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for: (a) the full dump of Plaintiffs' secret ROM Code; (b) the full dump of Plaintiffs' EEPROM Code and accompanying secret keys; and (c) the instructions on how to internally 'hack' or access Plaintiffs' microprocessor thereby granting the ability to 'read' and 'write' to Plaintiffs' Access Cards. In essence, Defendants' December 21, 2000 posting provided hackers for the first time with the 'Exploit key' or method necessary to gain access to Plaintiffs' microprocessor and subsequently read and write to Plaintiffs' Access Cards. The result of such dump also enabled a pirate/hacker to locate and identify Plaintiffs' secret "box keys" and secret "decrypt keys."

106. On December 24, 2000, Tarnovsky used the alias "NiPpEr2000" to publish the FULL Echo ROM Code, which had been modified to create a 3M counterfeit EchoStar access card, on www.piratesden.com. "NiPpEr2000's" post, entitled "tHe ReAl V3 DuMp!," states: "tHeRe Will bE nO bOxEs aNyMoRe! tHeRe Will bE nO mOrE flgHtInG aMoNgSt uS. LeArN fRoM ThIs aNd pRosPer. tHiS WiLl Be PoStEd To All NeWsGrOuPs ArOuNd ThE WoRlD! This is Dr7'S cOdE (WeSt 3M v3) the rEal sTuff!!" Tarnovsky then goes on to state: "I wIlL dUmP AlL vErSiOnS oF tHe WeSt CoDe LoOk FoR iT hErE! nIpPeR cLaUz 00".

107. The first harmful effect of Tarnovsky providing this information was that every ROM3 EchoStar Access Card (approximately 7.6 million in circulation at that time) could then be compromised and forced to dump the EEPROM Code segment revealing the location and identity of Plaintiffs' secret "pairing keys." As a result, a pirate/hacker was now able to personally update a Pirated EchoStar Access Card or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Device to comport with Plaintiffs' frequent "pairing key" changes. Before December, 2000, a pirate/hacker was dependent on NDS, Tarnovsky and/or Menard, to either (1) have Nipper [Tarnovsky] provide the new "pairing keys" on pirate websites; or (2) send the disabled Pirated EchoStar Access Card back to the dealers for updating. However,

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as a result of Tarnovsky's publications in December 2000, hackers around the world now had the information necessary to personally circumvent any future EchoStar pairing key change to a ROM3 Access Card. Users now simply inserted the disabled Access Card into a card reader, performed the sequence of commands and data provided by Tarnovsky which would identify the new pairing key change, and update the Access Card with the new pairing keys. After performing these steps, the user's Pirated EchoStar Access Card or other signal theft device was no longer disabled and could once again receive unauthorized access to EchoStar Programming.

108. Shortly after Defendants' December 2000 publications, the first harmful effect evolved into the outright destruction and full compromise of Plaintiffs' Security System. Given the information Tarnovsky provided, "Johnny ASIC" was able to create and publish a modified version of Tarnovsky's information consisting of another sequence of events and data that a pirate/hacker could use to dump the entire ROM Code segment. The result of such dump enabled the person to possess the intimate personal knowledge of how Plaintiffs' Security System works. As a result of Tarnovsky's December 2000 publications, the piracy world was now able to gain access, retrieve, and steal the heart and soul of Plaintiffs' Security System and to dump both the EEPROM Code segment and the requisite Nagra ROM Code segment.

- 109. Subsequent to these December 2000 postings, NDS, by and through Tarnovsky, continued to provide technical information, support services, and assistance related to EchoStar Access Cards and Plaintiffs' Security System, and the unlawful circumvention and compromise thereof, to Menard and the "dealers" of the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network until the date that each such dealer's unlawful website was shut down.
- 110. As a result of this information, support, and assistance, Menard and the "dealers" of the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network continued to:

unlawfully reprogram EchoStar Access Cards; (b) unlawfully traffic in the sale and/or distribution of reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards; (c) periodically update reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards after they had been disabled and rendered inoperable through one of Plaintiffs' ECMs; and (d) otherwise post or provide technical information, support services, and assistance related to EchoStar Access Cards and Plaintiffs' Security System by and through their websites to facilitate others in the unlawful piracy and circumvention of Plaintiffs' CAS. This unlawful conduct continued up to and including the following dates on which the respective pirating websites were shut down: (1) January 28, 2001 - Sergei www.koinvizion.com; (2) June 21, 2001 - Menard - www.dr7.com; (3) June 19, 10 2003 - Dawson - www.dsscanada.com; (5) June 19, 2003 - Quinn www.hitecsat.com; and (6) June 25, 2003 - Frost - www.newfrontiergroup.com. 12 111. NDS's wrongful conduct also gave other satellite pirates the ability to 13 14 15 16

design, manufacture, sell, or otherwise traffic in Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices for a profit and the ability to release Plaintiffs' proprietary information to other satellite pirates for the same or similar purpose.

112. Specifically, on or about May 31, 2001, a Pirates Den "DISH Network" file search yielded the following downloadable illegal files related to circumvention of Plaintiffs' Security System in order to receive the unauthorized viewing of DISH Network programming services: (1) sorry Charlie 2.8 (sc28.exe); (2) 2 Piece AVR (2pieceavr.zip); (3) msg306src (mcg306src.zip); (4) EEEdit Blocker (6) Nagra (mracttv2.zip); Mracttv2 (eepedit.zip); (5) (nagra_blocker21.zip); (7) Rom2 Disassembly (rom2.zip); (8) Talk10 (talk10.zip); (9) Dish500 (dish500.zip); (10) Edit305 (edit305v1.zip); (11) Virgin Bin (virgin.zip); (12) Stuntguy's NagraVision hacking FAQ (erom_faq_012000.zip); (13) E3m Disassembly (e3ms.zip); (14) 288-02 disassembly (disasm.zip); (15) Simple ATME: Programmer \$5 in parts (13418eprog.zip); (16) Wbininfo150

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(wbininfo150.zip); (17) Dish 3m (dish3m.zip); (18) Sorry Charlie (sorrycharlie.zip); (19) Talk 31d (talk31d.zip); (20) 01-02 Dumps (0102dumps.zip); (21) Talk3.1b (talk31b.zip); (22) Fbprg16 (fbprg.zip); (24) Dish Blank Bin (dishblank.zip); (25) Dish PPV Wipe (dishppvwiipe.zip); (26) EDump (edump.zip); (27) Dish Hardware FAQ (faqdishhdwr.zip); (28) MCG305 (mcg305.zip); (29) **E3m code (west3mv3.zip)**; and (30) Talk 3.1 (talk31.zip).

- 113. On or about December 16, 2001, Tarnovsky admits to Giles Kaehlin, Head of Security for Canal+, at a meeting in London, that NDS was responsible for the hack and publication of the DISH Network ROM Code on the internet. Tarnovsky admits that the DISH Network code was sent to him by Reuven Hasak, head of security for NDS in Israel, from John Norris, head of security for NDS Americas. Tarnovsky later sent an email stating that he wanted no further communications to occur between himself and Kaehlin.
- 114. As a result of Tarnovsky's conduct outlined above, he became the target of an investigation by the federal government. Specifically, various packages containing up to \$20,100.00 in cash hidden in various electronic devices were intercepted in transit from Menard to Tarnovsky. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that said payments, which were being sent daily from Menard to Tarnovsky, with the assistance of Main, constituted compensation for Tarnovsky reactivating the reprogrammer such that Menard could produce more unlawfully altered EchoStar Access Cards using NDS and Tarnovsky's "stinger."
- 115. On or about December 14, 2000, U.S. Customs advised the Hays County Narcotics Task Force that *Tarnovsky worked for NDS in California and was believed to be counterfeiting or pirating satellite T.V. access cards*. U.S. Customs was working with Direct TV's private security company who was also investigating Tarnovsky's hacking activities. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that U.S. Customs also investigated Tarnovsky on a case in the states of Oregon and Washington.

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116. On or about January 9, 2001, a "knock and talk" by U.S. Customs agents Flannigan and Spears, as well as Ruben Romero of Galaxy Latin America, takes place at Tarnovsky's house in California. During the walkthrough, Agents witnessed various electronic equipment believed to be used for reprogramming EchoStar access cards.

117. On or about March 8, 2001, at a meeting with Menard in Canada with Ereiser present, Menard stated that "Tarnovsky would lose his job" if Menard provided any information as to how the initial hack of Plaintiffs' conditional access system occurred. Tarnovsky was an employee and agent of NDS at this time.

HAVE BEEN, AND CONTINUE TO BE. VII. **PLAINTIFFS INJURED** ILLEGAL **CONDUCT**

118. Since NDS's hacking EchoStar's Access Card and posting its hack methodology on the Internet in December 2000, Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices have become available. Plaintiffs have also been and continue to be substantially injured as a result of the proliferation of their Security System effectuated by Tarnovsky and Menard reprogramming cards, distributing same through Dawson, Quinn, Sergei and Frost, and subsequently providing technical support for same. These unlawful acts continued up to and including June 25, 2003 when the last distributor's website was shut down.

119. These Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices enable, assist, and facilitate the decryption of DISH Network's Programming services without EchoStar's authorization or viewers' payment of the necessary and required fees. These Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices have been, and continue to be, advertised, marketed, distributed, and sold via the Internet, local publications, and

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in underground satellite publications, in addition to being often times sold by satellite equipment retail dealers. Regardless of how these Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices are advertised, marketed, distributed, or sold, the fact of the matter is that these Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices would not presently exist but for the wrongful conduct of Defendants, as described herein.

120. Defendants' wrongful conduct has injured, and will continue to injure, Plaintiffs by depriving Plaintiffs of subscription and pay-per-view revenues and other valuable consideration, compromising Plaintiffs' conditional access system, infringing on Plaintiffs' trade secrets and proprietary information, and interfering with Plaintiffs' contractual and prospective business relations. And, as a direct result of Defendants' December 2000 postings, Plaintiffs were forced to employ their very first card swap of approximately more than 7 million EchoStar Access Cards.

