE: Your Honor, would now be a good time?

THE COURT: Good time.

Ladies and gentlemen, you're admonished not to
discuss this matter amongst yourselves or express any
opinion concerning the case.

We'll see you at 1:00 o'clock. Have a nice lunch.

You can step down, please.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
(Witness steps down.)
(Jury adjourned for lunch.)

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, 1:00 o'clock.
Have a nice lunch.
(Lunch recess held at 11:58 a.m.)
(Further proceedings reported in Volume III.)
-০○○-



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