VIII. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO INTERVENE IN THE CANAL+ V. NDS **LITIGATION**

- 121. Hacking Plaintiffs' Security System is not the first time NDS has engaged in wrongful behavior against a competitor's Security System. On or about April 9, 2002, Oliver Kommerling, NDS's employee and agent, explained the methods that NDS used to break the Security System of another encryption competitor, Canal+, and to distribute that information to foster satellite piracy.
- 122. Kommerling testified that "NDS engineers in the NDS facility in Haifa, Israel obtained Canal+ Access Cards and using the techniques taught by me [Kommerling] (some of which were described in my paper Design Principles for Tamper Resistant Smartcards written with Markus Kuhn) were able to physically extract the Canal+ machine code embedded in their Access Cards." Further Kommerling testified that "NDS engineers disassembled and analyzed the extracted

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machine code . . ." which was later confirmed by Kommerling as the same code that was published on the "DR7 website" by NDS agent Christopher Tarnovsky. (Kommerling Dec. \P 6(a)-(e), attached hereto.)

- 123. Upon further investigation, in approximately early September 2002, Plaintiffs discovered the sworn declaration of Jan Saggiori, an employee of SSS Saggiori testified that he "asked Chris LLC, based in Geneva Switzerland. Tarnovsky if he could obtain the [missing] code present at the 2000 address from Al Menart. By an email exchange from Chris Tarnovsky [on March 28, 1999], Chris sent me [Saggiori] an 8kb binary file that he claimed contained the requested code extracted from the Canal+ smart card." (Saggiori Dec. ¶ 5 and Exhibits to his declaration, attached hereto)
- 124. Upon Plaintiffs' receipt and review of the code sent from NDS employee Tarnovsky to Saggiori, Plaintiffs discovered that the code was actually from an ST microchip that NagraStar used within its Access Cards. As evidenced by this code, and the well pleaded facts herein, Plaintiffs are now informed and believe that NDS may have cracked Plaintiffs' Security System as early as March 28, 1999 and distributed Plaintiffs' illegally obtained proprietary codes at this time through its employee and agent Tarnovsky, among other Defendants, with the intent and common plan to facilitate the piracy of Plaintiffs' Security System and cause harm to Plaintiffs.
- 125. Upon discovering that NDS was responsible for the acts complained of herein in approximately early September 2002, Plaintiffs immediately brought an action against NDS on September 27, 2002 by filing a Motion to Intervene in Canal+'s pending lawsuit against NDS - which was based upon similar facts and circumstances. The Canal+ v. NDS et al. case settled before Plaintiffs' Motion to Intervene could be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed this suit on June 6, 2003.

OUTLINE OF WRONGFUL CONDUCT AND THEORIES IX.

LIABILITY UNDERLYING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS

A. NDS Group

126. NDS Group used its laboratory in Haifa, Israel and its employees (including Oliver Kommerling) to unlawfully obtain EchoStar Access Cards for the purpose of hacking into Plaintiffs' microprocessor embedded in EchoStar Access Cards to gain access to and extract therefrom Plaintiffs' proprietary and secret ROM and EEPROM Codes secured therein. NDS Group also used the information they extracted from EchoStar's access cards to develop a hack methodology which would defeat EchoStar's security measures. (See 5AC ¶¶ 13, 82, 83; see also Kommerling Decl. ¶7, Stewart Aff. ¶¶ 16, 20, 21, 26.)

127. Hasak subsequently transferred Plaintiffs' ROM and EEPROM Codes from Israel to NDS Americas (Norris and Tarnovsky) with instructions for Tarnovsky to use the codes to develop an unlawful reprogramming device to modify Plaintiffs' Access Cards and create a distribution network to sell and distribute the reprogrammed cards. (5AC ¶¶ 14-16, 84, 85, 109, 110; see also Kommerling Decl. ¶7, Stewart Aff. ¶¶ 16, 20, 21, 26.)

128. As a result of the foregoing, NDS Group is directly and secondarily liable for the unlawful acts of piracy committed by: (a) NDS Americas and its employees (Norris and Tarnovsky), (See 5AC ¶¶ 38; see also Kommerling Decl. ¶ 7, Stewart Aff. ¶¶ 26); (b) NDS Americas agent Menard, (See 5AC ¶¶ 40, 41); (c) NDS Americas' sub-agent "dealers" in the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network (Dawson, Quinn, Sergei, and Frost), (See 5AC ¶¶ 42, 43); and (d) all enduser satellite pirates who received reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards or subsequent technical support for same from any of the foregoing Defendants in furtherance of Hasak's directives to Tarnovsky and Norris. (See 5AC ¶¶ 118, 119). Specifically, NDS Group and its employees are secondarily liable under the following theories: (1) aiding and abetting, (See 5AC ¶¶ 16, 17, 89, 90, 92); (2)

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contributory and/or vicarious copyright infringement, (See 5AC ¶¶ 118, 119); and (3) conspiracy/joint contribution (See 5AC ¶¶ 46-48). NDS Group's secondary liability for the unlawful acts committed by any of the foregoing Defendants under the foregoing theories continued up to and including June 25, 2003 – the date the last website through which the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network operated was shut down. (See 5AC ¶¶ 24, 25, 95, 110).

B. NDS Americas

- 129. NDS Americas, by and through Norris and Tarnovsky, received Plaintiffs' proprietary and secret ROM and EEPROM Codes that were unlawfully obtained and extracted by NDS Group through Norris and Tarnovsky via Hasak, (See 5AC ¶¶ 13, 14, 84; see also Stewart Aff. at ¶ 26).
- 130. NDS Americas, by and through Norris and Tarnovsky, used Plaintiffs' Codes to design and build an unlawful reprogramming device capable of modifying EchoStar Access Cards. (See 5AC ¶¶ 15, 84, 85, 87).
- 131. NDS Americas, by and through Norris, instructed Tarnovsky to set up a distribution network through which the unlawfully reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards could be marketed, sold, and distributed to the pirating public. (See 5AC ¶¶ 16, 17, 89, 90; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 12, 17).
- 132. Under this directive, Tarnovsky successfully solicited Menard to: (a) use the NDS reprogrammer to reprogram EchoStar Access Cards, (See 5AC ¶¶ 16, 17, 87, 88); (b) assist in establishing and maintaining a distribution network through which these cards could be marketed, sold, and distributed, (See 5AC ¶¶ 89-97); and (c) assist Tarnovsky in the posting of software, instructions, codes, fixes, updates and/or other technical support for the reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards, (See 5AC ¶¶ 94; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶¶ 12, 17).
- 133. With the assistance and protection of NDS Americas, by and through Norris and Tarnovsky, Menard successfully solicited Dawson, Quinn, Sergei and

Frost to serve as distributors of the reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards and software and technical support for same and to assist in the maintenance of the distribution network. Menard also successfully solicited the assistance of Main, as a "courier" to traffick in same. (See 5AC ¶¶ 16, 17, 44; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 18).

- 134. Through Tarnovsky and Norris, NDS controlled Menard and the distribution network. (See 5AC ¶¶ 16, 18, 39-41, 90, 98, 99; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 17-19).
- 135. Through Menard and the distributors (Dawson, Quinn, Sergei and Frost), NDS Americas and Tarnovsky were able to unlawfully reprogram EchoStar Access Cards, distribute these reprogrammed cards to pirating end-users, and provide technical support for same with this conduct continuing up to and including June 25, 2003 when the last NDS distribution website was shut down. (See 5AC ¶¶ 16, 24, 25, 95, 110; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 17-19).
- 136. Tarnvosky continued in unlawfully reprogramming EchoStar Access Cards directly up to and including January 9, 2001 when his home was visited by federal officials in connection with a federal investigation into Tarnovsky's activities. (See 5AC ¶ 26, 116).
- 137. Under the instruction and direction from NDS Americas, on December 21 and 24, 2000, Tarnovsky caused Plaintiffs' ROM and EEPROM codes extracted from Plaintiffs' microprocessor by NDS Group and all necessary instructions to utilize same for reprogramming EchoStar Access Cards in the circumvention of Plaintiffs' CAS, to be posted on the Internet resulting in the immediate widespread compromise of Plaintiffs' Security System. (See 5AC ¶¶ 19-23, 103, 106).
- 138. In addition to NDS Americas and its employees (Norris and Tarnovsky) direct liability for the foregoing acts, they are also secondarily liable for: (a) the acts of each other; (b) NDS Americas agent Menard, (See 5AC ¶¶ 40, 41, 89, 90; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 12, 17); (c) NDS sub-agent distributors

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Dawson, Ouinn, Sergei, and Frost, (See 5AC ¶¶ 42, 43, 89-91; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 18, 26); and (d) all end-user satellite pirates who received reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards or subsequent technical support for same from the any of the foregoing Defendants in furtherance of Hasak's directives to Tarnovsky and Norris. (See 5AC ¶¶ 118, 119). Specifically, NDS Americas and its employees (Norris and Tarnovsky) are secondarily liable under the following theories: (1) agency with Menard, (See 5AC ¶¶ 40, 41, 89, 90); (2) agency/subagency with the distributors of the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network (Dawson, Quinn, Sergei and Frost), (See 5AC ¶¶ 42, 43, 89-91; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 18); (3) contributory and vicarious copyright infringement by Menard, (See 5AC ¶¶ 40, 41, 89, 90; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 18), and the distributors of the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network (Dawson, Quinn, Sergei and Frost), (See 5AC ¶¶ 42, 43, 89-91; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 18), as well as the pirating end-users purchasing the reprogrammed cards and/or receiving technical support for same, (see 5AC ¶¶ 118, 119); (4) agency by ratification of the foregoing acts engaged in by the distributors of the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network (Dawson, Quinn, Sergei and Frost) on NDS Americas' behalf, (see 5AC ¶ 45); (5) aiding and abetting Menard, (see 5AC ¶ 16, 17, 89, 90, 92; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 17), and the distributors of the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network (Dawson, Quinn, Sergei and Frost), (See 5AC ¶ 16, 17, 91, 93, 95-97; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 18); and (6) conspiracy. (See 5AC ¶¶ 46-48). NDS Americas' secondary liability for the unlawful acts committed by any of the foregoing Defendants under the foregoing theories continued up to and including June 25, 2003 - the date the last website through which the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network operated was shut down. (See 5AC ¶ 24, 25, 92-95, 110).

Menard and the NDS Distributors Dawson, Quinn, Sergei and C. Frost

17, 90, 91; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 18).

16, 18, 92, 93; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 18).

139. After NDS Americas successfully solicited Menard, by and through

140. In furtherance of that directive, Menard assisted NDS, by and through

141. Menard used the reprogrammer device NDS provided to him, by and

142. Menard supplied reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards to the NDS

143. Through the business names of "X-Factor Design, Inc.," "Hi-Fi Audio

websites

Tarnovsky, Menard agreed to (and did) assist NDS Americas and Tarnovsky in

Tarnovsky, in successfully soliciting Dawson, Sergi, Quinn and Frost to serve as

NDS distributors for the reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards. (See 5AC ¶¶ 16,

through Tarnovsky, to unlawfully reprogram EchoStar Access Cards. (See 5AC ¶¶

distributors of the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network (Dawson, Quinn,

Exchange," and "Regency Audio," his hacker website (www.dr7.com), and the

www.newfrontiergroup.com), among other Internet websites, Menard assisted

Tarnovsky in the posting of "software," "instructions," "codes," "fixes," "updates,"

and/or other technical support for the reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards. (See

www.hitecsat.com,

Sergei and Frost) to market, sell, distribute to the pirating public. (Id.)

hacker

establishing and maintaining a distribution network. (See 5AC ¶¶ 16-18, 89, 90).

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5AC ¶¶ _24, 25, 93-95; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 12).									
	144.	Menard	continued	reprogramming	EchoStar	Access	Cards	and	

(www.discountsatellite.com,

and

www.koinvizion,

- providing technical support services for same up to and including June 19, 2001 -
- the date his hacker website, www.dr7.com, was shut down. (See 5AC ¶¶ 24, 25, 27,
- 95, 110; see also Scullion Decl. at ¶ 12).

distributors'

www.dsscanada.com,

- 145. Sergei continued to advertise, provide, and otherwise traffic in unlawfully reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards and/or other Signal Theft
- Devices, as well as technical support for same, up to and including January 28,

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– the date his hacker website, <u>www.koinvizion.com</u>, was shut down. (*See* 1000 100

- 146. Dawson continued to advertise, provide and otherwise traffic in unlawfully reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards and/or other Circumvention Signal Theft Devices, as well as technical support for same, up to and including June 19, 2003 when his website, www.dsscanada.com, was shut down. (*Id.*).
- 147. Quinn continued to advertise, provide and otherwise traffic in unlawfully reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards and/or other Circumvention Signal Theft Devices, as well as technical support for same, up to and including June 19, 2003 when his website www.hitecsat.com was shut down. (*Id.*).
- 148. Frost continued to advertise, provide and otherwise traffic in unlawfully reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards and/or other Circumvention Signal Theft Devices, as well as technical support for same, up to and including June 25, 2003 when his website www.newfrontiergroup.com was shut down. (*Id.*).

D. Main

149. Main was successfully solicited by Menard to assist Menard in the day-to-day maintenance of the NDS distribution network and Menard's hacker website which operated up to and including June 21, 2001 when it was shut down. (See 5AC ¶ 24, 25, 27, 44, 95, 110.)

X. CAUSES OF ACTION

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Circumventing Technological Measures Concerning Protected and Copyrighted Works in Violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A))

- 150. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference 5AC ¶¶ 126-149, as if set forth fully within this cause of action.
- 151. Defendants violated 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) by directly or indirectly circumventing Plaintiffs' CAS that effectively control access to works

protected under Title 17 of the United States Code, namely DISH Network's satellite television programming services and the protected works broadcasted thereon.

Defendant NDS Group

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152. Defendant NDS Group is directly and/or secondarily liable for the unlawful circumvention activities committed by Defendants NDS Americas and its the Menard, the "dealers" in and Tarnovsky), employees (Norris NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network and other persons in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC ¶¶ 12-27, 38-48, 82-85. 89-97, 101-106, 118, 119 & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein, including but not limited to Tarnovsky's publication of the hack methodology (which Defendants created) on pirate-websites on or about December 21 and 24, 2000.

Defendant NDS Americas

- 153. Defendant NDS Americas violated 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) by and through its employees (Norris and Tarnovsky) engaging directly in the conduct stated in (5AC at ¶¶ 12-27, 38, 84-97, 101-106, & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein, including but not limited to Tarnovsky's publication of the hack methodology (which Defendants created) on pirate-websites on or about December 21 and 24, 2000.
- 154. Defendant NDS Americas are also secondarily and/or contributorily liable for the unlawful circumvention activities of Menard, the "dealers" in the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network, and other person committed in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC ¶¶ 16-18, 39-48, 84-97, 118, 119 & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein.
- 155. These acts complained of herein occurred in, amongst other places, the State of California, Canada, and Israel.

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- 156. Defendants' direct and indirect acts of circumvention were performed without the permission, authorization, or consent of Plaintiffs or any owner of copyrighted programming broadcasted on the DISH Network.
- Defendants violated Section 1201(a)(1) of the DMCA willfully, and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.
- 158. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 1203, Plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief, damages (either statutory damages of \$200 to \$2,500 per violation, or actual damages plus any profits realized by Defendants as a result of this unlawful conduct), reasonable attorney's fees, and costs, in addition to all other relief to which they may be entitled.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Manufacture of and Traffic in Signal Theft Technology and Devices in Violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2))

- 159. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference 5AC ¶¶ 126-149, as if set forth fully within this cause of action.
- 160. Defendants violated 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2) by directly or indirectly manufacturing, importing to the United States, offering to the public, providing or otherwise trafficking in altered, modified, compromised and/or reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards or other Signal Theft Technology and Devices, including but not limited to Defendants' December 2000 postings, knowing that such technology or devices: (a) are primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing Plaintiffs' CAS or the protections afforded thereby to copyright owners' rights of works or portions thereof; (b) have only limited commercially significant purposes or uses other than to circumvent Plaintiffs' CAS or the protections afforded thereby to copyright owners' rights of works or portions thereof; or (c) were marketed by the following Defendants or another person acting in concert with Defendants with Defendants' knowledge for use in circumventing Plaintiffs' CAS or the protections afforded thereby to copyright owners' rights of

Defendants NDS Group

161. Defendant NDS Group is secondarily liable for the unlawful activities committed by Defendants NDS Americas and its employees (Norris and Tarnovsky), Menard, the "dealers" in the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network and other persons in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2) by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC ¶¶ 12-27, 38-48, 82-85. 89-97, 101-106 & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein.

Defendant NDS Americas

- 162. Defendant NDS Americas violated 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2) by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC at ¶¶ 12-27, 38, 84-97, 101-106 & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein.
- 163. Defendant NDS Americas are also secondarily liable for the violations of 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2) of Menard, the "dealers" in the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network and other persons by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC ¶¶ 16-18, 39-48, 84-97, 118, 119 & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein.
- 164. These acts complained of herein occurred in, amongst other places, the State of California, Canada, and Israel.
- 165. Defendants' violations have injured, and will continue to injure, Plaintiffs by depriving Plaintiffs of subscription and pay-per-view revenues and other valuable consideration, compromising Plaintiffs' security and accounting systems, infringing Plaintiffs' trade secrets and proprietary information, and interfering with Plaintiffs' contractual and prospective business relations.
- 166. Defendants' acts of circumvention were performed without the permission, authorization, or consent of Plaintiffs or any owner of copyrighted programming.

- 167. Defendants violated Sections 1201(a)(2) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act willfully, and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.
- 168. Defendants knew that manufacturing, importing (to the United States), offering to the public, providing, and trafficking in Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Signal Theft Devices was and is illegal and prohibited.
- 169. Such violations have caused, and will continue to cause, Plaintiffs irreparable harm, and Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to redress any such continued violations. Unless restrained by this Court, Defendants will continue to violate 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2).

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Facilitating the Unauthorized Reception of Satellite Signals in Violation of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 605(a))

- 170. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate 5AC \P 126-149, as if fully set forth in this cause of action.
- 171. Defendants engaged in and/or assisted other persons in the unauthorized reception of use of EchoStar's satellite transmissions of television programming in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) by directly or indirectly designing, manufacturing, developing, assembling, modifying, importing (to the United States), distributing, selling, providing, or otherwise trafficking in reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards and other Signal Theft Technology and Devices, including Defendants' December 2000 postings.

Defendants NDS Group

172. Defendants NDS Group are directly and/or secondarily liable for the unlawful acts of Defendants NDS Americas, Menard, the "dealers" in the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network and other persons committed in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC ¶¶ 12-27,

38-48, 82-85. 89-97, 101-106 & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein.

Defendants NDS Americas

- 173. Defendants NDS Americas violated 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) by and through its employees Norris and Tarnovsky engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC ¶¶ 16-18, 39-48, 84-97, 118, 119 & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein.
- 174. Defendants NDS Americas is secondarily liable for the unlawful acts of Menard, the "dealers" in the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network and other persons committed in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC at ¶¶ 12-27, 38, 84-97, 101-106 & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein.
- 175. These acts complained of herein occurred in, amongst other places, California, Canada, and Israel.
- 176. Defendants' violations have injured, and will continue to injure, Plaintiffs by depriving Plaintiffs of subscription and pay-per-view revenues and other valuable consideration, compromising Plaintiffs' security and accounting systems, infringing Plaintiffs' trade secrets and proprietary information, and interfering with Plaintiffs' contractual and prospective business relations.
- 177. Defendants' acts of circumvention were performed without the permission, authorization, or consent of Plaintiffs or any owner of copyrighted programming.
- 178. Defendants violated Section 605(a) of the Communications Act willfully, and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.
- 179. Defendants knew that assisting third persons in the reception and use of EchoStar's satellite transmissions of television programming, without authorization, was and is illegal and prohibited.

- 180. Defendants' violations of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) have injured, and will continue to injure, EchoStar's ability to maximize the revenues which it seeks to derive from its satellite television programming as EchoStar has been deprived of the benefit of subscribers to EchoStar's satellite television programming.
- 181. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3), Plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief, damages (either statutory damages of \$1,000 to \$10,000 per violation, or actual damages plus any profits realized by Defendants for each violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a)), and reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiffs seek all other relief to which they may be entitled.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c))

- 182. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate 5AC \P 126-149, as if fully set forth in this cause of action.
- 183. Defendants NDS, NDS Americas, Norris, Hasak, Kommerling, Tarnovsky, Menard, Main, Dawson, Quinn, Sergei, and Frost's unlawful, tortious and otherwise actionable conduct as alleged in Plaintiffs' 5AC constitutes a pattern of "racketeering activity" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
- 184. Plaintiffs' hereby incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein each separate and distinct theory of direct and indirect liability outlined above in Count I of Plaintiffs' 5AC.
- 185. Defendants committed at least the following predicate acts: (i) criminal copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319; (ii) misconduct in connection with access devices in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029; and (iii) mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and §1343. Defendants

Plaintiffs acknowledge that its mail and wire fraud predicates and bases for independent RICO liability were previously denied by the Court's November 5, 2007 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion to Reinstate RICO Claims. Plaintiffs include these claims/allegations in its 5AC, however, for the sole purpose of preserving appellate rights.

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produced, trafficked in, controlled, and possessed device making equipment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(4).

186. Each of these violations by each of the foregoing Defendants of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029, 1341, 1343, and 2319, constitutes an instance of "racketeering" activity" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), and was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy to compromise and make available EchoStar's proprietary information to the general public for an illegal use. Each of the foregoing Defendants aided and abetted the commission of these violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029, 1341, 1343, and 2319.

187. At all times relevant, NDS, Tarnovsky, Menard, and the distribution network, ("distribution network") were associated-in-fact through their continuing efforts from as early as 1998 to present to compromise, and make available to the general public for improper and illegal use, EchoStar's proprietary information including, but not limited to, EchoStar's secret ROM and EEPROM Codes, Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Technology and Devices, and software programs, technical support services, and fixes designed and intended to circumvent Plaintiffs' ECMs that instituted primarily to disable Defendants' illegal devices and/or support services. Such association in fact constitutes and enterprise as defined in 18 U.S.C. §1961(4).

188. Defendant NDS specifically functioned to oversee and coordinate the implementation of specific acts by NDS Group, Tarnovsky, Menard, and the distribution network, made strategic decisions concerning the extraction of Plaintiffs' secret ROM and EEPROM Codes, the design and manufacture of Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices, and facilitated communication between the various Defendants referenced herein. Specifically, Defendant NDS directed the affairs of NDS Group, Tarnovsky, Menard, and the distribution network on an ongoing basis and recruited and attempted to recruit others for the enterprise including, but not limited to, Norm

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Defendant NDS also made decisions about the Dick and John Greyson. information that was to be made available to the general public in addition to manner and timing of the release of Plaintiffs' secret ROM and EEPROM Codes, select portions thereof, and/or specific and detailed instructions on how to extract same, the design and manufacture of Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices. This constitutes an organization separate and apart from the activity in which NDS was engaged.

- 189. Defendant NDS has and had at all times relevant herein an organizational structure or system of authority for making and implementing decisions and for exercising common control over the members of the RICO enterprise.
- 190. The organization and structure of Defendants' RICO enterprise existed as an entity separate and apart from the pattern of conspiratorial racketeering activity. Menard is or was at the top of the distribution and sale structure of the enterprise and controls this enterprise through various business entities. business entities included, among others, DR7, a Canadian business entity operating through the website www.dr7.com. DR7 has or had a legal existence separate and apart from the enterprise and its illegal racketeering activity. However, it is or was operated and utilized as part of the enterprise for the purpose of furthering the racketeering activity. The enterprise also operates through, among others, "Discount Satellite" owned and operated by Dave Dawson, "Koinvizion" owned and operated by Andre Sergei, and the "NewFrontier Group" owned and operated by Stanley Frost. Menard employed various associates who work directly for him, assisting in the day to day operation of the DR7 website and of the enterprise.
- 191. Menard is or was the primary decision-maker of the distribution and sale structure of the enterprise, controlling and directing the affairs of the group on an ongoing basis and recruiting the various individual Defendants and/or their

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27 28 agents. Menard exerted control over the direction of the enterprise by, for example, selling devices that allowed the pirates to operate as "dealers" of Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and/or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices. Those associated with Defendants constituted a distribution network for the Pirated EchoStar Access Cards, other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices, and otherwise pirate technology. They imported, exported, concealed, and sold Pirated EchoStar Access Cards to persons (DISH Network's subscribers and prospective subscribers) throughout the United States and elsewhere. They used pirate technology, including reprogrammers, to manufacture Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and/or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices and repair disabled Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and/or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices upon Plaintiffs' ECMs. These actions were taken in furtherance of the enterprise's goal of harming Plaintiffs and decreasing Plaintiffs' competitiveness in the DBS and CAS marketplaces.

192. NDS is or was the primary decision-maker of the technology structure of the enterprise, controlling and directing the affairs of Tarnovsky on an ongoing basis and recruiting or attempting to recruit others for the enterprise. NDS exerted control over the direction of the enterprise by, for example, employing or attempting to employ individuals to hack or break the Security System, and by determining what technology and information would be made available to harm Plaintiffs. The enterprise is more than the sum of its racketeering activity.

- 193. The distribution side, and the technology side, of the organization and structure discussed herein functioned as a continuing unit and were controlled primarily by the single-decision making apparatus within NDS, which determined when and what hacked software code to release to the public.
- 194. The central decision making apparatus within NDS was able to control Menard and his distribution network by, inter alia, (a) NDS bestowing upon Menard the ability to reprogram EchoStar Access Cards by providing Menard with

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a sophisticated reprogrammer device (coined by Tarnovsky as "the stinger") designed and built by NDS and Tarnovsky using the proprietary information NDS unlawfully obtained from the microprocessor embedded in Plaintiffs' Access Cards at the NDS laboratory in Haifa, Israel; (b) controlling the number of EchoStar Access Cards that Menard was able to unlawfully reprogram, and ultimately distribute to pirating end-users via his distribution network, by instructing and/or assisting Tarnovsky in writing software codes that operated the NDS/Tarnovsky reprogrammer in a controlled manner such that it would automatically become disabled after reprogramming a predetermined number of EchoStar Access Cards; (c) controlling Menard's ability to 'reactivate' the NDS/Tarnovsky reprogrammer - to wit, Tarnovsky would not send software and/or command codes to reactivate the reprogramming device until instructed to do so by NDS; (d) controlling which specific portions of Plaintiffs' proprietary code that Menard could publically post on his www.dr7.com website as well as when such posts could be effectuated; (e) controlling the specific type, generation, or version of EchoStar Access Cards that Menard was able to reprogram and ultimately provide to the pirating end-users via his distribution network; (f) controlling if, when, how and where the unlawfully reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards distributed by Menard and his distribution network would be reactivated and/or repaired after Plaintiffs launched an ECM to disable these cards by deciding whether to provide Menard a "fix", "update," or "counter-ECM," among other technical support, in which to post on his website or whether to have Tarnovsky physically write a new software program to repair disabled Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and/or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices in which case Menard and his distribution network would be required to reacquire these distributed cards and load them back into the NDS/Tarnovsky reprogrammer; (g) controlling the price (and conversely, the supply and demand market) that Menard and his distribution network were able to distribute these Pirated EchoStar Access Cards for; (h) controlling the degree of protection NDS

EchoStar's 5AC

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would provide and when such protection was provided to Menard and the members of his distribution network by, inter alia, running interference with and/or providing information to the Canadian RCMP; and (i) controlling when and how NDS/Tarnovsky would effectuate the wide-spread compromise of Plaintiffs' CAS which ultimately occurred via Tarnovsky's December 21 and 24, 2000 posts on Menard's website, among others.

195. Defendant NDS was also able to exercise and/or retain control over the distribution structure of the RICO enterprise by using various intimidation tactics, threats of civil and criminal proceedings, and monetary compensation. By way of example, NDS through its officer and employee Norris directed Menard to terminate his website (www.dr7.com) during a meeting between Norris and Menard in early 2001. Specifically, after Norris learned that representatives from Plaintiffs had met with Menard in an effort to investigate the acts outlined herein, Norris immediately directed Menard to terminate his website - which was done on June 21, 2001. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Norris directed Menard to terminate his site and discard any and all evidence connecting same to Tarnovsky and/or NDS in a continued effort by NDS to conceal its involvement in same.

- 196. Defendants knowingly produced, trafficked in, controlled, and possessed "device making equipment" - any equipment, mechanism, or impression designed or primarily used for making an access device or counterfeit access device - in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029, by at least the following:
 - On or about April 5, 1999, a post to the Internet by "DR7" [Menard] states that Menard "visited Discount [Discount Satellite/Dawson] this aft, got card reloaded with bootstrap and main.enc file and some other small one that some program made, bat card now fully functioning."
 - On or about April 20, 1999, Dawson and Discount Satellite were (b) raided in Edmonton by the RCMP; local reports regarding Dawson's selling pirated EchoStar access cards and other illegal signal theft devices on his Internet website, www.dsscanada.com. Among the items confiscated were

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- illegal satellite access cards, computers, and other equipment used to program access cards, approximately \$69,500 in U.S. and Canadian money orders and cash, and drugs. Dawson continued to operate his illegal business in Canada through another hacker website owned, operated, and maintained by him www.discountsatellite.com up until June 21, 2003 when it was shut down.
- On or about October 6, 1999, a post to the Internet by "Code" (c) [Tarnovsky], concerning a new circumvention or signal theft device called an AVR, states "if the key servers are working correctly, you will know the new avr key they [DISH Network] are about to switch to in advance!"
- On or about October 6, 1999, a post to the Internet by "JD" [Dawson], concerning inquiry to purchase AVR devices, states "we have available to us now an aftermarket avr device that will activate all channels on the Echostar Dishnetwork system. It runs without the use of the original plastic card and is totally supported via the internet. It is NOT an auto-update product and will stop working in the event of a keychange. HOWEVER, key updates are posted within minutes and available to all. . . . Total cost for board and programmer is currently 150.00 usd. Or 110.00 usd for just the avr board."
- On or about September 8, 2000, a post to the Internet by "DR7" [Menard] stating "I have only honestly patched 3 times in 18 months...where do they get the info they post about E3m [EchoStar hack committed by NDS by and through its employees and agents - Tarnvosky, Menard, and others] being so bad??...I have had one [ECM] since day one when discount [Discount Satellite/Dawson] began selling and have not needed to be updated 15 times...total updates I have had are 3 and since June 1999 that has cost me approximately 5 minutes of my time spent loading."
- On or about November 21, 2000, a post to the Internet by (f) "Koinvizion" [Sergei] announcing that [Defendants] can now fix the "smartcard not inserted correctly Error for \$50.00USD per card + the usual shipping charges for everyone."
- On or about December 29, 2000, a post to the Internet by "hitek" [Sean Quinn], entitled "e3m cards," states "the new group wants to sell the machines now...please e-mail us and we will give you info on the machines as well as where you can order it from...30 machines ready to go."
- 197. Defendants engaged in mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 when Defendants transmitted, by means of United States Postal Service and/or

commercial interstate and foreign carriers, at least the following:

- (a) On or about April 16, 1999, NDS letter was sent from Adams to Hasak concerning, among other things, a piracy investigation of www.dr7.com and "DR7" [Al Menard]. Adams states, "[s]omewhere in the loop appears PINKERTON investigative Service. They at one time worked for Irdeto as well as other companies. There is talk that an agency is investigating DR7[Menard]."
- (b) On or about June 18, 1999, a NDS Letter to Hasak from Adams concerning NDS's hiring satellite pirates and hackers in order to "CONTROL" them as well as NDS's fear of losing its contract with DirecTV to be DirecTV's smart card provider.
- (c) On or about August 2, 2000, "X-Factor, X-Factor Design [Menard's company], sent a package to "CT [Tarnovsky]", through a mail account in San Marcos, Texas 78666 USA. The item enclosed was described as a "Sony Play Station manufactured in Japan" with tracking number "W601 911 651 5." Menard sent the "expedited" with the special instructions "UPS CALL MBE 1ST ON ANY SHIPPER ISSUE." The "Declaration of Contents and Shipper's Letter of Instruction" states that "X-Factor, X-Factor Design" shipped the package and describe the items enclosed as "one (1) Sony Psx Z, manufactured in Japan, valuing \$900.00; one (1) Sony Controller, manufactured in Japan, valuing \$30.00, and three (3) Sony CDs, manufactured in Japan, valuing \$60.00." The remarks section of the declaration reads "Birthday Gift." Tarnovsky's birthday listed on his California driver's license is xxxx xx, xxxxx.
- (d) On or about August 11, 2000, a "Declaration of Contents and Shipper's Letter of Instruction" states that "Hi-Fi Exchange [Menard's company]," sent one package weighing 11 pounds to "CT Electronics [Tarnovsky]" through a mail account in San Marcos, TX 78666. The item enclosed is described as "one (1) Technics Cassette Deck, manufactured in Singapore valued at \$350.00."
- (e) On or about August 15, 2000, a "Declaration of Contents and Shipper's Letter of Instruction" states that "Regency Audio [Menard's company]," sent one package weighing 10 pounds to "CT [Chris Tarnovsky] Electronics" through a mail account in San Marcos, TX. The item enclosed is described as "one (1) Graphic Equalizer, manufactured in the USA, valuing \$300.00."

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- On or about August 23, 2000, a "Declaration of Contents and Shipper's Letter of Instruction" states that "Regency Audio [Menard's company]," sent one package weighing 10 pounds to "Owner, CT [Tarnovsky] Electronics," through a mail account in San Marcos, TX 78666. The item sent is described as "one (1) Sony Minidisk, manufactured in the USA, valuing \$350.00." The shipment was charged a \$62.78 transportation charge.
- On or about August 25, 2000, "Regency, Regency Audio [Menard's company]," sent one package, with a weight of 11 pounds to "CT [Tarnovsky]," through a mail account in San Marcos, Texas 78666. The item is described as a "compact disc player manufactured in the USA." The tracking number on the package was "W619 045 603 0." The package was sent "expedited" with the special instructions "Zone 351."
- On or about August 28, 2000, "Regency, Regency Audio [Menard's (h) sent one package, with an actual weight of 9 pounds to "CT [Tarnovsky] Electronics," through a mail account in San Marcos, Texas 78666. The item was described as a "DVD Player manufactured in the USA." The tracking number on the package was "W619 045 602 1", and the package was sent "expedited."
- On or about August 28, 2000, a package was sent to "Von," (i) [Tarnovsky]" from Washburn Ct, Luling, TX 78648, with FedEx letter to "Chris Tarnovsky" through a mail account in San Marcos, TX 78666. The parcel was sent FedEx Priority Overnight with the tracking number "8153 1564 6118." The sender, "Von," has an account that will be billed to pay for the shipment. The parcel was to be delivered by August 29, 2000.
- On or about August 29, 2000 a package was sent to "Von" (j) [Tarnovsky] " from Mail & More in San Marcos, Texas 78666 with a FedEx Envelope/Letter to "Chris Tarnovsky,XXX XXXX XXXX, XXX XXXX, CA XXXXX." The parcel was sent FedEx Priority Overnight with the tracking number "8213 3536 0680." Tarnovsky, "Von," has an account, number 1700-1825-7 that is billed for the shipment. The FedEx tag is marked "XENIRA."
- On or about August 29, 2000, an investigation by a Detective at the (k) Hays County Narcotics Task Force was conducted in response to an anonymous call from a concerned citizen stating that a suspicious parcel had been mailed from Luling, Texas to XXX XXXX, Texas, and then forwarded to XXX XXXX, California at Tarnovsky's expense. The caller advised "there was no reason for the parcel to be mailed to San Marcos, TX before being mailed to XXX XXXX, CA." The investigation revealed that the return address and phone number on

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- this parcel was invalid. The name for the return address was "Von" [Tarnovsky]. The investigation further revealed that Chris Tarnovsky was living at XXX XXXX XXXX, XXX XXXX, California XXXXX. On July 29, 2000, he rented mailbox number 245 at "Mail and More, 925 E.HWY 80, San Marcos, Hays County, Texas." In doing so, Tarnovsky falsely told the store manager that he was a student at Southwest Texas State University and was returning home to XXX XXXX, CA. However, there was no record of Tarnovsky ever attending Southwest Texas State University or living in the San Marcos, TX area. Tarnovsky instructed the store manager to forward all of his mail as arriving next day including Saturday to XXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, California XXXXX. The store manager had been forwarding parcels to Tarnovsky approximately "every day or every other day."
- On or about August 30, 2000, the store manager notified the (1) investigating detective that he received another parcel to be forwarded to Tarnovsky. The parcel was in a JVC compact disc box with a return address of and addressed to "CT [Tarnovsky] "Regency Audio [Menard's company]," Electronics," in San Marcos, Texas. Canines gave a positive alert at the presence of the odor of marijuana or other illegal drugs after smelling the parcel. A search warrant was then executed and \$20,100.00 in US currency was discovered inside a medium brown envelope taped to the circuitry inside the JVC compact disc player.
- On or about August 31, 2000, the store manager again notified the investigating detective that a parcel had arrived. The parcel was identical to the one received the day before, except the box was from a "Pioneer DVD." Canines again gave a positive alert at the suspected parcel. A second search warrant was executed and \$20,000.00 in US currency was found in a medium sized envelope taped to the circuitry of the DVD player.
- On or about December 1, 2000, a post to the Internet by "Kingtut" (n) stating "I just got my cards from koin [Andre Sergei]."
- On or about January 9, 2002, Norris purchased a "Karl Suss Probe" (o) manufactured by K&S, model 4524, serial number 610009, with a manual, for the amount of \$18,500 for Tarnovsky. On or about January 17, 2002, the item was shipped via Atlas Van Lines to "Chris Tarnovsky at XXXX XXXX XXXXX, XXXXX, California USA XXXXX, phone number xxx-xxxx, fax number xxx-xxx-xxxx." The invoice lists the "End User" to be Chris Tarnovsky at the same address.

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- On or about July 26, 2002, Tarnovsky purchased a manufactured "Karl Suss, model PM-8" for the amount of \$15,000. On or about August 15, 2002, the item was shipped via Federal Express to Chris Tarnovsky at XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXXX, California USA XXXXX, phone number xxx-xxxx, fax number xxx-xxx-xxxx. The invoice lists the "End User" to be Chris Tarnovsky.
- On or about August 30, 2002, Norris purchased a "Karl Suss Probe (2 (g) units), \$1,700" and had them sent to Tarnovsky. One item, manufactured by Karl Suss, was a model Probe for the amount of \$850. The other item was also manufactured by Karl Suss and is a model Probe for the amount of \$850. On August 30, 2002, the items were shipped via Federal Express to "Chris Tarnovsky at XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXXX, California USA XXXXX, phone number xxx-xxx, fax number xxx-xxxx." The invoice lists the "End User" to be Chris Tarnovsky.
- 198. Defendants engaged in wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 when Defendants repeatedly used interstate and international wire facilities, including telephone and Internet communications, by at least the following:
 - On or about November 20, 1998, a post to the Internet by "DR7" (a) [Menard], concerning the EchoStar hack, states: "a file was sent too me recently by Swiss cheese boys [Tarnovsky] and they asked me too add, lins too it are in todays news 11.20.98 and it is also added to the Echostar tools section, sorry I didn't have more info with this text file but I think a few of you could use this info...thanks again too the Users of this forum who have contributed their time to the Echostar Project as well as the SCP [Tarnovsky] for initiating this...good luck guys and hope to have more info shortly."
 - On or about December 4, 1998, a post to the Internet by "Nipper" [Tarnovsky] providing Plaintiffs' Bat keys.
 - On or about December 7-8, 1998, a post to the Internet by "Nipper" supplying illegally obtained information concerning DISH [Tarnovsky] Network.
 - On or about March 26, 1999, a post to the Internet by "DR7" [Menard] (d) states: "the CAM dump is posted in the Tools section... Echostar Running Card Dump + Public Keys by Swiss Cheese Productions [Tarnovsky]"
 - In or around April 1999, Menard telephoned Scullion again to solicit Scullion's participation in a distribution network to sell Pirated EchoStar Access

Cards. During this conversation, Menard informed Scullion that he was close to receiving a full hack of the EchoStar system and that, "due to the pirate community's interest in Swiss Cheese Production's stuff," the plan was a guaranteed money maker. Menard also informed Scullion that the distribution network was going to have something special attached with its operation: protection of NDS. Menard informed Scullion that "NDS was the entity whom had ordered the hack and the distribution of pirated cards through Menard's Menard also informed Scullion that "NDS had an distribution network." arrangement with Tarnovsky to provide the support and facilitation of the hacked EchoStar code to be sent to Menard to be used in the distribution network." Menard also informed Scullion that Scullion had nothing to worry about with respect to being raided by the RCMP due to the fact that "NDS was connected and had a solid relationship [with the RCMP]." Menard further informed Scullion that "NDS would be running interference in the distribution network."

- On or about April 10, 1999, a post to the Internet by "DR7" [Menard] (f) where he inserts a private chat he had with "CanBert" including "went to jd's [Dawson] today; if I send my batt [illegal battery card] in how much to get it fixed??; not sure...never heard the price when I was there...customers pay \$40; you'll have to call; at Discount Sat??; yes 780-448-1787; thankx DR7; np man."
- May 9, 1999, a post to the Internet states that the "Echostar update for (g) the commercial battery cards has been released and is confirmed working again. websitel downloaded from [Dawson's be The file can www.discountsatellite.com/Efile.zip."
- On or about May 19, 1999, a post to the Internet by "DR7" [Menard] (h) states that he asked JD [Dawson] why the bat [battery card] isn't autorolling [automatically finding keys to counter ECMS]. JD [Dawson] stated the reason was the requirement to hand out a bootstrap and that the potential source code would have to be released.
- In April 1999, Menard telephoned Reginald Scullion with an offer to (i) participate in the "DISH Network" hack. During these conversations, Menard informed Scullion that, among other things: (a) NDS was behind the EchoStar hack; (b) the Tarnovsky/Menard distribution model would be protected and controlled by NDS; (c) NDS had an arrangement with Tarnovsky to provide the technical and software support and facilitate the hacked EchoStar ROM Code to be sent to Menard and used in the distribution network; and (d) NDS would protect this distribution network from potential RCMP raids.

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- (j) On or about July 6, 1999, a post to the Internet by "DR7" [Menard] states that "marry3M is used for JD's [Dawson's] 3M customers to do the following: Write IRD# Write Key# Read Key# from card with sub/previous sub Set zipcode/timezone."
- (k) On or about August 10, 1999, a post to the Internet by "Nipper" [Tarnovsky] providing EchoStar Bat keys.
- (l) On or about August 21, 1999, a post to the Internet by "DR7" [Menard] states that Menard called "JD" [Dawson] to confirm status of file and JD [Dawson] stated that he would "post REV20A.E3M on his website."
- (m) On or about September 8, 1999, a post to the Internet by "xbr21" [Tarnovsky], quoting "Nipper's" [Tarnovsky's] previous post, stating "here is a neat no-mod trick- send out a control work packet using a key offset of 07 (eg 05/15/07). Card should skip decrpt of packet and simply encrypt with your boxkey!! Simple and why not use this on channel 101? Another example of stupidity."
- (n) On or about September 29, 1999, a post to the Internet by "DR7" [Menard] states that he talked to "JD" [Dawson] on the phone about 20 minutes ago and JD [Dawson] said that he would also just "sell the programmed [DISH Network] chip" if there was a demand for it. A later post to the Internet, on the same date, by "DR7" [Menard] stating that he "confirmed with JD [Dawson] that the keys in the latest talk.cfg file are not for AVR freeware and will only work on JD's [Dawson's] AVR."
- (o) On or about October 19, 1999, a post to the Internet by "DR7" [Menard] announced that "'xfile 2.01' and 'Blocker version 2.3 Beta' were posted to the Echo files section of the DR7 website." "DR7" [Menard] further states "sorry they were not posted earlier but the creators [Defendants/Tarnovsky] never bothered to send them so basically I couldn't post what I didn't have, thanks to those that did send them."
- (p) In November 1999, Menard again telephoned Reginald Scullion with an offer to participate in the "DISH Network" hack. During these conversations, Menard informed Scullion that, among other things: (a) NDS was behind the EchoStar hack; (b) the Tarnovsky/Menard distribution model would be protected and controlled by NDS; (c) NDS had an arrangement with Tarnovsky to provide the technical and software support and facilitate the hacked EchoStar ROM Code to be sent to Menard and used in the distribution network; and (d) NDS would protect this distribution network from potential RCMP raids.

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- On or about November 9, 1999, a post to the Internet by "DR7" (q) [Menard], regarding "JD's [Dawson's] gone???," states "since Friday I have not been able at all to call your shop and get through, I tried over 20 times per day at least just to test. JD [Dawson] this is getting outta hand and now its come to the point where I am looking bad for advertising for you and also for being in same city, I think you owe these people an explanation as well as an apology and shouldn't expect me to have to deal with any of this... I an now removing Discount Satellite advertising banners from this website JD [Dawson] because I cannot and will not give you [Dawson] any more benefits that other advertisers and make myself look bad in the process.
- On or about November 19, 1999, a post to the Internet by "DR7" (r) [Menard] provides instructions to remedy problem of member who received an AVR2 [smart card replacement] and programmer [device used to program Access Cards or illegal substitute cards] and was unable to load properly. "DR7's" [Menard's] instructions include, "using DOS talk v1.7 and loading the avr2e3m [EchoStar] file which allows AVR2 to use the 3M keys from wintalk."
- On or about December 8, 1999, a post to the Internet by "Shrimp" (s) [Tarnovsky] states "the sole purpose of the Atmel chip in the wildthing is a slave who can count clock cycles and perform a high glitch on vcc/clk given a command from the PC. All that is required to fix the current situation is a new .exe file given different glitches to the card."
- On or about December 17, 1999, a post to the Internet by "Nipper-(t) Clauz" [Tarnovsky], entitled "Twas the Night Before Christmas," provided EchoStar Bat keys.
- On or about December 20, 1999, a post to the Internet by "Nipper-Clauz" [Tarnovsky] entitled "tis the season to be jolly," provided additional EchoStar Bat keys.
- On or about December 21, 1999, a post to the Internet by "Nipper-Clauz" [Tarnovsky] entitled "be merry harry," provided even more EchoStar Bat keys.
- On or about February 2, 2000, Dawson and Discount Satellite were (w) regarding local reports time by the RCMP after raided a second Dawson's continued selling of pirated DSS and EchoStar access cards and other website, theft devices Internet through his illegal signal the on www.discountsatellite.com.

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- On or about February 25, 2000, a post by "NiPpEr" [Tarnovsky] to the internet providing EchoStar Bat keys.
- On or about March 29, 2000, DirecTV executed and seized Dawson's business in satisfaction of the judgment obtained by DirecTV against Dawson. Shortly thereafter, Dawson posted a public statement on his website, www.discountsatellite.com, regarding the status of his business's operations. Included in this statement, Dawson provided a link to www.DSScanada.com, another website owned, operated, and maintained by Dawson. Through this website, Dawson continued to solicit business from his large customer base in addition to new customers.
- On or about May 5, 2000, an NDS Memorandum captioned "Report (aa) Week 18", concerning NDS agent Christopher Tarnvosky, states in relevant part: "You will note that suspicion has fallen on MIKE [Tarnovsky]...There are a series of threatening statements inasmuch that MIKE [Tarnovsky] is behind DR7 [Allen Menard and the website www.dr7.com] and therefore MIKE [Tarnovsky] hacked ECHOSTAR etc, etc."
- On or about June 21, 2000, a post to the Internet by "Hitec" [Quinn], concerning "Koin" [Sergei], states "[f]or the time being... I am removing all dealer links from the site... Koin is closing the website but still accepting orders at Koin@koinvision.com . . . now its cash (no money orders at all) and no site.... Any other files that are required to help out the Koinster will be posted here from now on."
- On or about June 27, 2000, a post to the Internet by "Hitec" [Quinn], (ac) concerning business operations of Koin [Sergei], stating "Koin [Sergei] is closing the website but still accepting orders at Koin@Koinvision.com . . . My self I personally vouch for Koin and his support. Even with his one complaint the guy has to admit that Koin did send his package originally (although it was seized) and he did make up for it after a couple of weeks . . . Any other files that are required to help out the Koinster will be posted here [www.hitecsat.com] from now on." A later post on the same date by "Hitec" [Quinn] stating "as I already said . . . no money order now and only email . . . I will post any files again [Sergei]. email addv out Koin His needed to help Koin@koinvizion.com."
- On or about August 15, 2000, a post by "HeeD" states "the group that (ad) is supporting DN E3M [the illegal DISH Network hack] has proven that they know this system inside-and-out. They are not just taking stabs in the dark, or speculating about things...they actually know!"

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- On or about September 19, 2000, it was discovered that Tarnovsky (ae) placed approximately 80 phone calls to Israel [NDS] and 120 to Belgium. Tarnovsky also traveled overseas twice every six months going to Brussels and other European countries. Tarnovsky had received two parcels at his residence from Minnesota and Virginia [Tarnovsky Sr.].
- On or about November 21, 2000, a post to the Internet by (af) "Koinvizion" [Sergei] announcing that [Defendants] can now fix the "smartcard not inserted correctly Error for \$50.00USD per card + the usual shipping charges for everyone."
- On or about December 21, 2000, Tarnovsky, using the alias "nIpPeR (ag) cLaUz 00", published a file entitled "nipperclauz.txt" on Menard's website which consisted of a hack methodology for defeating EchoStar's security system. In his post Tarnovsky states: "there will be no boxes anymore! There will be no more fights amoungst us. Learn from this and prosper. Works across the world! Do the following: get atr, wait 500ms to ensure card is idle. Send this packet to 288-02 or equivalent ROM 3 nagra cam! Rx 4+4096 bytes and you have entire eeprom. Send this, then rx 4 bytes + 4096 bytes of eeprom." The post was signed by "nIpPeR cLaUz 00" [Tarnovsky]. This December 21, 2000 post by Tarnovsky provided hackers around the world the 'road map' and instructional code to effectuate a complete dump of Plaintiffs' entire EEPROM Code and exploit vulnerabilities in Plaintiffs' CAS which could be leveraged to attack and hack EchoStar's security system.
- On December 24, 2000, a post to the Internet by "NiPpEr2000" [Tarnovsky] at 3:26 a.m. publishing the FULL Echo ROM Code on www.piratesden.com, Discussion Forum. "NiPpEr2000" [Tarnovsky's] post, entitled "tHe ReAl V3 DuMp!," stating "tHeRe WiLl bE nO bOxEs aNyMoRe! tHeRe WiLl bE nO mOrE flgHtInG aMoNgSt uS. LeArN fRoM ThIs aNd pRosPer. tHiS WiLl Be PoStEd To AlL NeWsGrOuPs ArOuNd ThE WoRlD! ThIs Is Dr7'S cOdE (WeSt 3M v3) tHe rEaL sTuFf!!" Tarnovsky then goes on to state: "I wIIL dUmP AlL vErSiOnS oF tHe WeSt CoDe LoOk FoR iT hErE! nIpPeR cLaUz 00" [Tarnovsky].
- On or about May 18, 2001, a post to the Internet by "Kelly" [Menard] (ai) stating "we all do know "Hitec" [Quinn] and "Koin" [Sergei] were partners selling echostar stuff...I bought my avr and echostar 3m from you [Quinn] and that bitch koin [Sergei].

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- On or about May 18, 2001, a post to the Internet by "Hitec" [Quinn], (aj) responding to "Kelly's" [Menard's] allegations, stating "if I was involved in the Echostar hack I would have forced the price down to an affordable rate instead of lying to dealers and constantly gouging them. If memory serves me correctly I even advertised for the competition that did force the price down considerably."
- On or about December 16, 2001, Tarnovsky admits to Giles Kaehlin, (ak) Head of Security for Canal+, at a meeting in London that NDS was responsible for the hack and publication of the DISH Network ROM Code on the internet. Tarnovsky admits that the DISH Network code was sent to him by Reuven Hasak, head of security for NDS in Israel, from John Norris, head of security for NDS Americas. Tarnovsky later sent an email stating that he wanted no further communications to occur between himself and Kaehlin.
- Defendants willfully infringed on EchoStar's copyrighted 199. information for purposes of commercial advantage, in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506 and 18 U.S.C. § 2319.
- specifically used their positions at Alternatively, Defendants 200. NDS to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of NDS's affairs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029, 1341, 1343, and 2319 by, among other unlawful acts, engaging in the conduct specifically set forth above.
- The multiple acts of racketeering activity as set forth above by 201. Defendants and their employees, agents, sub-agents and/or co-conspirators were interrelated, part of a common and continuous pattern of fraudulent schemes, and perpetrated for the same or similar purposes, thus constituting a "pattern of racketeering activity," as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
- By reason of these circumstances and events, Defendants 202. agreed to and/or did conduct and participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
- Defendants' violations have injured and will continue to injure 203. EchoStar by depriving them of subscription and pay-per-view revenues and other

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valuable consideration, compromising EchoStar's security and accounting systems, infringing on EchoStar's trade secrets and proprietary information, interfering with EchoStar's contractual and prospective business relations, and damaging Plaintiffs' reputation in the DBS and CAS marketplaces resulting in, among other injuries, irreparable harm to the commercial goodwill that Plaintiffs have established in the relevant industries.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Unfair Competition, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200)

204. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate FAC \P 152-180 above, as if fully set forth in this cause of action.

Defendant NDS Americas

205. Defendant NDS Americas engaged in unlawful or unfair business acts or practices by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC ¶¶ 12-27, 38-48, 82-85, 89-97, 101-106, 118, 119, 182-203 & incorporated citations).

Defendant NDS Group

206. Defendant NDS Group engaged in unlawful or unfair business acts or practices by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC ¶¶ 12-27, 38-48, 82-85. 89-97, 101-106, 118, 119, 183-204 & incorporated citations).

Defendants' violations of this statutory provision caused injury to Plaintiffs in the district, the State of California, the United States, and elsewhere.

208. NDS Americas and its employees/agents Tarnovsky and Menard willfully, unlawfully, and according to a plan, with the intention of harming Plaintiffs, acquired EchoStar Access Cards.

Defendants' invasive attack of EchoSar's Access Cards, dissemination of the information about the Security System and assistance to Menard and his network of distributors was intentional and done for the wrongful purpose of inhibiting competition in the industry and unfairly benefiting Defendants. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violations of Section

17200, Defendants have been unjustly enriched at Plaintiffs' expense. Defendants' and/or their agents have taken money from Plaintiffs in the form of lost business opportunity from subscription sales to persons that, instead, used pirated Access Cards to receive DISH Network programming without paying the subscription price. Plaintiffs therefore have an ownership in the unjust profits received by Defendants and/or their agents. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover restitution of any and all of Plaintiffs' property including, but not limited to, EchoStar Access Cards, Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and/or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices, unlawfully obtained or possessed by Defendants and/or their agents. Plaintiffs are also entitled to restitution on behalf of their customers who were mislead and defrauded by Defendants' actions. Plaintiffs are also allowed to recover monetary damages to be paid from Defendant to Plaintiff to the extent that Defendants have directly taken money or property from Plaintiffs. Defendants violated this statutory provisions within the State 210. of California.

As a direct and proximate result of each of the foregoing 211. Defendants' violations of Section 17200, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm, including but not limited to harm to their business reputations, and goodwill. Therefore, Plaintiffs' remedy at law is inadequate and Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction prohibiting Defendants from taking any steps to contribute to the copying of any of Plaintiffs' software code or any steps to reverse engineer, hack, or otherwise violate any technological measure on any EchoStar Access Card or any other aspect of Plaintiffs' CAS, as well as other remedies to which Plaintiffs may prove themselves entitled at trial.

> SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Violation of California Penal Code § 593d(a))

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- 212. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate 5AC ¶¶ 126-149, as if fully set forth in this cause of action.
- 213. Defendants violated California Penal Code § 593d(a) by knowingly and willfully: (1) making or maintaining unauthorized connections to EchoStar's DBS system or Plaintiffs' Security System, or any components thereof; (2) purchasing, possessing, attaching, causing to be attached, assisting others in attaching, or maintaining the attachment of unlawfully reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards or other Signal Theft Devices to EchoStar's DBS system or Plaintiffs' Security System; (3) making or maintaining any modification or alteration to EchoStar Access Cards without authorization from EchoStar; or (4) obtaining and using unlawfully reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards or other Signal Theft Device to obtain EchoStar Programming without authorization:

Defendant NDS Group

214. Defendant NDS Group are secondarily liable for the unlawful acts of Defendant NDS Americas and its employees (Norris and Tarnovsky), Menard, the "dealers" in the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network and other persons committed in violation of Cal. Penal Code 593d(a)(1)-(4) by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC ¶¶ 12-27, 38-48, 82-85. 89-97, 101-106 & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein.

Defendant NDS Americas

- 215. Defendant NDS Americas violated Cal. Penal Code 593d(a) by and through its employees Norris and Tarnovsky engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC ¶¶ 16-18, 39-48, 84-97, 118, 119 & incorporated citations).
- 216. Defendant NDS Americas is also secondarily liable for the unlawful acts of Menard, the "dealers" in the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network and other persons committed in violation of Cal. Penal Code 593d(a) by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC at ¶¶ 12-27, 38, 84-97, 101-106 & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein.

- 217. EchoStar is a "multichannel video or information provider" within the meaning of California Penal Code § 593d(i).
 - 218. Defendants' acts constituting violations of California Penal Code §§ 593d(a)(1)-(4) have been and continue to be performed without the permission, authorization, or consent of Plaintiffs.
 - 219. Defendants' violations have injured, and will continue to injure, Plaintiffs by depriving Plaintiffs of subscription and pay-per-view revenues and other valuable consideration, compromising Plaintiffs' security and accounting systems, infringing Plaintiffs' trade secrets and proprietary information, and interfering with Plaintiffs' contractual and prospective business relations.
 - 220. Defendants' violations of California Penal Code §§ 593d(a)(1)-(4) were done knowingly and willfully, and for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain. EchoStar is entitled to recover, under California Penal Code § 593d(f), the greater of three times its actual damages, or statutory damages of \$5,000 for each violation of California Penal Code §§ 593d(a)(1)-(4). Plaintiffs are also entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees. California Penal Code § 593d(f)(2).

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Violation of California Penal Code § 593e(b))

- 221. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate 5AC ¶¶ 126-149 as if fully set forth in this cause of action.
- 222. Defendants violated California Penal Code § 593e(b) by knowingly and willfully providing a device, plan, or kit for a device (including but not limited to unlawfully reprogrammed EchoStar Access Cards and a methodology for hacking EchoStar's Security System) designed in whole or in part to descramble or intercept or otherwise make intelligible EchoStar's satellite television programming transmission signal without the express authorization of EchoStar:

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Defendant NDS Group

Defendant NDS Group is secondarily liable for the unlawful acts 223. committed by Defendants NDS Americas and its employees Norris, Tarnovsky, Menard and the "dealers" in the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network and other persons in violation of California Penal Code § 593e(b) by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC ¶¶ 12-27, 38-48, 82-85. 89-97, 101-106 & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein.

Defendant NDS Americas

- Defendant NDS Americas violated California Penal Code § 224. 593e(b) by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC ¶¶ 16-18, 39-48, 84-97, 118, 119 & incorporated citations).
- Defendant NDS Americas is secondarily liable for the unlawful 225. acts and/or omissions of Menard, the "dealers" in the NDS/Tarnovsky/Menard distribution network and other persons committed in violation of California Penal Code §593e(b) by engaging in the conduct stated in (5AC at ¶¶ 12-27, 38, 84-97, 101-106 & incorporated citations) under the theories advanced therein.
- EchoStar is a "subscription television system" within the 226. meaning of California Penal Code § 593h(1).
- EchoStar's satellite transmission of television programming is 227. an "encoded, scrambled, or other nonstandard signal" within the meaning of California Penal Code § 593e(g).
- Defendants' acts constituting violations of California Penal 228. Code § 593e(b) have been, and continue to be, performed without the permission, authorization, or consent of Plaintiffs.
- Defendants' violations have injured, and will continue to injure, 229. Plaintiffs by depriving Plaintiffs of subscription and pay-per-view revenues and other valuable consideration, compromising Plaintiffs' security and accounting systems, infringing Plaintiffs' trade secrets and proprietary information, and

interfering with Plaintiffs' contractual and prospective business relations.

- 230. Defendants' violations of California Penal Code § 593e(b) were committed knowingly and willfully, and for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.
- 231. Due to Defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiffs are entitled to either: (i) statutory damages in an aggregate amount of not less than \$500 or more than \$10,000 for each unlawful device; or (ii) three times the amount of actual damages sustained by Plaintiffs as a result of Defendants' violations of California Penal Code § 593e(b) in addition to any revenues which have been obtained by Defendants as a result of Defendants' violations thereof, or (iii) an amount equal to three times the value of the services unlawfully obtained by Defendants, or the sum of \$500 for each unauthorized signal theft device manufactured, sold, used, or distributed. Cal. Penal Code § 593e(c)(2)).
- Because Defendants' violations of California Penal Code § 593e(c) were committed knowingly and willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, the Court may increase the award of damages, whether actual or statutory, by an amount of not more than \$50,000. Because of Defendants' violations of California Penal Code § 593e(c) were committed knowingly, willfully, and wantonly, punitive damages are appropriate under California Penal Code § 593e(c)(2). Plaintiffs are also entitled, under California Penal Code § 593e(d), to its full costs plus an award of reasonable attorney's fees.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs seek a judgment against Defendants as follows:

A. Find that Defendants' conduct in designing, developing, manufacturing, assembling, modifying, importing (to the United States), exporting, distributing, selling, advertising for sale, trafficking in, and providing software, information, and technical support services related to Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other

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- Circumvention or Signal Theft Technology and Devices intended to facilitate the illegal and unauthorized reception and use of EchoStar's satellite television programming services by persons not authorized to receive such programming violates 47 U.S.C. §§ 605(a), 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(A) and § 1201(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), California Business and Professions Code § 17200, California Penal Code § 593d(a)(2) and § 593e(b);
- Find further that Defendants' violations were willful, for a tortious or illegal В. purpose, or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain;
- In accordance with 47 U.S.C. § 605(a), 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1), 18 U.S.C. § C. 1964(a), California Business and Professions Code § 17206, and California state law, enjoin and restrain Defendants and persons or entities controlled directly or indirectly by Defendants from: (a) designing, manufacturing, assembling, modifying, importing (to the United States), trafficking, possessing, distributing, or selling Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices; (b) assisting, procuring, or aiding and abetting any persons in the unauthorized reception and use of EchoStar's satellite television Programming; (c) advertising for sale Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Technology and Devices; or (d) providing software, information, or technical support services relating to (1) Pirated EchoStar Access Cards, (2) other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices, or (3) the illegal and unauthorized reception and use of EchoStar's satellite television Programming by persons not authorized to receive such programming;
- In accordance with 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(i), and California Business & D. Professions Code § 17206, grant an Order directing Defendants to return to Plaintiffs all trade secrets, proprietary information, Pirated EchoStar Access Cards, other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices, and any other hardware or software

- E. In accordance with 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(i), 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(1), and California Business & Professions Code § 17206, grant an Order impounding all Pirated EchoStar Access Cards and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices in the possession, custody, or control of Defendants, or related entities of Defendants, that the Court has reasonable cause to believe were involved in a violation of any causes of action alleged herein;
- F. Grant an Order requiring Defendants to post a prominent public notice on any Internet website owned, operated, or maintained by Defendants notifying all persons in possession of Pirated EchoStar Access Cards or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices that said Access Cards and devices have been recalled and must be returned to Plaintiffs;
- G. Grant an Order requiring Defendants to identify all John Does working in concert with Defendants in performing the unlawful acts described herein, and to use all contact information in Defendants' possession, custody, or control to notify anyone who has obtained a Pirated EchoStar Access Cards or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices from Defendants that said Access Cards and devices have been recalled and must be returned to Plaintiffs;
- H. Grant an Order directing Defendants to preserve and maintain all records, in any form (including electronic form), that evidences, refers to, or relates to: (a) EchoStar Access Cards; (b) Plaintiffs' encryption technology; (c) Pirated EchoStar Access Cards; (d) other Circumvention or Signal Theft Technology and Devices; (e) communications or correspondence with manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, or customers of Pirated EchoStar Access Cards or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices, or access card programming services; (f) the identity of any manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, or customers of Pirated EchoStar Access Cards or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices; and (g) the quantity of

Pirated EchoStar Access Cards, including EchoStar Access Cards that have not yet been altered, pirated, modified, compromised, and/or counterfeited, and other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices in inventory and sold by Defendants;

- I. Grant an Order permitting Plaintiffs, through its counsel, to inspect and make mirror image copies of any computer or electronic storage drives or back-up tapes in the possession, custody, or control of Defendants or related entities that contain information that evidences, refers to, or relates to Defendants' conduct of designing, developing, manufacturing, assembling, modifying, importing (to the United States), exporting, trafficking, distributing, and selling Pirated EchoStar Access Cards or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Technology and Devices, or providing software, information, or technical support services relating to Pirated EchoStar Access Cards or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Technology and Devices designed to facilitate the illegal and unauthorized reception and use of EchoStar's satellite television Programming services by persons not authorized to receive such programming;
- J. Grant an Order requiring Defendants to file with the Court and to serve on counsel for Plaintiffs, within 30 days from entry of the injunction, a report in writing under oath setting forth in specific detail the manner and form in which each respective Defendant has complied with the injunctions and orders described in paragraphs A through I above;
- K. In accordance with 47 U.S.C. §§ 605(e)(3)(C)(i) and (ii), award Plaintiffs the greater of (a) its actual damages together with any profits made by Defendants that are attributable to the violation alleged herein, or (b) statutory damages in the amount of up to \$110,000 for each violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a);
- L. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), award Plaintiffs treble the amount of actual damages suffered by Plaintiffs in their business or property by reason of Defendants' violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(c);

- M. In accordance with California Penal Code § 593d, award Plaintiffs the greater of (a) three times the amount of actual damages suffered by Plaintiffs in their business or property by reason of Defendants' violations of California Penal Code § 593d(2), or (b) statutory damages in the amount of up to \$5,000 for each violation of California Penal Code § 593d.
- N. In accordance with California Penal Code § 593e, award Plaintiffs the greater of: (a) three times the amount of actual damages suffered by Plaintiffs in their business of property by reason of Defendants' violations of California Penal Code § 593e(b), or (b) statutory damages in the amount of up to \$10,000 for each violation of California Penal Code § 593e. In addition, award Plaintiffs \$50,000 for each knowing and willful violation of § 593e committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, plus punitive damages.
- O. In accordance with California state law, Order an accounting, establish a constructive trust in favor of Plaintiffs, and direct Defendants to make restitution as a result of: (a) designing, manufacturing, assembling, modifying, importing (to the United States), trafficking, possessing, distributing, or selling Pirated EchoStar Access Cards or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Technology and Devices; (b) providing software, information, or technical support services relating to: (1) altering, pirating, modifying, compromising, and/or counterfeiting EchoStar Access Cards; (2) Pirated EchoStar Access Cards; (3) other Circumvention or Signal Theft Technology or Devices; or (4) the illegal and unauthorized reception and use of EchoStar's satellite television Programming services by persons not authorized to receive such programming; (c) assisting, procuring, or aiding and abetting third persons in the unauthorized reception and use of EchoStar's satellite television Programming services; or (d) advertising the sale of Pirated EchoStar Access Cards or other Circumvention or Signal Theft Devices;
- P. In accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(4)-(5), 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), California Penal Code § 593d(f), and California Penal Code §

593e(d) direct Defendants to pay Plaintiffs all of Plaintiffs' costs, reasonable attorneys' fees, and investigative fees;

- Q. For pre-judgment interest on all damages, where allowable by law;
- R. For post-judgment interest on all damages, where allowable by law; and
- S. For such additional relief as the Court deems to be just and equitable.

PLAINTIFFS' DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs hereby assert their rights under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and demand, in accordance with FRCP 38, a trial by jury on all issues excepting equitable/injunctive relief specifically sought above.

DATED: January 31, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

T. WADE WELCH & ASSOCIATES

By: Chad M. Hagan (pro hac vice) 2401 Fountainview, Suite 700

Houston, Texas 77057

Telephone: (713) 952-4334 Facsimile: (713) 952-4994

Attorneys for Plaintiffs EchoStar Satellite LLC, et al

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Additional Counsel: DLA PIPER US LLP Cynthia A. Ricketts (pro hac vice) David A. Grenardo (State Bar No. 223142) 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Fourth Floor Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: (310) 595-3000 Facsimile: (310) 595-3300

EchoStar's 5AC